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The purpose of the following analysis is to highlight rhetorical patterns common 
during wartime across multiple decades and forms of mass media communication, and to 
demonstrate how the technologies of media intersect with rhetorical patterns in the 
creation of collectives and countercollectives. 
By drawing on and extending the theories of Kenneth Burke and Marshall 
McLuhan, I pinpoint the similarities and differences in persuasive strategies across 
shifting electronic mass media, noting how rhetorical appeals remain consistent though 
the forms they take and the modes in which they are delivered by rhetors changes with 
historical context and technological affordances. Historical accounts and primary sources 
provide the basis for such rhetorical analysis. 
While the technology may change and become increasingly sophisticated in its 
affordances and accessibility, the rhetorical patterns of collectives and countercollectives 
remain similar, as strategic appeals to logos, pathos, and ethos are relied upon similarly 
by both pro- and antiwar collectives. The rhetorical analyses of the collectives and 
countercollectives across the four wars under investigation suggests useful strategies for 
rhetors of both present-day and future mass media communications. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: CONSUBSTANTIAL COLLECTIVISM 
 
 
Rhetoric is an instrument of continuity and change, of tradition and of revolution. 
Richard McKeon, ​Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery​ 2 
 
 
Every new technology necessitates a war. 
Marshall McLuhan, ​War and Peace in the Global Village ​98 
 
 
Iconic images of modern warfare have seared the minds of Americans, shaping 
what citizens know about humanity’s ability—and sometimes, penchant—for violent 
battle and ​en masse​ killing in the name of political advantage. Consider such examples as 
President Roosevelt’s December 8, 1941, radio speech that initiated American 
intervention in World War II; Morley Safer’s 1965 video footage of US marines setting 
fire to the huts of defenseless Vietnamese villagers; Saddam Hussein’s mingling with his 
“guests” who were being held hostage in 1990 during the Gulf War, and then, years later, 
his infamous Firdos Square statue being demolished on live television during the Iraq 
War in 2003. These captured historic moments serve as haunting reminders of a recent 
past filled with horror, heartache, and destruction resulting from political upheaval that, 
while undertaken in lands several thousands of miles from most American citizens, was 
directly shaped by those whom Americans voted into office. Often, these horrific 
moments and others like them, grew from days, weeks, and months of international 
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tension, political negotiation, and escalating events about which American citizens had 
much opportunity to learn and react. 
React they did—some in peaceful support and others in contentious protest. The 
decision-making process as to whether to support or protest the nation’s war acts—and 
how citizens arrive at their decisions—fills the following pages. Insofar as one’s response 
to war takes shape through a process of negotiating intertwined ideological, social, 
economic, and various other mitigating factors, the decision-making process to support or 
protest any war is inherently a rhetorical one, influenced by multiple rhetorical actors 
creating and responding to often-unforeseen rhetorical exigencies that can evolve over 
decades, or within just minutes. Within this context of international political tension, the 
rhetors are often government heads, delivering what they hope are persuasive messages 
to the citizenry audience. The messages such rhetors deliver intersect with citizens’ 
personal stances as shaped and influenced by an array of previous beliefs and 
experiences, all of which the rhetors must consider as they invent, arrange, stylize, 
memorize, and deliver their persuasive messages. Such a complex collision of current 
events, personal history, and national backdrop renders the process of convincing a 
nation’s people to support the war effort a delicate game of psychologically strategic 
persuasion, becoming civilian participants in what Kenneth Burke calls “the ultimate 
disease or perversion of cooperation” (​Rhetoric​ 22). In other words, war is an inherently 
rhetorical situation for those initiating it, for those participating in it, and for those 
supporting or protesting it. 
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Deciding to support one’s country as it embarks in battle is often touted as the 
patriotic response to a grave situation. Labeling such support as patriotic is even more 
exaggerated when the war at hand is a hot one, a war that necessitates human combat, or 
a “boots on the ground” approach, as opposed to a cold war, in which economic policy 
and political sanctions take precedence as modes of accomplishing some larger goal. 
Even the fragment of society who did not vote for the acting presidential administration 
and congressional majority party likely feels more inclined to support their own country 
during wartime than the opposing country. The assumption of such support is common 
sense when war seems inevitable. Hot wars have a way of persuading even the originally 
unenthusiastic citizens to support a presidential administration they may have not 
otherwise, particularly if a clear case for national self-defense exists and citizens feel 
their safety or rights are compromised by a foreign enemy. However, there are those, too, 
who, regardless of their opinion for the acting presidential administration or 
congressional majority party, protest their country’s involvement in war. Individuals 
make such a decision for various reasons, but similar decisions by others result in a 
collective refusal to support the officially sanctioned national agenda, though such a 
stance does not necessarily equate to support for the opposing nation(s). In such 
moments, citizens are at odds with their own government, and typically at odds with most 
of their fellow citizens. To hold an often unpopular opinion during wartime suggests that 
some sort of convincing reasoning must lie behind the citizens’ protesting; in fact, such 
unpopular opinions are the result of rhetorical persuasion in many ways similar to the 
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rhetoric that convinces other citizens to support a war. Achieving polar opposite results 
via the same rhetorical strategies and stylings is further complicated by the creation, 
delivery, and propagation of war-centered rhetoric, as those means and modes shift 
constantly. The way that the technology both pro- and antiwar rhetors use impacts their 
message and its public reception appears to reveal an emerging pattern of increased 
democratic agency for the everyday citizen. 
Whether supporting or protesting a given war, citizens exercise rhetorical agency 
as both consumers and producers of persuasive messages. In (dis)agreeing with the 
country’s official rhetors’ national agenda, citizens first listen to those messages sent 
from government heads which establish and then maintain an “us-versus-them” mentality 
by arguing why citizens should take the enemy's threats seriously. Deciding to either 
accept or reject the government’ claims, citizens become a powerful audience with the 
ability to resist the message, and to thus pressure the government into reconsidering the 
national agenda during (potential) wartime. The process of interpreting the official 
national message from a recognized government head, such as the president or military 
personnel, is an inherently rhetorical process, as the listeners must first receive, then 
interpret, and finally act on, the messages they hear. This requires recognition of the 
exigency of war itself, and, in some instances, agreement as to the identity of the enemy. 
Finally, citizens must then agree as to the best course of action—or at least agree to 
accept the government’s decision as to what it is. If citizens deviate from the official 
agenda at any point during this process of exigency recognition-enemy 
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identification-response, they can opt to pursue alternate paths to responding to the 
original exigency. Deviating from the government’s agenda provides opportunity for 
resistance ​en masse​. Such resistance requires that the protesting collective recognize 
some exigency related to the official account, then identify the common “enemy,”  then 1
formulate an alternative set of responses to address the redefined exigency at hand. In 
order to survive as a collective of resistors, this opposing group of citizens must not only 
persuade the like-minded to vocalize their dissent, but it must also work to persuade those 
supporting the war effort to renegotiate their own stance and adopt another. Moreover, 
the resistors must establish whether they identify the enemy as another nation, their own 
government, or the proposed action of their own government, or any combination thereof. 
Because resisting collectives are often the minority of American citizenry, they 
have historically tended to gain only negative press coverage, encouraging an unwanted, 
even deviant label for those who choose to exercise their constitutional rights and voice a 
dissenting and unpopular opinion. Supporting one’s nation during wartime is typically 
regarded as patriotic; dissenting is typically regarded as ​un​patriotic. One need to only 
think for a brief moment about the commentary during the Vietnam War to imagine just 
how unpopular a war needs to be before protesting it becomes more accepted than 
supporting it. Such moments in the United States have been rare, but protesting, despite 
its often negative connotations, has in some instances proven ever so slightly popular. 
1 Because the protesting collective resists the call to hot war, they may identify the enemy as some entity or 
ideological system other than that which the official agenda identifies. Thus, the “enemy” in many 
instances becomes the war itself as opposed to another nation or its leader. 
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If protesting a war (and, in essence, one’s own government officials or their 
suggested national plan of action) is usually an unpopular opinion, why have so many 
chosen to participate in protest movements throughout American history? A citizen’s 
wartime stance is often influenced by competing social narratives as to the motivations, 
causes, and anticipated results of any given war campaign. While it is understood that 
citizens initially approach their understanding of American conflict with other nations 
from a background characterized by their own political leanings, there is still much room 
for persuasion to operate. From a rhetorical perspective, the shift toward support or 
protest proves a fruitful ground for inquiry. How is it that citizens—especially those with 
well-established political beliefs and value systems—can be persuaded to modify their 
stance on war? What tactics can encourage revising former political beliefs in favor of 
adopting modified, or even totally rewritten, new ones? What medium or mode can 
produce such an effect? Who will use such medium or mode—and how? Given what we 
know about rhetorical technology use in previous wars, what might we anticipate in terms 
of rhetorical mass mediated communication in the future? 
To be able to answer such questions—to even hypothesize and find significant 
patterns of correlation if causation cannot be definitively confirmed—could prove 
advantageous for those who desire to sway public opinion. The possibilities for those 
working in the fields of political policy, legislation, social justice, education, and even 
advertising are both endless and promising, assuming such patterns can be uncovered, 
rhetorically analyzed, and made replicable. Moreover, these patterns would need to be 
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flexible in a globalized world where international, national, and local relationships among 
citizens and political leaders are constantly shifting, and wherein technology 
continuously evolves at a rate that often outpaces humanity’s ability to fully understand 
its effects on the structure of daily life. Moreover, a clarified rhetorical explanation of 
how mediated mass communication, and especially communication concerning war 
support or protest, persuasively functions would serve American citizens and their leaders 
well by encouraging increased civil(ized) discussion about both current and future 
military endeavors abroad. At the very least, understanding the common rhetorical 
patterns that have accompanied hot wars in years past could aid in anticipating future 
citizenry response to international conflict, thereby granting national leaders a framework 
built from previous experience as to how best approach future wars—and what to avoid 
doing—when seeking citizen support. 
By extending primarily the theoretical works of Kenneth Burke, Jürgen 
Habermas, and Marshall McLuhan, this dissertation examines the role electronic mass 
communication technologies have played in shaping and reflecting American collective 
rhetoric with respect to four modern wars: World War II, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, 
and the Iraq War. This analysis of how collectives form uses Burke’s concept of 
identification, or consubstantiality, to explain the role electronic technology plays in 
solidifying mass identification on a national level. When identification links citizens and 
prompts social action, the impact of the public sphere becomes of prime importance for 
both the citizens within the sphere and for those they seek to add to their collective. A 
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modified, contemporary version of Habermas’ public sphere sheds light on how the 
social construct of consubstantial citizenry can spark structural political change from the 
bottom up when provided rhetorical space in which for individuals to engage with one 
another. Finally, McLuhan’s work on electronic technology explains how different wars, 
different eras, and different generations of citizens still experience the same rhetorical 
pressures via mass communication devices—and how that pressure is applied in 
remarkably similar ways despite appearing novel. Consider how each war saw a 
contemporary technological development that became the crux of relaying news, 
information, and perspectives about combat: the radio was instrumental during World 
War II (1939-1945), the television across the years of the Vietnam War (1955-1975) and 
the Gulf War (1990-1991), and the Internet during the Iraq War (2003-2011). These 
technologies played a pivotal role in shaping and reflecting collective discourse 
advocating the war efforts. This dissertation tempers and complicates the voices of the 
collective supporting the institution—those promoting the privileged discourses aligned 
with the government-backed war effort—with the rising vocalization of what I call the 
countercollective—all those citizens and collectives who resisted the privileged collective 
discourse and protested the war effort—through the same medium.  What results from 2
collectivism and countercollectivism is a back-and-forth dialogue that is sometimes 
peaceful, sometimes contentious, but always creating, arguing, and publicly circulating 
2 ​My definition of a countercollective is based on Chesters’ and Welsh’s definition of counterculture as that 
which spurs and invites countermovements based on a collectiving of individuals with a collective identity 
(49; 53). The term “countercollective” as used here signifies individuals who identify with the 
counterculture and participate in its countermovements, whether on a short- or long-term basis. 
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multiple perspectives vying for citizen identification and support. This communication 
and public dialogue presumably creates democratic  
 
deliberations as [it] demands that agents respond to and/or anticipate the 
objections, alternatives and criticisms of their interlocutors, and, indeed, that they 
both seek out mutually agreeable premises upon which to construct their case and 
work logically from those premises. (Crossley 22)  
 
What results besides discussion at the national level is, more foundationally, a set of 
rhetorical patterns characterized by “a transformation in the habits, including linguistic 
and basic domestic habits, that shape our everyday lives” (8). Although the details of 
these patterns are slightly modified across the investigated wars because of unique 
cultural backdrops and time periods, particular political contexts, and technological 
affordances and constraints, these patterns of appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos 
nonetheless persist holistically across wars and technologies, presenting valuable 
strategies that can be modified and applied in future wars. I identify those patterns and 
explore their role in contributing to both collectives’ and countercollectives’ actions and 
rhetorics in each of the four designated wars. 
The rhetorical agency that American citizens internalize and then act on when 
presented a choice to either support or protest a war constitutes an important part of what 
it means to be a democratically involved citizen. When the definition of citizenship is 
further negotiated through a technological lens in addition to a public rhetoric lens, a shift 
occurs from private belief to public action and presence, from consumer to producer, 
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from mass acceptance or acquiescence to an opportunity for mass rejection as more and 
more citizens gain access to authorship within mass communication media. While protest 
movements have garnered more attention in recent decades due to their rejection of the 
status quo and more participation due in large part to increasingly sophisticated 
communication media beginning shortly before World War II, they have always existed 
throughout the nation’s history, although the level of citizen participation has increased 
notably since the 1940s.  The electronic media culture that grew right along with the 3
protest movements across recent American wars illustrates an emerging pattern in line 
with McLuhan’s theory of hot and cool media: the cooler the media, the hotter the 
audience's participation in interpreting the message. I suggest in the following pages that 
the cooler the media, the “hotter” the protest in the sense of increased citizen 
participation. The hotter the protest, the more involved the citizenry are in a diverse array 
of both private and public platforms by which they express their dissent, further tilting 
the ownership of public rhetoric toward the citizens rather than largely managed by 
national leaders. The more diversity in protest, the larger the protest may grow, thereby 
contributing to an even higher possibility for protest during the following war. What 
results is a redefined public sphere of consubstantial citizens who have harnessed new 
3 ​Social movement theorists such as Tarrow distinguish between social protest and social movement, noting 
that the former is an isolated event while the latter is a prolonged effort characterized by repeated 
interactions focused on a collectively agreed upon struggle against some opponent. However, the two terms 
are used interchangeably here with a modified definition: a social protest or movement for the sake of this 
study is action taken by a countercollective who makes its disagreement with national authority publicly 
known. Thus, the definition used here does not distinguish between members’ participation in isolated 
events and their participation within an organization over a prolonged amount of time; identification with 
and support of the countercollective suffices to categorize individuals as part of that countercollective for 
the sake of this study.  
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media in a way that challenges mainstream authority and increases citizen resistance to 
political endeavors across time. 
Western culture’s shift from collective consensus to independently centered 
literate collective, and then to a hybrid platform for intertribal movement suggests a 
connection between the technology that conveys information and the people who both 
share it and are shaped by it. To understand how the technologies of mass communication 
are connected to public rhetoric and general opinion is to understand and even predict 
how the citizenry approaches, interprets, analyzes, and responds to a call to support or 
protest war. In short, the life of the body politic is one deeply intertwined with rhetoric 
and its vehicles of delivery. 
Consubstantial Collectivism and Technologies 
This study’s purpose is to better understand the process of consubstantial 
tribalization and to articulate what that process has looked like across different wars, time 
periods, and electronic media. Such investigation paints a clearer picture of how 
increasingly sophisticated technologies continue to expand the chances for citizens to 
exercise their own rhetorical agency and for individuals to participate in and contribute to 
that exercise as part of a collective, whether in support of or protest against the 
mainstream authority that is the government and its representatives. Further, it addresses 
how the American people can be of consubstantial collectives, how tribal identification 
and membership directs individual understanding of a wartime situation, and how 
individuals can be involved in multiple collectives simultaneously. Lastly, this 
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examination illuminates how the rhetorical power system of rhetor, counter-rhetor, 
audience, message, and medium converge and how that system can create a sense of 
tribalization with the increased use and sophistication of electronic technologies. 
Particular terms have been specifically chosen to achieve these aims. 
Several terms throughout this dissertation have been used in various academic 
disciplines and popular conversation alike; thus, they offer a host of nuanced definitions 
and criteria for application. However, their specific uses in the current context reflect the 
author’s orientation toward a McLuhan-framed approach to understanding collective 
public action that is conditioned by, and in turn conditions, current technological 
innovation. This approach is heavily influenced by the underpinnings of Burke, 
Habermas, and Walter Ong insomuch as the use of language and literacy draws people 
together in a public arena so that they can create a cohesive identity that allows them to 
exercise rhetorical agency as a collective. Because the argument of this dissertation rests 
on how citizens make use of technology to exercise their rhetorical agency, the 
interpretation and analysis of rhetorical patterns in citizen use of technology takes 
precedence over the defining of Burke’s, Habermas,’ and Ong’s, terminologies. Thus, the 
terms used in this dissertation neither directly reflect nor challenge those definitions 
posed by others, especially in the fields of social movement theory and political science, 
wherein terms such as “public,” “protest,” “collective,” and “countercollective” have 
seen much debate and redefinition over the years.  4
4 A cursory look through the works of Gerald A. Hauser, Hannah Arendt, and Nancy Fraser demonstrates 
how varied and nuanced the terminology of the public sphere is. While much could be said about the 
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In referring to the arena in which collectives and countercollectives contend with 
each other, the notion of Habermas’s “public sphere” is useful for situating civic 
discourse alongside citizen use of technology to build collectives with others. This 
dissertation expands the public sphere to a virtual arena of public discussion that is more 
accessible than the public sphere of centuries past, wherein traditionally white, educated, 
wealthier males participated while the rest of society was excluded. However, 
Habermas’s exclusionary definition of the public sphere does not fully serve the nuanced 
purposes of this dissertation, I have opted to use the term “collective” for those American 
citizens who supported the federal government’s prowar stance during each of the four 
conflicts this dissertation covers; I have opted to employ the term “countercollective” for 
those American citizens who protested and dissented the war. Countercollective, as used 
throughout this dissertation, signifies a collective of individuals, whether or not of legal 
voting age or status, who participate in social dialogue about the nation’s life, be it 
political, economic, cultural, or otherwise in nature. Like mainstream authority, 
individuals in the countercollective also have access to mass media technologies so 
crucial for public dialogue—particularly the radio, television, and Internet. 
Burke’s Identification and Consubstantiality 
Locating other individuals with whom one can identify suggests that two 
opposites can, and do, exist simultaneously: the potential for agreement and peace, and 
interpretation of the term itself, debating the merits of existing definitions and attempting to decide a 
definite definition is beyond the scope of this work.  
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the potential for disagreement and war. For every collective whose members identify and 
agree with one another, there is some other collective with whom they are disagreeing, 
with whom they are separated because of one or more geographical, physical, or 
ideological reasons. If there were no differences separating these collectives and their 
members, there would be no need for consubstantiality in the first place—and no need for 
persuasion to negotiate between competing and coexisting collectives. In short, without 
the possibility for both agreement and disagreement, there would be no need for rhetoric, 
and no need for articulating the phenomenon of identification. When identification is 
achieved, individuals feel bonded through their commonality, or what Burke defined as 
“consubstantiality,” a state of social existence in which an individual identifies with a 
collective that desires to enact some shared rhetorical motive and bring about desired 
results (​Rhetoric ​21). While the individual is part of a collective, (s)he also possesses his 
or her own individual will which (s)he, to some degree, conforms to the collective’s will. 
In such an instance of conformity, the individual is not persuaded to wholly give up his or 
her existence, but rather, to incorporate the collective’s identity as part of his or her own 
individual identity, and to integrate their individual identity as a complement to that of 
the collective’s. The individual is both a representative of him- or herself and of the 
collective simultaneously:  
 
In being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than 
himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. 
Thus, he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and 
consubstantial with another. (21)  
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To be one’s own locus of motives while also a cooperative unit within a larger collective 
requires the individual to balance the microscopic self with the macroscopic collective; 
assuming no drastic ideological differences prevents the individual from blending her or 
his own motives with those of the collective, the individual and collective can—and 
must—be persuaded to identify with each other. Such persuasion is achieved through 
communication that convinces both parties of binding similarities, whether actual or 
perceived (20). 
Consubstantiality is built largely upon one’s own feeling of cohesion with the rest 
of the collective members. First, the understanding that one is part of the collective​ ​must 
be communicated, and typically by an individual already in cohesion with the collective 
(Burke, ​Rhetoric​ 300). Then the potential collective member must communicate back to 
the rest of the collective that (s)he understands his or her identity as a collective member, 
and that (s)he upholds his or her collective member status by acting according to the 
collective’s principles and values. Burke equates consubstantiality with communication, 
as the former cannot exist without the latter. Because individual agency still exists even 
after becoming consubstantial with the collective, each collective member retains the 
ability to be both self and part of something larger than the self simultaneously. If no 
glaring differences between individual and collective exist, such consubstantiality will 
not elicit identity crises for either party.  
 Yet, even an individual who identifies both as an autonomous person and a 
collective member may also identify as a member of another collective also vying to 
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enact some different rhetorical motive. Each collective thus comprises individuals, each 
of whom possesses her or his own individual identity, but whose shared rhetorical motive 
moves them to act in unison toward accomplishing some goal. The commonality shared 
among members is stronger than individual will or distinguishing markers, making the 
cohesiveness of the collective stronger than any individual’s own identity and motives as 
far as accomplishing the collective will is concerned.  Because the individuality—a result 5
of print literacy, as Ong argues—that characterizes Western culture can never ​not​ exist 
once literacy has been introduced into a society, and because tribal affiliation as it was in 
ancient cultures cannot resurge and totally replace an increasingly post-literate society 
dominated by electronic technology, individual will can affect collective identification 
and membership in complex ways that were formerly unknown in pre-literate societies, 
and it remains to be fully understood how a cognitive revolution such as that brought on 
by literacy can and will affect collective identification and cohesion as the modes and 
media of communication evolve (Ong 175). For example, membership in collectives can 
overlap, thus creating not just consubstantiality within collectives, but also 
consubstantiality with those identifying as members of outside collectives; what results is 
a web of cohesive individuals across collectives, thereby linking collectives, even if only 
weakly. While McLuhan understands electronic media to bring people back together into 
a common kinship like that of ancient cultures—or a consubstantial cohesive if thinking 
along the lines of Burkean terminology—I instead argue that it is not really a 
5 This is not to say, of course, that personal identity does not take precedence within the private sphere of 
the home, or when not actively engaging in collective activities. 
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re​tribalization so much as a ​modified​ tribalization that could not exist without modern 
technology. Electronic media has supported consubstantial tribalization, and its presence 
in American society is continually morphing to match the nation’s needs, interests, and 
technological savvy. 
Different collectives—or even factions within a single collective—find 
themselves at odds over some issue that prevents cohesion with one another; their 
differences outweigh their similarities. If disagreement arises and communication cannot 
persuade either or both parties to recommit to consubstantial identification with each 
other, the collectives could end up engaging in a power struggle. The greater the number 
of collectives that exist, the greater the chances are of them disagreeing with one another. 
Similarly, the larger a single collective is, the greater the chance that some small factions 
will form within the collective, creating opportunity for dissension and an ensuing power 
struggle within the collective.  In other words, while consubstantiality can act as a 6
cohesive agent, it can just as quickly become a divisive agent. When one is within a 
particular collective, they are also ​not​ within other collectives. Thus, consubstantial 
identification creates cohesion as it simultaneously creates division. 
Burke emphasizes the necessity of division in order for consubstantiality—and 
with it, rhetoric—to exist, and acknowledges the naivety of failing to observe the effects 
6 Although inner-collective dissension can exist and has historically created multiple collectives that 
branched off from a larger original collective, this dissertation limits its focus to the dissension experienced 
and expressed between different collectives, rather than faction collectives within larger ones. For example, 
while several collectives existed that protested the Vietnam War, many different lines of reasoning served 
as the backbone for these collectives. Rather than examining the differences between these collectives, who 
all identified as “anti-Vietnam War,” I instead only focus on the anti-Vietnam War collective as a whole.  
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on human relationships and social order that exist only because of the presence of both 
cohesion and separation with and from others:  
  
We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as a characteristic 
motive of rhetorical expression. We need not close our eyes to their almost 
tyrannous ubiquity in human relations; we can be on the alert always to see how 
such temptations to strife are implicit in the institutions that condition human 
relationships; yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order, to the 
principle of identification in general, a terministic choice justified by the fact that 
the identifications in the order of love are also characteristic of rhetorical 
expression. (​Rhetoric​ 20) 
 
 
Because disagreements and differences always exist and always separate 
collectives—even characterizing small factions within larger collectives—the limitations 
of consubstantiality’s swaying power have to be acknowledged, for it is at the threshold 
between identification (agreement with others) and the lack thereof that the power of 
rhetoric becomes evident. Choosing to focus on the unity experienced among those who 
find themselves identifying with one another—with those whom they are 
consubstantial—is what Burke calls a “terministic choice” (20). Terministic screens act 
almost as blinders; if one is looking at point A, then one is not looking at point B. Her 
screen maintains her focus on one thing at the cost of another. Choosing 
consubstantiality, or identification with others, is choosing to focus on the similarities 
with the collective and those within it, and to choose not to focus on what differences 
might exist between consubstantial members. At the same time, to become consubstantial 
with one collective means that one collective is focusing on their intracollective 
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similarities while separating themselves from the other collectives; this terministic screen 
means that non-consubstantial people and collectives focus on their differences rather 
than their similarities. Burke suggests here that terministic screens are, at least to some 
degree, enforced by one’s own choosing. With every act of identification, or 
consubstantiality, there is also an act of division. To participate in social life as a 
consubstantial member of any collective necessarily means not identifying as a 
consubstantial member of other collectives. An individual’s identification and 
consubstantiality is largely rhetorically determined, for without some persuasive element 
factoring into one’s social participation, one would be unable to identify with others at 
all. 
However, consubstantial identification presents an opportunity for enough people 
to locate one another, to band together, and to either support mainstream authority and its 
desires, or to resist and protest that power structure that threatens the collective’s value 
system. When collectives, such as a mainstream collective and a counterculture 
collective, disagree over some point, they are promoting intracollective cohesion while 
emphasizing intercollective dissension. Upon first glance, this increasing role of 
difference appears problematic. However, it is necessary in order to maintain 
intracollective cohesion; there cannot exist as “us” if there is no “them” who are different 
from “us.” In fact, the very existence and progression of society is at least partially 
dependent on this dialogic relationship between sparring collectives: “For even 
antagonistic terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust, can be said to ‘cooperate’ 
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in the building of an over-all [sic] form” (Burke, ​Rhetoric​ 23). Before collectives can 
express their differences and vie for cultural capital, though, they must first attract 
enough individuals with whom they share consubstantial identities. This process of 
attracting and maintaining such individuals to create the collective is accomplished 
through acts of pure rhetorical dialogic, and often at a national scale—such as leading up 
to and during times of war. 
The existence of consubstantial collectives, or tribes, is an anticipated trait of any 
system of power, of any organized system that structures a society. If a public rhetor is a 
member of the mainstream authority, such as the federal government, and if his or her 
message to a particular audience—the American public—or, more specifically, the 
consubstantial collectives comprising the American public—then the mass media is the 
vehicle through which the mainstream authority delivers its message to its audience. 
Because electronic technology has become increasingly sophisticated, no longer is 
mainstream authority the only voice being heard across the media, reaching the 
consubstantial collectives of the American people. Now the consubstantial collectives of 
the American people can use the same media to talk back to mainstream authority. Often 
consubstantial collectives feel unease or express dissent toward mainstream authority due 
to some ideological difference. Now the collectives can make their voices heard and 
exercise their rhetorical agency using the same media as the authority. What results is 
bidirectional communication for older media such as the radio and television and 
multidirectional communication for newer media such as the Internet where mainstream 
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authority is talking to the countercollective and the countercollective talks back to 
mainstream authority. Further resulting is a version of Habermas’s salons where people 
could come together for civil debate, but one updated and now taking the form of an 
increasingly accessible—and potentially more democratic—public forum. The modern 
Habermasean parlor or salon appears quite different from what Habermas described and 
defined as the public sphere, but the communicative space remains similar in that citizens 
can still come together for dialogue, though the demographics of people now granted 
access to the conversation are those who would not have had access to the same public 
platforms in the past. Currently, an increasing number of citizens not only have access to 
electronic media so as to create collectives, consubstantial communities where kinship is 
felt, but they are also able to express their voices and command a sense of authority 
which they formerly did not possess. As a result, mainstream authority is now constantly 
having to validate and fight for their authority. What was traditionally a power structure 
dominated by traditional hegemonic patriarchy is now being contested by individuals 
who occupy a wide range of demographic positions.  
In fact, these collectives can disagree with mainstream media (which is typically 
controlled by the majority or those in a place of privilege who align to some degree with 
government leaders) just as easily as they can disagree with one another. I would argue 
that a positive correlation exists between the increasing modes and media of 
communication, the number of distinct consubstantial collectives, and the amount of 
protest, dissention, and tension that exists in a community. Ong suggests such a 
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correlation by positing that with the spread of textual literacy comes the ability for further 
stages of human consciousness to evolve (178). With the more sophisticated development 
of human consciousness comes more in-depth and abstract self-examination about the 
nature of oneself and one’s position within society:  
 
The evolution of consciousness through human history is marked by growth in 
articulate attention to the interior of the individual person as distanced—though 
not necessarily separated—from the communal structures in which is person is 
necessarily enveloped. (178)  
 
 
In oral cultures, people communed with their tribe using spoken and gestural 
communication that inherently required an audience to receive the communication, 
interpret and analyze it, and then respond to it. However, with the invention of writing 
and then the later mass production of print-based texts, communication became more 
individualized and asynchronous, and thus the communal bonds centered on 
communication weakened (or were at least drastically reformed). This type of tension 
would not have existed in the oral cultures of ancient traditions. Even individuals who 
may have felt unease with their society would not have been able to be part of a 
collective in which the entire collective could come together as a kindred unit to resist 
mainstream authority because the collective will was one and the same as individual will 
and the individual will was the collective will, as McLuhan noted when he argued that 
“Phonetic letters and numbers the first means of fragmenting and detribalizing man” 
(​Understanding Media ​148). 
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McLuhan’s notion of retribalization reflects the social trend instigated by 
electronic media whereby citizens of literate, and thus highly individualized and visually 
oriented, societies abandoned the more asynchronous pattern of public life brought into 
existence by print culture in favor of increased sensory experiences that blend multiple 
modes of communication. Thus, after developing increasingly advanced individualized 
consciousness, individuals then recreated the social connections of tribal culture, and 
could now share these individualized, idiosyncratic points of view with one another. The 
media of mass communication—first oral, then written and printed, then a combination of 
orality and print literacy—provided opportunities for people to connect with one another, 
share their opinions, shape others’ opinions, and decide whether or not to move forward 
as a single tribal unit or to differentiate into multiple collectives with varying—and 
sometimes competing—agendas.  
McLuhan’s Tribalization and Hot and Cold Media 
Tribalization​, McLuhan’s term for what this dissertation refers to as collectivism, 
is both the cause and result of technology’s growing prevalence and use in American 
society. According to McLuhan and his student Ong, collectivism is a social condition in 
which an entire community shares a common identity, or collective consciousness, built 
around shared values, ideologies, goals, and perhaps even customs and rituals (McLuhan, 
Understanding Media​ 169-70). Typically found in ancient cultures, collectives comprise 
oral peoples who rely on close proximity to one another, on orality and on shared 
experiences in order to participate in a common identity. What is known as individual 
23 
 
will or individual identity closely aligns with the collective’s shared ideologies and value 
systems—the collective’s identity. No major difference exists between the individual and 
the collective, so the collective consciousness dictates that of the individual. Ong realizes 
that only those cultures who were preliterate could truly be oral cultures, and that only 
oral cultures experience true collective consciousness, thus true tribalization. These 
cultures had a different understanding of time and space than do literate peoples, as those 
who were preliterate experienced life non-linearly through acoustic space. They did not 
possess the sense of linearity, whether in time or space, that print literate humans would 
later have (200-01).  The mentality of oral cultures—because they share a sense of close 7
proximity in this acoustic space—is “we” and “us.” Individual will is the same as 
collective will. Collectivism contributes positively to society because it enables 
individuals to do collectively what they cannot do independently. What results is a sum 
greater than its parts; this sum—or collective—possesses the power to take actions and 
shape society in ways sole individuals cannot, suggesting there is rhetorical power in 
numbers. Sociologist Emile Durkheim wrote about collectivism’s effects in his 1895 
Rules of Sociological Method​: 
 
An outburst of collective emotion in a gathering does not merely express the sum 
total of what individual feelings share in common, but is something of a very 
different order...It is a product of shared existence, of actions and reactions called 
into play between the consciousnesses of individuals. If it is echoed in each one of 
7 ​“Print literacy” throughout this dissertation refers to the first known phonetic alphabet that included both 
consonants and vowels. The ancient Greeks, particularly the Athenians, created this alphabet after its 
precursor, the Phoenician alphabet, made its way through trade to Greece. Because the Phoenician alphabet 
lacked vowels, the Greeks modified the Phoenician alphabet to include vowel sounds. Thus, the alphabet as 
Western culture knows it was born. 
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them it is precisely by virtue of the special energy derived from its collective 
origins. If all hearts beat in unison, this is not as a consequence of a spontaneous, 
pre-established harmony; it is because one and the same force is propelling them 
in the same direction. Each one is borne along by the rest. (60) 
 
 
This passage demonstrates what can result from the stirring of the collective 
consciousness and how a shared consciousness moves from the common identity that 
binds and maintains a set of individuals toward some action. Nearly twenty years later, 
Durkheim elaborated this collective identity theory further and gave it a name: “collective 
effervescence.” In his 1912 book ​The Elementary Forms of Religious Life​, he outlines the 
ways that the collectivity of individuals cooperating for some common goal, or sharing 
some common value, create collective effervescence—a sense of communion with others 
that amplifies one’s own sentiments. When acting within a collective of like-minded 
others, a person is susceptible to being “caught up in the moment,” or is prone to this 
collective effervescence that spurs the individuals in the collective to take part in actions 
they otherwise would not have. Durkheim hints at the drawbacks of individualization 
which prevents the phenomenon of collective effervescence:  
 
In the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become 
susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our 
own forces; and when the assembly is dissolved and when, finding ourselves 
alone again, we fall back to our ordinary level, we are then able to measure the 
height to which we have been raised above ourselves. (209-10)  
 
 
Although Durkheim examined the rhetorical power of people within collectives from a 
sociological perspective, and although his observations are rooted in his specific time and 
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space, his notion of collective effervescence is essentially a rhetorical positive feedback 
loop: all people identifying as part of a collective urge one another on to further 
intermingle individual identity with collective identity, and because these individuals are 
now even more enmeshed within the collective, they urge one another to continue doing 
so. With collective effervescence, all members of the collective, are both rhetors and 
audiences. The collective is thus its own self-perpetuating power structure that can take 
action by persuading its own members and potential recruits, as well as action in support 
of or in protest against other collectives. The ultimate goal of collectivism, however, is 
sheer survival. The longevity of the collective becomes more important than the activities 
or well-being of any one member. During wartime, the health of the collective takes 
precedence over all else, pressuring members to loyally contribute to the collective 
well-being, potentially at the cost of the individual. On a national level, such an approach 
results in a “country-over-self" mentality. At a collective level, such an approach can 
result in a “party-over-self.” Should the collective and the country conflict, such an 
approach can result in “party-over-country.” 
What makes this type of collective arrangement so beneficial in oral cultures is its 
relative ease of establishment and membership. Before alphabetic literacy and the 
introduction of mass literacy via the printing press centuries later, individuals only had to 
physically be together to locate their tribal counterparts. For example, in ancient Athens, 
one only had to walk to the agora to find other like-minded individuals; when these 
people presented themselves before some rhetor in the city center, they had the power to 
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urge one another on in response to the rhetor, be it in acts of support or protest. Audience 
response to the rhetor was instant, just as tribal formation was. All those in attendance 
knew immediately who supported the rhetor, who dissented against the rhetor, and who 
looked uncommitted either way, and thus vulnerable to persuasion from either side. This 
example is simplistic in assuming that only two sides to an issue would have existed, and 
only two tribes, or collectives, would have formed in response. Of course, this was not 
necessarily always the case, and numerous collectives could have arisen as a result of any 
given rhetor’s message. The number of collectives created in this moment does not alter 
the pattern of behavior or thought by which collectives formed. 
With the developments of the alphabet and writing and as they grew in use, these 
oral cultures with their reliance on orality and acoustic space evolved into linear 
communities. With alphabetic literacy taking root in ancient Athens in approximately 
700-500 BCE, collectivism gradually disintegrated and was replaced with 
individualization (Enos 6). McLuhan notes that “The alphabet (and its extension into 
typography) made possible the spread of the power that is knowledge and shattered the 
bonds of tribal man, thus exploding him into an agglomeration of individuals” 
(​Understanding Media ​48). The notion of collective will gave way to individual desires, 
wants, and ambitions as print literacy grew in popularity and accessibility. Collectivism 
no longer existed in the same sense. Upon the invention and spread of alphabetic literacy, 
people were no longer required to physically gather together in the same space to hear the 
same message and thus, they no longer shared the same experiences—even if they were 
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reading the same text and the same messages and communications individually. The 
sense of the collective mentality began to dissolve when individuals could take messages 
and consume them independently.  
In the nineteenth century, with the Industrial Revolution and the mechanization 
processes of many factories, the need for collective communication, collective will, and 
collective effort was isolated into individual bits, pieces, and units. No longer were 
craftspeople, communities, and families creating and making the objects. Women no 
longer spun thread, wove cloth, and stitched clothing. Men no longer heated and beat the 
metal of plowshares, swords, and silverware. In factories across Western nations, workers 
experienced the alienating effects of creating only specific pieces of a product; the 
agency to create, for example, an entire table was not common in this era of machination. 
Karl Marx theorizes that such mechanization would not only alienate man from his work, 
but from himself and his peers: 
 
An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of 
his labour, from his life activity, from his species-being, is the​ estrangement of 
man​ from ​man​…. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of 
his labour and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to 
the other man’s labour and object of labour...The estrangement of man, and in fact 
every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is realized and expressed 
only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men. (24)  
 
 
Just as workers no longer participated in the full creation of a product from beginning to 
end, no longer were they participating in the full embodied experience of community and 
the formation of collectives around common interests. Instead, they acted as part of a 
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machine or as a cog in a machine without the ability to affect other cogs, or people. 
While people did still function as part of a whole and thus appeared as a collective, 
because it was economically necessary to work for living wages, these people of the 
Industrial Revolution did not constitute a true collective—they were motivated more so 
by the common driving force of financial capital, but beyond that, there was no collective 
consciousness or identity built around common values or ideologies. Yet, individuals 
were interdependent, relying on one another to actively participate in their social role so 
that commodities could continue to be made, sold, and purchased, so that the government 
and other forms of communal organization could continue existing, and so that life could 
progress for all. While solidarity among individuals still existed, it was not the type built 
around collective consciousness, and thus genuine tribalization did not exist. 
With a rhetorical stance, McLuhan makes similar observations of the Industrial 
Revolution’s negative effect on tribalization: 
 
A tribal and feudal hierarchy of the traditional kind collapses quickly when it 
meets any hot medium of the mechanical, uniform, and repetitive kind. The 
medium of money or wheel or writing, or any other form of specialist speed-up of 
exchange and information, will serve to fragment a tribal structure. 
(​Understanding Media ​53) 
 
 
Because mechanization was just such a medium—mechanical, uniform, and 
repetitive—the tribal structure broke down when the Industrial Revolution introduced 
factory settings and workers were driven by Taylorism to complete tasks rather than 
29 
 
achieve collectively-decided-upon goals.  This breakdown was not just apparent in the 8
workplace, but extended into the home and social lives of individuals as well. 
Even outside the industrialized workplace, people no longer needed to be 
physically together to learn of current social events which would invite participation; 
instead, people could leave their workplaces to return to their own homes, where they 
could then read the daily newspaper alone, even if surrounded by family members. In 
other words, those individuals who would have grouped together at the agora to discuss 
pertinent social matters and act accordingly with their fellow collective members were 
now working alone and reading alone, even if others were physically nearby. 
Collectivism seemed to exist no more. 
However, during the twentieth century electronic media promised something new. 
With the rise of electronic media—such as radio, television, and the Internet—certain 
parts of collectivism returned. Although McLuhan observes how the hot media involved 
with the Industrial Revolution threatened the tribal structure, he also foresees hope for the 
return of communal social life:  
 
a very much greater speed-up, such as occurs with electricity, may serve to restore 
a tribal pattern of intense involvement such as took place with the introduction of 
radio in Europe, and is now tending to happen as a result of TV in America. 
Specialist technologies detribalize. The nonspecialist electric technology 
retribalizes. (​Understanding​ ​Media​ 53)  
 
8 Taylorism refers to Frederic W. Taylor's approach to simplifying and speeding up industrial workplace 
practices. This approach assigns workers repetitive movement using a limited skill set; the combination of 
all workers' efforts produce a final product. See Jan Rehmann's work for a description of Taylorism in the 
workplace. 
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If mechanization was hot media, then electronic technology was relatively cool and 
resembled the instantaneous connection between human beings that had existed in places 
such as ancient Athens. Ong draws a similar conclusion about technologies such as the 
radio and telephone when he highlights that by 1982, when his ​Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word​ was first published, electronic technologies were bringing 
people back together in ways resembling the social conventions of ancient Greece (11). 
In other words, tribalization and post-mechanization electronic technologies are 
tribal-friendly since they require synchronous physical presence or can simulate 
synchronous physical presence, respectively. While these bits and pieces of tribalization 
that began to reappear with electronic media did not quite resemble the sense of 
tribalization once seen in oral cultures, enough of it came back that the individual will 
and the individualization that accompanied print literacy was now being questioned for 
its potentially negative effects on community relationships. Collectivism captures this 
difference between pre-literacy oral cultures and post-industrial literate cultures in that 
while tribalization suggests more or less permanent membership with virtually no overlap 
into other tribes, collectivism is more fluid. Collectives can now form, shift, dissolve, and 
reform as members identify with multiple collectives simultaneously. Modern collectives 
are more dynamic than pre-literate tribes. 
McLuhan notes that electronic media, such as the radio or television, brought 
people back together to experience an acoustic—and now visual—space, the same 
messages, the same experiences, and the same pieces of communication often at the same 
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time, and he labels this “retribalization.” This term is a misnomer because tribalization as 
he explained it in early cultures is not what happened in the twentieth century. Ong points 
out that once print literacy destroyed the old notions of tribalization and its emphasis on 
communal identity, there could not be a direct return to oral culture and the consequential 
tribalization. Labeling cultures such as ancient Athens’ “primary orality” and cultures 
such as Western society’s print literate ones “secondary orality,” he distinguishes the 
processes of tribalization before and after alphabetic literacy. Because of advances in 
electronic technologies and their abilities to bring more instantaneous communication 
than was possible before their inventions, this turn still resembled ancient tribalization to 
a degree due to increased speed in social connection: in “present-day high-technology 
culture, in which a new orality is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other 
electronic devices that depend for their existence on writing and print,” people could 
communicate with one another more quickly than they had been able to since 
synchronous physical presence of oral society (Ong 11). Ong also argues that this 
“return” was not a true return because once consciousness has been shaped by print 
literacy and the linearity inherent in its design, the “allatonceness,” as McLuhan calls it, 
could not exist; time and space could never be truly collapsed as they had been before the 
introduction and widespread use of alphabetic and print literacy. Ong claims that  
 
Today primary oral culture in the strict sense hardly exists, since every culture 
knows of writing and has some experience of its effects. Still, to varying degrees 
many cultures and subcultures, even in a high-technology ambiance, preserve 
much of the mind-set of primary orality. (11)  
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He later goes on to emphasize that while “Literacy can be used to reconstruct for 
ourselves the pristine human consciousness which was not literate at all…we can never 
forget enough of our familiar present to reconstitute in our minds any past in its full 
integrity” (15). In other words, while words provide a way to talk about the impacts of 
both orality and literacy, a truly oral culture as of pre-literacy days cannot exist again, as 
humankind’s consciousness has been permanently affected by literacy. This inability to 
capture and recreate the past social condition of an oral culture means that retribalization 
is thus impossible, though we may get close to it via certain technologies that allow for 
citizen participation similar to that of oral cultures. Rather than “retribalization,” then, 
what has dominated the twentieth century is what I refer to as a “consubstantial 
collectivism.” Consubstantial collectivism allows for a regrouping of individuals into 
tribes while accounting for multiple factors that have influenced the nature of thought and 
social existence, such as linearity of thought produced by print literacy and the nature of 
human relation to work and its influence on social order produced by the Industrial 
Revolution. Currently, I argue that hyperlinearity characterizes collectivism to the point 
that neither time nor space constrict identification and affiliation. While literate 
individuals can differentiate between past and present, their ability to return to 
“allatonceness” via the Internet deflates the separation of past from present, as well as 
individual from individual due to the ability to instantly communicate globally. Linearity, 
as well as cause-and-effect, are weakened in hyperlinear existence, and thus a modified 
form of tribalization results—consubstantial collectivism. 
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In the midst of war, a nation’s citizenry is more likely to pay attention to the 
political decisions and military action rather than the medium through which they receive 
that news. Yet, the medium plays a much larger role than it has previously been given in 
either academic or popular conversation. According to McLuhan, “the medium is the 
message” (​Understanding​ ​Media​ 23). The message, in turn, influences the public to 
believe, think, and behave in particular ways, even as the medium is itself in turn shaped 
by the public. While scholars have spent decades exploring McLuhan’s work in an effort 
to understand how his theories treated technologies of both past and present, they have 
yet to begin work exploring a central tenet of McLuhan’s later theories: the act of 
retribalization. McLuhan argues in ​War and Peace in the Global Village​ that “Man-made 
environments are always unperceived by men during the period of their innovation” (17). 
He maintains in this text, as well as throughout several of his works, that the influence of 
the medium is initially overlooked and regarded only insofar as its novelty. Its persuasive 
power in shaping culture is only fully observable in hindsight: “When they [man-made 
environments] are superseded by other environments, they tend to become visible” (17). 
Throughout this dissertation, I make visible the link between the man-made environments 
of dominant electronic technologies and the American wars during which they played a 
pivotal—though initially unseen—role in shaping the public’s response to both pro- and 
antiwar rhetoric. 
While propagandistic technologies have always existed in some form, electronic 
means of supporting or protesting government and military action proved invaluable in 
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shaping the public’s perception beginning with World War II. President Roosevelt’s 
Fireside Chats​ series took a sharply prowar stance following the December 1941 attack 
of Pearl Harbor, though his radio program had conditioned the American public to 
support his political agenda beginning in the first week of his administration. Yet, 
Roosevelt’s prowar sentiments were not the only opinions expressed across the airwaves 
and into the homes of millions of Americans during the war; antiwar figures with their 
own radio programs disseminated an opposing interpretation of government and military 
action. These dissenters, while often overlooked in historical accounts of World War II 
and radio’s relationship to the American public, nonetheless played a role in shaping 
American public opinion—even if they only served to reinforce war supporters’ beliefs. 
Notably, antiwar figures’ responses to prowar figures often took (and still do take) similar 
forms through the same media to persuade the countercollective. Whereas militaries 
research the weapons and strategies of their enemies, so too do rhetors (McLuhan, ​War 
and Peace​ 125). 
Similar pro-and antiwar rhetors rose to public prominence during the following 
American hot wars: the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War. These rhetors and 
the collectives and countercollectives they inspired not only shared a common cultural 
moment, but common rhetorical strategies to convince the public of their own stance and 
to attract more members to their collectives and countercollectives. Shaping these 
strategies were the dominant media of the day. Though the radio was eventually 
succeeded by the television, and then television by the Internet, the role this electronic 
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technology played in preparing the public for a future of wars mediated through 
increasingly sophisticated, non-print means is monumental.  
McLuhan understood technology as inherently rhetorical, unconsciously shaping 
culture as it both reflects and shapes human communication and interaction. His 
communication, technology, and social interaction theories suggest one means of 
interpreting how rhetorical strategies work within human interaction aided by electronic 
devices. His theories are especially useful when considering how new technologies work 
over the human psyche by playing on usage patterns of previous technologies, and how 
those previous technologies are then supplanted by newer forms of technology that retain 
some trace elements of their predecessors but take on new methods of persuasive 
communication. Generations of media consumers are thus constantly bombarded by 
increasingly sophisticated forms of technology that serve purposes similar to older 
technologies, but in new, and sometimes difficult to define, ways. According to 
McLuhan, the ability of electronic technology to persuade consumers—and most often 
without their conscious realization of this persuasive process happening at all—speaks to 
the supreme importance of understanding how that technology comes by this power.  
The medium itself even determines how much interaction citizens can take in 
receiving and responding to mass mediated messages. McLuhan theorized media 
interactivity as either “hot” or “cold”—the more audience participation that was involved, 
the colder the medium (​Understanding Media ​139). When individuals fill in the gaps of a 
message with their own analysis, they become active, and the need for additional 
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information from the mediated message becomes less. Hot media, on the other hand, 
supplies all needed information, and one can think of the medium’s temperature rising as 
it works overtime to supply each and every thought the audience should have in response, 
according to the rhetor. In a similar vein, the wars investigated in this dissertation work 
much the same way as the technologies they were characterized by. A “cold war” is one 
in which military action is limited or non-existent. Rather than guns and bombs, countries 
prohibit trade and employ other sanctions to force negotiations. In a “hot war,” soldiers 
go to battle, and bloodshed follows. Whereas cold war asks leaders to actively participate 
in analysis of conflicts, hot war relies on weaponry to do the heavy thinking. The 
research discussed in this dissertation suggests that the hotter the war, the hotter the 
media.  
Yet, discerning hot and cold media during any war is often not straightforward, as 
the flurry of current events can confuse and distract citizens in the moment. McLuhan’s 
analysis of technology’s role in shaping culture suggests that most of the rhetorical work 
of any given electronic form is performed subconsciously and, often, only understood in 
hindsight: “Man-made environments are always unperceived by men during the period of 
their innovation. When they have been superseded by other environments, they tend to 
become visible” (​War and Peace ​17). Only once a piece of technology has been 
supplanted by its predecessor is its power and capabilities truly understood—an 
understanding which comes with analysis of the technology as humans seek to design, 
implement, and strategically make use of newer ones. For instance, consider the radio: 
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while used to mostly entertain leading up to President Roosevelt’s administration and the 
United States’ entrance into World War II, its use as a powerful, efficient, and popular 
form of newscasting came to be regarded as revolutionary after it had been supplanted by 
the television, which then took over newscasting and proved critical during the following 
war in Vietnam. 
Though a scholarly examination and analysis of electronic technologies often 
happens once a newer form has supplanted its predecessor, the effects of the technology 
take root on a social, public scale much more quickly. Consider how the technology of 
online shopping has impacted the success (or failure) of brick-and-mortar stores or how 
the circulation of print newspapers has dramatically decreased since the availability of 
online news websites. Careers now exist due to technologies that did not exist just years 
ago—and yet all of these changes influence how people interact with one another, and 
thus influence the very composition and functioning of society. Examining this 
technological influence upon society from a perspective of McLuhanist collectivism 
suggests that, with each new electronic technology, there comes a shift in the degree of 
tribalization and, with ever-increasing forms of technological communication, there is 
increasing tribalization that resembles that of pre-literate society.  
Although the majority of his scholarly work was published before the Internet 
became a household commodity, McLuhan notes that “civilization is entirely the product 
of phonetic literacy, and as it dissolves with the electronic revolution, we rediscover a 
tribal, integral awareness that manifests itself in a complete shift in our sensory lives” 
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(​War and Peace​ 25). A return to the sensory life is a return to when the human body was 
synesthetically involved in existence—when the senses of sight, sound, touch, taste, and 
smell mixed together in a way that involved all (or at least most) to some extent. Literacy, 
however, privileges the sense of sight at the expense of the other senses. However, 
though the connectedness and increased collectivism resembles that of pre-literate 
society, the majority of the American public is still literate. Thus, the current age is a 
resemblance of an ancient social structure constructed by futuristic technology that both 
shapes and is shaped by the people who are themselves structures of and structured by the 
ancient element of tribalization. 
Technology’s Mediation of Public Dialogue 
As electronic mass media technologies have become increasingly affordable and 
accessible, more citizens have gained opportunities to make public use of them, leading 
to a similarly increased public dialogue pertaining to political developments such as war. 
In such a case as the Internet, where many representatives of the collective and 
countercollective can participate in public discussion, a tripartite model of participants 
are in dialogue: the mainstream authority, the collective made up of the public supporting 
mainstream authority, and the countercollective resisting the appeals of the mainstream 
authority. In addition, a fourth participant influences and shapes the access, agency, and 
rhetorics of the other three in this dialogue. The mass media technologies of the radio, 
television, and Internet that convey this dialogue directly affect the frequency and timing 
of the rhetors, allowing for or limiting engaged participation by the American public. As 
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electronic mass media technologies grow increasingly sophisticated and as more 
individuals take advantage of their rhetorical agency to participate in the 
countercollectives, the amount of back-and-forth discussion similarly increases. 
Whereas with the radio during World War II the government had most rights and 
most authority to it and individual people only a little, with television, ownership of the 
media widened, allowing more private individuals to have access to this medium and 
control its content. More consubstantial collectives—whether they supported or contested 
the mainstream authority—could exercise rhetorical agency by influencing what 
messages were conveyed to the wider public via this medium. The Internet allows for an 
expanded participation of consubstantial collectives, both in support and protest, who can 
now own media and practice rhetorical agency. As the technology of the media continues 
to grow increasingly sophisticated, the number of consubstantial collectives may increase 
as well. The more collectives that exist, the more the mainstream power system is 
threatened by the dissenting public. 
This evolution of technology is not always just a story of protest, dissent, or 
contest. With increasingly sophisticated electronic technologies, citizens can locate those 
with whom they agree, and they can become parts of communities that they would 
otherwise never have been able to become part of without the affordances of electronic 
media. While some collectives consent and while others protest, what the media is also 
doing is allowing for a sense of returned tribalization—a sense that is felt within, among, 
and between consubstantial collectives who share overlapping values. Although modern 
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tribalization looks different than it did before literacy became the dominating cultural 
characteristic of advancing society, the sense of relationship, community, and 
accountability to other citizens marks a vast and important turn in Western—particularly 
American—history and rhetoric. This turn is due largely to increasingly sophisticated 
electronic media acting as a bridge between those who govern and those who are 
governed. Additionally, these media allow for citizens to talk back to their government 
(though not necessarily always in a hostile or contentious manner, but sometimes in such 
a way as to inform the government what the desires of the public are). The media also 
grants the government a way to speak directly back to the masses concerning these 
desires, while also making the desires of the ruling authority system known. In other 
words, media does not just allow for contest, dissent, or protest, but also allows for 
healthy relationships to develop through open (and often nearly instantaneous) 
communication in a way that has not existed since orality dominated Western culture. 
Tribalization, then, is much different than it was in the pre-literate oral cultures, hence the 
use of “collectivism” rather than “tribalization.” 
While this healthy sense of communication might be a possibility, it seems that, 
more often than not, the communication that electronic technologies enable is instead a 
vehicle of dissatisfaction, dissent and protest. While the media do allow people to locate 
other like-minded citizens to build communities and to create consubstantial collectives, 
at the same time government—the previously mainstream authority—finds itself 
increasingly at the will of these consubstantial collectives and their growing influence 
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over other collectives and, thus, over one another as individual citizens. The government 
then finds itself answering to multiple collectives with multiple desires and wishes. 
Often, the mainstream authority is unable to please all these collectives simultaneously. 
What results are many issues that draw into question who really holds power in society 
and if that power is ever stable or if it is always contested. 
Consider a case study of this tripartite dialogue through radio exchanges during 
World War II. The dominant mainstream authority rhetors during this time were 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his administration, and additional government agencies 
and offices that followed his directives regarding American involvement in the escalating 
war. His audience was the American people. The medium was the radio, a technological 
staple among many American homes and a source of both entertainment and news, 
though its use as news conveyor took on marked significance during the war due to 
Roosevelt’s rhetorical use of it to communicate events to the public. The radio, as 
informative as it proved to be, operated only through the transmission of information: the 
representative of the mainstream authority power system could speak directly to the 
American citizens, but those citizens had no way to speak directly back or to speak 
directly over the same medium to other citizens. While Roosevelt could host his series of 
Fireside Chats​ and ask the public for support going into the war, most Americans did not 
have the same type of access to talk either to him or to their fellow citizens. While any 
interested or concerned citizen could write to the White House and make his or her 
concerns known to the administration, that citizen still could not reach out to the rest of 
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the American public as Roosevelt could via the radio, and that citizen definitely could not 
reach such a mass audience in real time, such as in a thirty-minute radio broadcast heard 
nationally and on a weekly basis. The government owned all the syndication rights at this 
time, so the government owned this medium—not the citizens. On smaller levels, there 
were counter-rhetors, such as Father Coughlin, who had his own radio broadcast which 
he often used to contest Roosevelt’s agenda. However, Coughlin’s show was mostly 
local, and though it did grow to eventually become regional, and for a short time, even 
nearly national with syndication, it was still not heard by nearly the same number of 
citizens as Roosevelt’s ​Fireside Chats​. Additionally, while Roosevelt could take to the 
microphone at any time and speak as he pleased, Coughlin’s broadcast access was limited 
to certain days and times, and his messages eventually had to be submitted to his 
superiors—both within the Church and the government—for prior approval. During 
World War II, the government’s authority, while contested, would not be threatened in 
the same way it would be during later wars. Yet, it was during this era that the tradition of 
using electronic media to create community during wartime began. Electronic media 
began proving itself invaluable to the potential formation of consubstantial collectives 
who could exercise their rhetorical agency to contest, dissent, protest, and in other ways 
voice their dissatisfaction with mainstream authority.  
This example demonstrates how rhetorical power systems during wartime operate 
both with the collectives and the countercollectives. Even in its limited counter responses, 
this relationship and this two-way communication exists because of the media. As the 
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media becomes increasingly sophisticated, it increases the possibility that consubstantial 
collectives develop protests, further organize countercollectives, and create a sense of 
threatened power structures. What we see is patriarchal structure and power systems that 
have dominated American culture for so long now being threatened by what, upon first 
glance, looks to be a retribalization of the masses. However, a deeper investigation 
reveals that this is not the retribalization anticipated by McLuhan and Ong, but something 
similar to it: consubstantial collectivism. 
Social movement theory explains why individuals persistently collectivize despite 
changes to social structure and order that often bring about the weakening or dissolution 
of collectives and countercollectives. George Herbert Mead says that a stimulus, once 
recognized by an individual as a stimulus, becomes an object. The individual must be 
cognizant that 1) there is a stimulus, and that 2) (s)he is able to respond to the stimulus 
(has agency to do so). The link between social movement theory and rhetoric becomes 
clear: if the stimulus is recognized as a stimulus, it must, then, be rhetorical. If it were not 
rhetorical, it would not elicit recognition of its nature nor evoke a response of any degree 
or manner from the individual. It acts as an argument, as an exigence. Once an individual 
has perceived the stimulus exists, and that it can and should be responded to, the 
individual can then choose how, if, and when to respond, basing decisions concerning 
these factors on kairotic options available. The response options available span a 
spectrum, ranging from feasible, practical, and even expected, to unfeasible, impractical, 
and unexpected or novel. If a message (stimulus) is received by an audience as a stimulus 
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and then acted upon (whether in thought, feeling, or action), the message has the 
opportunity to produce some type of response which, when external to the individual, is 
socially rhetorical; when internal, even an individual response is still rhetorically 
socialized, as it is conditioned and molded by societal norms and mores. 
 But how can a message be successfully interpreted as a rhetorical stimulus if the 
message’s vehicle is so novel as to distract the audience and detract from its a) 
recognition of the stimulus as stimulus or b) understanding of the stimulus, message, and 
possible responses to it? A message cannot purposefully be acted on and responded to if 
the message is too poorly understood. When a medium of message delivery is too novel, 
it most likely prevents the audience from realizing its purpose, and thus from acting on it 
accordingly. In this case, the medium overrides the message, rendering the message 
ineffective. Is the medium the message? In some instances, yes—it can be. But the 
medium is not always the message. While they are not synonymous, they are highly 
codependent. If the vehicle attracts all the attention, the message is misunderstood at best, 
and overlooked at worst. If the medium, though, is familiar to some extent, the medium 
then becomes as natural to the message’s landscape as water to a fish. The audience can 
then focus their attention on the message in a more purposeful way. The medium, to be 
the most effective for message delivery, must be a vehicle whose novelty is not the 
primary focus of the communication. However, the medium must also not be outdated, 
lest it attract the same degree of vehicle attention, though with a potentially more 
negative connotation or awareness than a novel medium.  
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While the administration uses the new technology for calls to the collective to 
support the war, the countercollective experiments with the new medium, revises its use, 
and publishes their own anti-call to see if it has a similar, but opposite effect. In this way, 
the countercollective’s experimentation with the new technology is never quite “new,” 
but a revisited and revised form of experimentation with the same rhetorical appeals to 
the audience through the novel medium. The countercollective have a better chance of 
success because they have already witnessed successful—and less successful—uses of 
the medium. If a similar lesson is to be learned from revised uses of technology, the 
call-to-war pro-government rhetor has to use it in volley. This means that rather than the 
initial use of the technology necessarily being successful, the prowar rhetor has to see 
what revisions the countercollective make, then adjust his or her own rhetoric 
accordingly. In addition, the prowar rhetor has to discover a new rhetorical strategy to 
counteract the countercollective’s rhetoric. This creates a constant sense of struggle to 
redefine how the medium or technology can be used as well as the most sophisticated 
rhetorical approaches through that medium.  
Chapter Summaries  
The following chapters investigate the aforementioned wars and their 
corresponding technology, and each chapter considers how the dominant technology of 
that particular war came to replace its predecessor. The political role of the new 
technology and the means by which both pro- and antiwar figures made use of 
technology provide a cultural and historical backdrop to this rhetorical evaluation. Lastly, 
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each chapter concludes by offering an observation of how social movement theory 
indirectly draws on McLuhan’s work, though often applying different terminology.  
Chapter 2 examines the use of the radio as the main technological means for 
spreading mass communication during World War II. While President Roosevelt’s 
Fireside Chats​ are often remembered as the prime radio broadcasts that presented 
war-related news to the American collective, other, less well-known radio 
broadcasts—such as Father Coughlin’s weekly radio program—contributed to social 
unrest concerning American involvement in World War II, though the countercollective 
Coughlin helped foster remained rather small. Regardless, the role of the radio in 
providing an opposing narrative to the one promoted in mainstream society suggests that 
technology could be used to create an environment wherein like-minded people could 
find fellow supporters or dissenters and wherein citizens could hear opposing accounts of 
current events. These affordances reflect McLuhan’s notion of retribalization, even if 
only faintly. Moreover, the radio allowed for citizens to start distancing themselves from 
the linearity of print in that by hearing reports of war, the sense of space was deflated; 
citizens listened to reports as if they were present with the reporter himself, and the sense 
of immediacy that is a necessary component of collectivism took root. Spatial deflation 
and immediacy proved to be important rhetorical criteria for increasing collectivism 
during the following war in Vietnam. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the Vietnam War and is significant for at least two reasons: 
1) of the four wars discussed, this war was the longest, lasting twenty years and running 
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through the administrations of four different American presidents, and 2) this war was the 
first to be televised directly into the homes of citizens, allowing them to witness firsthand 
the harsh realities of combat, though the war was taking place across an ocean, in a 
country that had, up until the post-World War II fear of spreading Communism, remained 
little discussed in American politics. 
As with the radio during World War II, television sets were present in the 
majority of American homes during the war, allowing for a maximum of citizens to stay 
informed of developing military operations in Southeast Asia. However, unlike the radio 
during World War II, television involved more than just the aural sense: war was now 
both aural and visual. Adding an additional layer of sensory investment results in a higher 
degree of synesthesia—the blending of senses. Increased synesthesia means a feeling of 
increased personal involvement, or so McLuhan argues. 
This chapter first explores the similarities between the radio and the television, 
noting the rhetorical continuance of these technologies in terms of their affordances and 
constraints. The conversation then shifts to focusing on the main difference and 
advantage of the television to invite citizens into vicariously participating in combat 
events through both sound and sight. Next, I note how synesthesia compels citizens to 
identify their own value systems, relate them to others in their (potential) collectives by 
means of developing a collective consciousness, and then, perhaps, escalating that 
collective consciousness into collective effervescence by means of rhetorical action 
designed to persuade firstly mainstream authority power structures, but countercollectives 
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as well who may not share a high degree of said collectives’s consciousness. The act of 
collectivizing, then, became more likely with the development and accessibility of news 
programming that highlighted war developments, and thus encouraged more Americans 
to form collectives based on their stance regarding war than had taken place during 
World War II. The prowar collective could hear the countercollective protesting through 
on-air interviews, as well as how the authorities responded to them. 
Chapter 4 highlights the complicated television coverage of the Gulf War. 
Television continued to play a prominent role in informing the public—as well as 
prompting them to question their stance on government activity—during the Gulf War 
fifteen years after the Vietnam War officially ended. The Gulf War presented an 
interesting compromise between the freedom of media coverage experienced during the 
Vietnam conflict and that of the more scripted nature of radio broadcasts during World 
War II. Although news media did not have the ease of access to the front lines as 
reporters and photojournalists did in Vietnam, they still had access to key figures behind 
the war effort. Yet, coverage was filtered and limited in many ways, and became 
increasingly dictated by the personal preferences and leanings of those who owned the 
media. While CNN was able to broadcast footage of Saddam Hussein treating American 
hostages in a friendly manner, the channel was still only granted limited access to facts 
and figures, and it was not at liberty to join front line efforts as photojournalists and 
reporters did in Vietnam. Media personnel were also not as intimately familiar with the 
weaponry, plans of actions, or front-line soldiers as they had been during the previous 
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conflict. Ideological partisanship was also a determining factor in what news channels 
broadcasted, and political angles were adopted that defined and set apart stations such as 
CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and CBS. When these restrictions and ideological leanings 
are combined, the result is a distinct lack of accurate information that influences the 
actions of the collective and countercollective alike. 
It was during this war that citizens took to live news programming in real time 
thanks to call-in shows on news networks. The national platform became more accessible 
for citizens across demographics, and advancing television technology created a 
rhetorical space for the average citizen to be heard. While media conglomerates still 
owned the networks and could limit the amount of call-in opportunities made possible to 
citizens, the 24/7 broadcasting of real-time events, combined with call-in shows, created 
more public dialogue regarding unfolding war developments than had previously been 
possible. Citizens were now hearing for themselves the voice of their peers who 
represented both pro- and antiwar stances. 
Chapter 5 examines how the latest American war effort demonstrated the 
importance of electronic technology for informing and persuading citizens. Moving from 
the television age to the Internet age is the most significant technological advancement of 
all of these four wars. While citizens’ reliance on traditional modes of journalism had 
been suffering for decades, the events of September 11, 2001 revived the importance of 
reporters and their access to sources unavailable to the average citizen. An increasing 
percentage of the American population began looking to newspapers and news broadcasts 
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for information, including segments of the population that had never shown much interest 
in doing so before. However, because mainstream news sources were now 
accommodating their journalistic work for print, televised, and web-based platforms, a 
new opportunity for a previously nonexistent discourse community opened up: that of the 
virtual synchronous and asynchronous parlor, as it were, of websites and chatrooms. 
Affordances offered by the Internet allow citizens to directly communicate with 
one another both synchronously and asynchronously; moreover, citizens can 
communicate with mainstream authority as well. The introduction of “viral” web-based 
texts introduces a significant expansion of rhetorical platform, allowing citizens to reach 
others far beyond the ideological borders of their own collective. The Internet, then, is 
presently the most capable of all technology examined in this dissertation to collapse time 
and space. What results from such a collapse is the increase in palpable results of 
citizens’ and collectives’ rhetorical acts in support or protest of mainstream authority. 
Moreover, the Internet has provided space for nuanced collectives to form based on 
multiple consubstantial identifications, multiplying not only the number of pro- and 
antiwar collectives, but also allowing for members to simultaneously operate in numerous 
collective spaces and claim membership in co-existing—and sometimes even 
competing—collectives. What remains to be seen is how multi-collective membership 
could weaken  loyalty by pulling membership too thinly between competing collectives. 
The conclusion highlights the implications of this study and the methodology and 
concepts developed within, specifically the ways this argument extends McLuhan and 
51 
 
Ong and further complicates Warner’s and Hauser’s definitions of the public sphere. 
While no analysis of historical accounts can necessarily accurately predict the rhetorical 
trends of the future, informed estimates can be made regarding the most likely use of both 
persuasive strategies and electronic mass media communication technologies. 
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CHAPTER II 
WORLD WAR II: RADIO AS THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
World War II: a radio war of decentralization concluded by the Bomb. 
 Marshall McLuhan, ​The Book of Probes​ 388 
 
 
The United States’ entrance into World War II followed on the heels of the Great 
Depression, when citizens were largely focused on simply surviving. With public morale 
at a low point prior to the outbreak of war and with domestic financial matters consuming 
political discussion, there seemed little impetus for American citizens to support 
involvement in a largely European war. Yet, when the need to defend the nation became 
painfully clear after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American citizens demonstrated 
a very Burkean response in creating a strong national identity with one another, and 
against those forces that threatened the American way of life—the American identity. 
Such an identity would have struggled to exist at all had it not been for a key invention 
that made its major rhetorical debut during the years of World War II, and which set the 
stage for the creation of an electronically-mediated political culture in the United States: 
the radio.  
Using radio programming to spread news reports and analyses of current events, 
key figures during the late 1930s and early 1940s persuaded American citizens to either 
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support or resist the war. The number of weekly listeners such programming drew in 
suggests that both the pro- and antiwar rhetors who took to the airwaves were persuasive 
in their attempts to convince Americans to take a firm stance in the face of global 
warfare. As a result, the programming that centered on the war also contributed to the 
creation of domestic collectives, with the prowar collective proving historically dominant 
over the antiwar countercollective. The radio allowed the prowar message to spread by 
capitalizing on particular rhetorical appeals—primarily ethos—as well as the affordances 
offered through aurality’s persuasive impact on listeners. While some countercollective 
radio programming also drew in audiences, it paled in comparison to that produced by the 
prowar collective, resulting in a larger and more noticeable national support for the war 
rather than against it. 
Up until Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inauguration in March 1933, radio had been 
used primarily as a form of entertainment, with news segments occupying some limited 
evening hours. During Roosevelt’s presidency, the radio became, according to the first 
chief commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission, a fusion of all the most 
popular and significant social institutions of the day. It encompassed and reflected the 
interactions that took place in schools, churches, and other public forums (Hilmes 1). By 
late 1941, it is estimated that 90% of American households owned at least one radio and 
that the average American listened to it for approximately four hours each day (Craig 9). 
Because the radio was a household staple for millions of Americans between the 1920s 
and 1950s, it played a pivotal role in shaping social consciousness and public opinion 
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while simultaneously conflating other media—the newspaper, the town hall meeting, and 
the theater, among others—into a single electronic medium that spoke directly into the 
living rooms of the public (1). However, the Great Depression and Roosevelt’s plans for 
combating its fallout shed new light on the previously untapped capabilities and 
usefulness of this technology. The radio’s affordances posed new possibilities for direct 
communication on the national level regarding both domestic and international politics. 
Roosevelt’s numerous ​Fireside Chats​ demonstrated how easily the president could now 
reach the citizens of the entire country in one fell swoop. Rather than holding press 
conferences or in-person speeches where only a limited few would be able to attend, and 
rather than gambling on the portrayal of his speeches as presented in strategic rhetorical 
frames of carefully-chosen paraphrases by various local, privately-owned newspapers, 
Roosevelt smartly seized the opportunity to make his agenda known to the nation directly 
and synchronously. He no longer had to rely on reporters, newspapers, or citizens’ word 
of mouth to announce his aims and plans for the country. By bypassing a middle agent to 
relay his administration’s goals, Roosevelt harnessed his own rhetorical agency in 
educating Americans about, and garnering support for, his policies. Moreover, as the 
highest-ranking government official in a medium whose ownership was largely still 
privatized yet sympathetic to the Roosevelt administration, the president found himself in 
a covetable position as he promoted policies concerning his New Deal programs. While 
he did harness the radio’s powerful affordances to reach the masses directly during the 
banking crisis and other particularly troublesome moments during the Great Depression, 
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his handling of Pearl Harbor and his radio-aired congressional address to solicit a 
declaration of war the following day became his most well-known use of radio for 
presidential and political speech delivery. At the hands of the president and a select few 
key figures, the nature of radio changed drastically leading up to and during World War 
II. 
However, the president was not the only voice occupying the airwaves. Although 
Roosevelt’s presence on the radio became commonplace and lasted throughout the 
duration of his presidency, the entertainment sector still accounted for a large part of the 
programming. When call-in radio programs took to the airwaves in the 1930s and 1940s, 
average citizens suddenly found themselves with opportunities to be heard across their 
own communities, and sometimes even further. While most call-in shows during these 
decades were for entertainment purposes, talk radio and programs where citizens were 
interviewed on a range of pertinent topics became increasingly popular. The potential for 
radio’s constitutive power was already at play: “On many of these talk and interview 
programs, the voice of the people spoke in performative utterances; like opinion polls, 
these programs helped to create the publics they simply claimed to represent” (Loviglio 
90). While the Habermasean notion of the public sphere did not exist in American culture 
during this time, a new form of that sphere was taking shape in the United States, and 
was created, in part, by the radio’s reflection of the public it also created (90). This 
collective of citizens coming together over the radio would prove absolutely vital for the 
prowar collective called for by the President of the United States via this medium. 
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Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, radio airtime gradually became less 
dominated by entertainment and local news segments and began sharing broadcast space 
with national and international news concerns. As Americans processed the attack on 
Pearl Harbor and listened to the President’s declaration to Congress about the need to get 
more involved with the war effort, they were also audience to the ongoing solicitations 
for support through Roosevelt’s ​Fireside Chats​. ​Fireside Chats​ heavily influenced 
citizens as they formed their opinions on whether or not American intervention was 
necessary in the European war to check Hitler’s campaign. The radio would also prove 
instrumental in updating American citizens as to the war’s progress during the following 
years. Because of the radio’s unprecedented importance as a vehicle of news delivery 
leading up to and during the war, World War II is often deemed the “radio war” (Douglas 
10).  
However, Roosevelt did not stand alone as the voice of wartime radio following 
the attack on Pearl Harbor; he was often discredited, fought against, and even ridiculed 
on the airwaves by a few key figures who vehemently opposed American intervention in 
what they considered a European war. Some of these isolationists had opposed 
Roosevelt’s national policies before December 1941, but it was not until Japanese 
Imperial Forces attacked the naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 that 
isolationists’ opposing viewpoints presented the possibility of sparking a national identity 
crisis that would ask citizens to either support or oppose American entrance into World 
War II. What resulted was a nationwide civil battle fought over the airwaves to determine 
57 
 
America’s extent of involvement, if any, in the war. However, this 
technologically-enhanced debate between interventionists and isolationists also created a 
surprising result: a unification of the public on a scale grand enough to warrant 
consideration of it as a return to tribal consciousness, even despite the division between 
the two domestic camps. Both the collective (the interventionists) and the 
countercollective (the isolationists) used radio air time to share ideologies and sentiments 
in hopes the public would adopt their particular view and act accordingly. Citizens 
identifying as prowar and antiwar could tune into certain programs to hear the voices of 
the like-minded—often citizens they would otherwise have never met or with whom they 
would have had an opportunity to discuss politics. While the radio was heavily dominated 
by the interventionist approach and agenda, the rhetorical seeds were being sown during 
World War II that would later grow into a more apparent and powerful phenomenon 
threatening to shake up the power structure typically owned and regulated by the 
government—the primary interventionist. Without radio, the multiplicity of voices would 
not have reached Americans with the same velocity and impact, and the effects of rapid 
mass mediated communication would have failed to stir citizens into action. Electronic 
technology’s affordances are what created a public that had the possibility to separate 
into multiple collectives spanning the country, each with their own desires concerning the 
war. Moreover, these multiple collectives also had the possibility to make their desires 
nationally known, to all citizens simultaneously. What resulted was both collectivism of 
those for and those against American involvement in the war, but also a national identity 
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of Americans as distinct from citizens of other nations. In other words, both McLuhanist 
collectives and Burkean consubstantial identification accompanied this new electronic era 
of the radio. 
The Collective 
The prowar collective dominated the airwaves shortly before and during 
American involvement in World War II. One of the most popular entertainment radio 
programs during this timeframe was the variety show ​Vox Pop​. With a name that literally 
translates to “the voice of the people,” and with a format that sent hosts out on the streets 
to interview the average citizen about an assortment of topics, the public was led to 
believe that this program represented what other citizens just like them were thinking 
regarding entertainment, the economy, politics, or the more mundane aspects of daily life. 
Yet, a show that suggests with its title that it belongs to the opinions of its listeners was 
more deeply affected by the Roosevelt administration than most citizens perceived. 
Owners of local stations who aired the national program were held under pressure to 
present only content that encouraged agreement with the government’s official agenda 
concerning war. While the average citizen’s opinion could still be heard when discussing 
Hollywood, fashion trends, or dinner recipes, only opinions respecting Roosevelt’s stance 
toward fellow Allied powers and against Axis powers were to be shared—lest station 
managers and other stakeholders risk losing their source of income in a still-precarious 
economic moment. As the war progressed, so did the show’s support of the war effort. 
During the war  
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Vox Pop​ refashioned its quest for the voice of the people…part of the networks’ 
dramatic commitment to the war effort. By July 1941 the show had converted to 
full-time war mobilization, traveling every week between military bases and 
defense plants, conducting personal interviews with servicemen and women, 
black and white, of every stripe, and from many backgrounds. The voice of the 
people, first assumed to reside in the randomness of the people, then in their 
‘averageness,’ now was sought in the exemplary ‘Americanness’ of those 
working for the nation’s defense. Heard on the Armed Forces Radio Service as 
well as on network radio, ​Vox Pop​ became an important link between the home 
front and soldiers abroad. (Loviglio 101) 
 
 
Vox Pop​, then, blurred the lines between entertainment and support for a particular 
political agenda, which in turn created a subconscious message that supporting the war 
effort was as natural as enjoying the entertainment one found in listening to a popular 
radio program. If so many listeners were tuning in to ​Vox Pop​, then the voice of the 
people seemingly supported the government’s agenda regarding the war. 
Vox Pop​ drew on the public’s pathos as it appealed to the sense of belonging—of 
making each individual citizen feel part of the unified, patriotic collective. The show also 
suggested that in identifying as an average citizen, listeners collectively formed the 
backbone of the nation. Even those citizens who spent most of their time in their own 
homes, such as homemakers, could identify at least in part with those other listeners 
coming over the airwaves and into their living rooms. Listeners knew that even if they 
were unable to share physical proximity with others who shared their opinions on 
political, economic, or social issues, there were at least those who did share their opinions 
somewhere in the nation—which they knew because they had heard these others on the 
radio.  
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As radio broadcasting continued to develop alongside an impending global war, 
interview-based programs such as ​Vox Pop​ focused on the average American citizen and 
their feelings of both civic and personal efficacy during a trying depression and 
upcoming military conflict: “​Vox Pop​...revealed a public mind overwhelmed by the 
blooming, buzzing confusion of public life and ruled by essentially private, psychological 
motivations,” and coalesced those private beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of the individual 
citizens “into an unprecedented national audience” which spoke with a singular public 
voice (Loviglio 97). Listeners were participating in a modern, electronic version of what 
could be considered a type of Habermasean public sphere. Though the traditional sense of 
a parlor debate was not as practical in 1930s and 1940s America, the idea of engaging 
with other citizens to hear out their opinions, and then considering again one’s own 
opinions, served as the work of Habermas’ parlor. The radio took what was no longer 
practical and reinvented it in an electronic medium, and in doing so enriched citizens' 
feelings of democratic agency. Americans, then, were engaging in public life, even from 
the comfort of their private spheres. Ultimately, individuals could feel part of something 
larger than themselves and could identify with their peers even if they never came face to 
face with them in such civic or political discussions. The ease with which the radio was 
able to appeal to listeners’ sense of pathos, which was itself fueled by a desire to be an 
active participant in public life, demonstrated its power as a rhetorical vehicle when 
strategically implemented by an equally strategic rhetor. While World War II-era studies 
on public reception of radio programming are limited,​ Vox Pop​’s historical success is 
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evidenced in its syndicated sixteen-year run over the airwaves (108). Despite the dearth 
of hard evidence or validated concrete numbers of listeners, the persuasive impact of ​Vox 
Pop​ can be assumed from its decade-plus, coast-to-coast lifespan. Listeners of this famed 
show would have undoubtedly felt pressure to accept and conform to those public 
opinions they heard so often repeated on the show. Disagreeing with the prowar agenda 
routinely expressed on ​Vox Pop​ would imply that one was not part of the rest of 
American society, but instead stood at odds with his or her fellow citizens. To disagree 
with the overtly prowar agenda expressed on the show would further imply that a 
citizen's individual rhetorical agency was weaker than that of others, as antiwar 
sentiments were not expressed publicly. To feel as though one belonged to the collective 
of American society, and to thus experience a sense of personal efficacy, one would most 
likely stand in agreement with the prowar agenda shared by the collective of ​Vox Pop​’s 
national audience base. 
Not every radio-based rhetor sought to persuade American citizens in the same 
way as ​Vox Pop​. While the popular radio show relied heavily on an appeal to pathos via 
focusing on members of the Armed forces and fostering a sense of belonging among 
citizens, other radio programming adopted a more logos-centered approach to promote 
the war effort. The Office of War Information (OWI), a government agency created by 
Roosevelt for the sole purpose of relaying critical and officially approved war news to the 
public, relied on what can be termed the “strategy of truth”  to convince radio-listening 9
9 ​The “strategy of truth” reflected only news accounts favorable to the government, specifically to the 
Roosevelt administration. The “truth” part of the strategy was not, therefore, totally exempt from bias. 
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citizens that supporting the war was the most logical and practical approach to halting the 
escalating global violence, and to protect the United States from becoming a victim of the 
Axis powers (Brewer 81). The idea was simple in theory, and resembled Roosevelt’s 
usual approach when addressing the public: if American citizens were given the facts of 
the war in a plain, straight-forward manner, then they would make a rational, informed 
decision about what needed to be done concerning the war in Europe. The Office of War 
Information limited radio discussion of the war to only what it officially approved, acting 
as a check on freedom of speech in the interest of national security (Jowett and 
O’Donnell 257). The reality, however, became murky when issues of national security 
and less-than-flattering stories of activities undertaken by American and allied troops 
surfaced or a less than fully supportive attitude became evident on the airwaves. Such 
instances compromised both the veracity of the official reports as well as the logical 
appeal of the government’s agenda moving forward (81). When the complete truth 
became a liability for ensuring public support, the OWI opted instead to present an image 
more favorable to the Roosevelt administration’s cause by strategically omitting unsavory 
details that contradicted what the OWI wanted the official narrative to be. What was said 
mattered just as much as what was left unsaid, and how what was said was conveyed to 
the public. In other words, an appeal to logos was still the official appeal to the people, 
though the people were largely unaware that they were receiving only a carefully selected 
portion of the truth, and therefore they were working on a diluted version of logos.  One 10
10 ​More than just diluting the truth of the facts, the OWI tampered with and falsified their own ethos, 
unbeknownst to the American citizens. 
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of the most persuasive strategies in swaying the masses toward intervention in Europe 
meant “blurring what was true with what people wanted to believe was true”—even if 
that required selective media coverage of some military activities and omission of others 
(81). Presumably, most American citizens were unaware they were being told only 
selected portions of the truth; however, even if they had known, there was little they 
could have done in that moment because the average citizen did not have access to 
airtime on the radio, and would have been unable to secure airtime during which to voice 
an antiwar stance, as call-in shows were notoriously prowar. Those who owned radio 
stations and had access and opportunity to voice antiwar sentiments were  more likely to 
cooperate with the government than point out the half-truths or selected accounts because 
cooperation with the government proved critical for the survival of local radio channels:  
 
Fearing a repeat of the World War I government takeover of the airwaves or some 
other incursion into their profitable hold on most of the North American airwaves, 
the networks worked closely with OWI [Office of War Information] and other 
agencies, starting as early as 1940, to create programming sympathetic to 
administration interests. (Loviglio 102) 
 
 
Interventionists (and isolationists alike) quickly realized how essential a strategically 
crafted rhetorical approach was to garnering citizen support while also maintaining 
profitability for those citizens who owned the media of mass communication—and what 
could happen to both media owners and media users if they deflected the official 
government agenda during war time. Collectivism in support of the war, then, took root 
across the airwaves.  
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With the help of popular radio programming like ​Vox Pop​ and the myriad 
radio-delivered addresses crafted by the OWI, the Roosevelt administration heavily 
influenced national opinion regarding the war, but still faced two pressing tasks: 
strategizing the American ​military​ response to the war should conscription go into effect 
as it had with the previous world war, and strategizing his public, domestic response to 
the war in a way that would encourage American citizens to support him in ordering a 
military response, even if that meant calling their loved ones into active combat. If ​what 
was said mattered every bit as much as ​how​ it was said, then the president needed to craft 
carefully planned messages in such a way that would convince the public to abandon 
fears related to the Depression which the country was still struggling to overcome, and to 
negate their fears of what the future might hold if the United States engaged in a 
European war that had as of yet been unstoppable to the nation’s allies (Brewer 82). 
Paying attention to these apprehensions, Roosevelt gathered his mass audience with a 
“galvanizing rhetorical invocation of ‘the forgotten man’ as inheritor of a revitalized 
democratic government and a more unified nation” and rather than speaking only to those 
who could offer much support, called on everyone to contribute in even the smallest of 
ways (Loviglio 94). For example, rather than asking for political and military help only 
from those who could afford to provide such, Roosevelt tapped into the financial 
frustrations so many citizens felt as a result of economic hardship extending from the 
1930s by reminding them that despite the turmoil of the Great Depression, democracy 
was still worth protecting in all financial states—that if one could practice patriotism 
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while economically comfortable, then one could also practice patriotism while 
economically uncomfortable.  
Shortly before beginning his first presidential term, Roosevelt delivered a 
broadcasted speech as the Governor of New York on behalf of the Democratic Party 
during the ​Lucky Strike Radio Hour ​on April 7, 1932 wherein he coined the term 
“forgotten man,” and during which he noted that as a public servant—and not as a 
partisan politician representing just a single party or even those citizens he hoped would 
vote for him in November of that year—he was concerned with the 50-60 million farmers 
who depended on a revitalized purchasing power in order to survive (“Forgotten Man”). 
He emphasized his care for all citizens, regardless of social class or economic standing, 
as equally important in restoring America’s national and economic lifeblood via a 
bottom-up approach: “Main Street, Broadway, the mills, the mines, will close if half the 
buyers are broke” (“Forgotten Man”). Roosevelt saw the farms as supporting the 
factories, who relied on raw goods for production. In the same breath, Roosevelt also 
drew attention to the importance of keeping citizens in their own homes and preventing 
foreclosures. He then continued up the social ladder of American jobs and worked his 
way up to bankers and those responsible for implementing policies that directly affected 
citizens’ ability to purchase commodities needed for both survival and a higher quality of 
living (“Forgotten Man”). In his appeal to citizens across various economic strata, 
Roosevelt played on his listeners’ sense of ethos as he presented himself as a politician 
who cared for the entirety of his constituents, regardless of how much they could 
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contribute to his campaign. This very public broadcast ensured that Americans from coast 
to coast heard the same version of Roosevelt as everyone else and suggested that he was 
comfortable with being transparent about his political ambitions and concerns as he 
sought the presidency. The “Forgotten Man” speech was both informative regarding his 
political platform, and rhetorical as a device for persuading American citizens that he was 
the type of politician others supposedly were not: one concerned with the prosperity and 
well-being of ​all​ Americans. This speech, made shortly before he was elected president 
for the first time, was arguably a persuasive tactic that persuaded Americans to vote 
Roosevelt into the Oval Office. It reasons to assume that if citizens could trust his ethos 
as he worked to dig the nation out of the economic hardships of the Great Depression, 
then they could also trust him as he considered the best course of action in the global war 
that would soon begin unfolding overseas. One need look no further into the past than to 
the “Forgotten Man” speech to recognize when Americans started putting their trust in 
him as a veritable leader through the toughest of times. 
Such one-off speeches attracted a wide audience, but the most persuasive means 
of radio persuasion in support of the war was undeniably President Roosevelt's ​Fireside 
Chats​. Although the radio as a source of news did exist prior to World War II, its use as 
the leading official news medium did not begin until Roosevelt took office in 1933. 
Within one week of assuming executive power, he began his ​Fireside Chats​ series. 
Initially designed to promote his New Deal agenda and explain political and economic 
happenings during the Great Depression in a way the average citizen could easily digest, 
67 
 
Fireside Chats​ served the purpose of unifying the American public in their support for 
Roosevelt and his initiatives. Moreover, addressing the public directly cut out the need 
for the media middleman of newspaper journalists who would condense, summarize, and 
potentially alter Roosevelt’s words en route to the public’s eyes. The more direct radio 
strategy proved effective for Roosevelt, as he was “voted the most popular personality on 
the radio,” and did not have to worry what part of his messages that citizens had heard, 
and whether or not it had been taken out of context (Buxton and Owen 85). Such a direct 
approach to addressing the American public—straight from the White House to the 
suburban living room—was a rhetorical move rooted in logos for Roosevelt but worked 
as an appeal to pathos on the listening citizens. Being called to the radio by the President, 
sharing in the most critical national updates, and hearing current affairs directly from the 
Commander in Chief assigned every American a privileged place in the political realm, at 
least in appearance and sentiment. Upon hearing the national and global news directly 
from Roosevelt himself, and in such a way that could be easily understood by the layman, 
American citizens were much more likely to feel a sense of political efficacy than they 
had in years previous, as economic circumstances spiraled out of control in complex 
ways understood by few outside the circles of Washington or Wall Street. Hearing the 
state of the nation from the one making the most important decisions created an 
aurally-transmitted sense of democratic possibility and need for participation than 
citizens would not have acquired from simply reading a condensed version of such news 
in the papers; the president now beckoned directly to the people, not to the reporters who 
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relayed information to the masses. The average citizen was now deemed important to the 
president, as evidenced by the fact that he requested their direct attention each week in 
his ​Fireside Chats​.  
President Roosevelt carefully constructed, developed, and maintained a specific 
ethos during his presidency, but it was through the radio that this ethos most notably took 
shape. He presented himself as an average citizen, despite his privileged background and 
upbringing. He opened his ​Fireside Chats​ by addressing American citizens as his “dear 
friends,” inviting them in for discussion as a caring peer rather than an authoritative, 
out-of-touch politician. He carefully avoided words and phrases that would alienate the 
common listener, focusing instead on digestible, simple wording that broke down the 
complicated processes and events impacting all sectors of American society, including 
economic, militaristic, social, and even religious (Fried 155). He was also careful to 
avoid taking too extreme a stand for fear of losing citizen support, especially when it 
came to his decision to intervene in a global war (156). By paying close attention to how 
he presented himself and explained his rationale for taking certain actions, Roosevelt 
cultivated a seemingly transparent ethos that easily garnered trust and support from the 
majority of American citizens who were overwhelmingly desperate in a time of 
depression and yet another impending world war. Had Roosevelt chosen to deliver his 
radio broadcasts as a member of the Washington elite, he would have failed to create 
such trust with his listeners—and thus, with his citizenry. Because Americans could 
access and understand the news Roosevelt delivered, they most likely felt little resistance 
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to agreeing to his future war plans, as he had presented himself as someone who 
seemingly told the truth, held nothing back, and most importantly, had nothing to hide. 
Toward the close of the decade, as war broke out in Europe, Roosevelt’s attention 
during his weekly ​Fireside Chats ​shifted toward increasing attention to international 
affairs in addition to the emphasis he sustained on domestic issues. As he realized the 
probability of the United States’ intervention in the war, he simultaneously realized his 
responsibility to drum up public support for it. He had already created an ethos as a 
leader who embraced the challenges of the Great Depression, and he used this rhetorical 
reputation he had created for himself as a base on which to build logos-centered war 
support. A turn toward logos only took a slight comparison to those European nations 
falling victim to Axis conquest to remind the American public that not all people were 
even given an option to decide for themselves whether to support their country’s military 
agenda (Brewer 81). By reminding Americans that democracy itself afforded them the 
privilege to support their nation, Roosevelt strategically positioned citizens to either 
support a war to protect democratic freedom (or at least, the illusion of it), or compromise 
that very freedom and become the equivalent of one of Hitler’s conquests. By presenting 
citizens with two options—support and prosper, or do not support and risk your life and 
freedom—Roosevelt framed adopting a prowar stance as the only logical choice a citizen 
might make. 
If an appeal to logos for the “forgotten man” allowed for an individual to 
contribute despite economic hardship and if s(he) was able to do so in the name of 
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preserving democratic freedom, then both Roosevelt and the OWI’s strategy had to be 
focused on what the individual could contribute to the war effort; in other words, if 
average citizens were being incited through radio-delivered messages to contribute to the 
war effort, then they also needed to be given options that would feasibly allow them to do 
so despite any financial limitations they might have been facing. Roosevelt and the OWI 
encouraged citizens to enlist in the armed forces, purchase war bonds, ration goods, and 
when possible, become increasingly self-reliant for everyday necessities rather than 
purchasing them (such as by growing one’s own vegetables or recycling clothing) 
(Brewer 80). Citizens with more social and financial capital—such as those who owned 
or had access to airtime on the radio—were asked to support the war effort. If all citizens 
could contribute by buying into these same practices, then all citizens could be called out 
to and appealed to via the radio—and addressed as the collective “forgotten man” whose 
hardships would no longer be ignored or discredited by the political machine that was 
Washington. The “forgotten man,” then, became the stand-in for the entirety of the 
listening radio public—in short, for the entirety of the American public, as citizens across 
all demographics had suffered some degree of stress during the Depression.  
Such a massing together of all citizens from across social strata further served to 
increase national unification and support for the war because underneath the appeal to 
logos was an appeal to pathos—that of being recognized and valued, and of belonging to 
a collective. To make American citizens feel invited and welcomed into his circle, 
Roosevelt strategically chose simple, common words and avoided political jargon; he 
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kept his speech general and somewhat vague rather than specifically speaking to 
particular people or aspects of the convention itself; he spoke slowly enough to be easily 
understood by those who only had the affordance of hearing, and not for those who had 
the affordances of both hearing and seeing. His audience awareness, coupled with and 
influenced by technological awareness, ultimately worked to produce feelings of 
fondness and trust from a listening nation. American citizens may have felt forgotten 
during the Great Depression, but now it was their individual contributions that the 
president—that friendly, familiar voice from the radio—was calling upon to fuel the 
nation through war. The forgotten man became the most pivotal resource for achieving 
global military victory. 
Extenuating circumstances, and Roosevelt’s response to them, would prove more 
than enough reason for the forgotten man to contribute to the war effort. Heavily 
appealing to both his own ethos and the pathos of a shocked nation, Roosevelt petitioned 
both Congress and American citizens for support to engage in a hot war on December 8, 
1941. In a radio-aired Congressional address, President Roosevelt asked for permission to 
enter the United States in World War II, risking economic strain on a nation still reeling 
from the collapse of its financial infrastructure over a decade prior. Yet, the relationship 
Roosevelt had built with citizens through his weekly radio broadcasts—a relationship 
built on a truthfully genuine and caring ethos—proved much stronger than the nation’s 
understandable hesitancy to entangle the United States in what was until that moment a 
European affair. While Roosevelt’s ethos may have been enough to draw support for the 
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war effort—a support that was enthusiastically backed in the form of Congressional 
approval to formally enter the war—Roosevelt did not have to rely solely on his person 
for military backing. Due to the dramatic and traumatic nature of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt naturally drew on pathos as a mechanism of soliciting an 
overwhelming American support for retaliation and the pursuit of justice against those 
who had, for the first time in decades, threatened American soil with an act of war. By 
addressing Congress within twenty-four hours of the attack, Roosevelt drew emotional 
support when citizens’ emotions were still raw, in shock, and least prone to being 
tempered by logos—instead of by offering a more careful consideration of what the road 
ahead may have looked like for a financially struggling country to engage itself in a 
global war that showed little sign of ending in the foreseeable future. 
While the Roosevelt administration did make smart use of the radio to directly 
speak to citizens, one cannot ignore the role the government played in determining what 
could and could not be aired during radio programming. Because the medium’s use as a 
type of newspaper for the ears was still in its infancy, the idea that the government’s role 
should be limited as it relates to the press was not yet a topic of discussion amongst the 
public. As a result, the Roosevelt agenda was able to significantly filter what was said 
about politics on national radio programming—and to a heavy extent, what was said on 
local programming as well. As the war dragged on and the United States eventually 
engaged in combat, the need to maintain national security through monitoring radio 
programming took an even stronger hold: “It is nearly impossible, after all, to tell the 
73 
 
story of radio broadcasting during this period without acknowledging the steadily 
increasing dominance of…the government’s heavy-handed influence on broadcasting 
during the war” (Loviglio 92). In what proved to be a highly strategic move, the 
government kept quiet about its role as radio authority, meanwhile giving the impression 
that this mostly-entertainment, sometimes-news source was more democratic than it 
actually was. At its foundation, radio was a heavily co-opted medium guarded by 
Roosevelt himself and the OWI department he created, though the former’s appeal to 
pathos and ethos effectively prevented too much suspicion of this government-media 
relationship at the public level. The government even allowed a limited voicing of 
opposition to the Roosevelt administration on the radio, further disguising its role in 
media ownership at the time. 
Roosevelt did not stand alone as the singular voice of wartime radio; he was often 
discredited, fought against, and even ridiculed on the airwaves by a few key figures who 
vehemently opposed American intervention in what they considered a strictly European 
war. This camp of protestors—the countercollective known during this time as 
isolationists—often waited for Roosevelt and other interventionists to publicize prowar 
sentiments before they took to their own radio programs in denouncement of those very 
sentiments. While the countercollective had opposed Roosevelt’s national policies—both 
war-related and not—before December of 1941, their focus on dismantling popular 
opinion in support of Roosevelt or American involvement in a global war did not gain 
much momentum until the Japanese Imperial Forces attacked Pearl Harbor on December 
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7, 1941—an event after which many Americans declared themselves interventionists due 
to a feeling of justification for retaliation, or just simply for maintaining national security 
and defense in a war that the United States neither instigated nor rushed to join. Not 
surprisingly, what resulted was a nationwide civil battle fought over the airwaves to 
determine America’s extent of involvement in World War II. However, this 
technologically-enhanced debate between the collective and countercollective also 
created a surprising result: a unification of the public on a scale grand enough to warrant 
consideration of it as a return to tribal consciousness. In the post-industrial age, this 
unified response illustrates a consubstantial collective. 
The Countercollective 
World War II has gone down in modern American memory not only as the radio 
war, but also as “the good war.” It has become fictionalized as this moment in time when 
the men were brave, the women supported them, and the nation rallied together as a 
homogeneously unified mass to defeat the forces of evil (Bodnar 2, 35, 193-94, 200-01). 
Culturally and historically, the conflict has been entombed in a rhetoric of justification, 
necessity, and glamorized victory. However, critical oppositional voices and moments are 
largely ignored in this common narrative, and the reality of a conflicted public is easily 
overlooked.  
In his study of public memory, John Bodnar notes “that the memory and the 
meaning of that war was actually a matter of contention among Americans who lived 
through those times” (1). Yet, despite this nostalgic take on historical events, the facts 
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still exist: the war was also fought for additional ulterior motives, and the American 
forces entered it too much later after other Western nations to claim that a moral 
obligation to check a tyrant was the guiding factor for involvement—or else the nation 
would have acted as soon as political allies came under attack. Mixed feelings associated 
with every stage of the conflict were muddied and contested among citizens. Bodnar 
notes that the overall feelings of the war were decidedly antiwar for quite some time due 
to public memory of the devastating human and financial cost of World War I (11). In the 
time between the end of World War I and America’s entrance into World War II, antiwar 
citizens had banded together to create the America First Committee. This group took an 
adamant stand against involvement in international conflict, and particularly dedicated 
itself “to resisting Roosevelt’s efforts to confront Hitler’s power” (11). Key figures stood 
out during the Roosevelt years as voices against intervention, and though they may go 
unnoticed or discredited in modern memory of the war, their opposition to Roosevelt’s 
call for support demonstrated the rhetorical and technological savvy of the 
countercollective, which would come to shape future protest rhetoric and use of mass 
media. Two men in particular—Father Coughlin and Huey Long—made their opposition 
to Roosevelt well-known and made strategic use of the radio to garner support from 
American citizens who also found themselves unhappy with the President’s plans. Their 
brazen calls to form a protest against Roosevelt influenced the use of the radio as a 
national medium and citizens’ responses to Roosevelt right before and during the war. 
The scope and long-lasting influence both men exerted on the national level was the 
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result of a highly strategic rhetoric that involved charisma, brash ambition, and a public 
call to defend the “threatened values and institutions” of the ordinary citizen (Brinkley 
143). As opponents to Roosevelt, these men shared ideologies for the future of America 
that involved a return to individual security and wealth, a collective uprising against 
federal powers that wielded too much control, and a returned focus to the stability of the 
United States rather than shifting the focus to a global war (143-44). 
One of the most prominent antiwar figures plaguing Roosevelt both before and 
during the war was Father Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest based near Detroit, 
Michigan. His weekly broadcast, ​The Hour of Power​, began as a religiously-based radio 
program designed for Catholic listeners wishing to learn more about the faith. However, 
it became clear rather quickly that Father Coughlin’s political leanings would heavily 
influence his programming, and eventually came to characterize the show completely. By 
the early 1930s the show was predominantly political in nature (Brinkley 83). ​The Hour 
of Power​, while initially pro-Roosevelt due to a brief political alliance, eventually took a 
sharp turn against Roosevelt and adamantly propagated an isolationist approach in direct 
opposition to that which the president requested from the public. While Coughlin’s 
broadcast was originally only heard by those in his local Michigan community, his 
popularity increasingly grew to encompass the surrounding Midwest region. CBS later 
picked up his program and aired it nationally, though it was not long before his show was 
cancelled because of his criticism of Roosevelt and the potential ramifications CBS faced 
from the OWI if they continued to allow Coughlin’s isolationist rhetoric air time. 
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Coughlin’s ethos in his specific time and place played an undeniably important 
role in securing an audience base. Had Coughlin not been based in a dominantly Catholic 
area of the country during a time when Christian church membership was more common 
than not, Coughlin’s appeal to listeners would most likely have meant very little. Had 
Coughlin begun his radio program while based in a church outside the Catholic 
stronghold of the Midwest (which also reached listeners in the Northeast, another 
stronghold of the Catholic faith), few may have noticed or cared for his religious 
views—and thus would not have been introduced to his political ones. However, those 
Catholic listeners who first became acquainted with Coughlin during the early days of his 
radio program—which did not veer from traditional tenets of the Catholic faith—would 
have had little reason to resist his political agenda, especially if such an agenda were 
couched within the context of Coughlin’s religious ethos. If he had not failed them in the 
religious arena after so long, why would he prove inaccurate or wholly erroneous now? If 
he had suspect political leanings, why would he have been so favored for so long, and by 
so many? Coughlin’s political broadcasts followed on the coattails of a religious 
reputation he had already cultivated, thereby granting him a wider realm of influence than 
he would have had otherwise. Time and place—1930s and 1940s Midwest—were the 
linchpins in creating this reputation in the first place. 
As arguably the strongest opponent of Roosevelt and his wartime agenda, Father 
Coughlin’s appeals to logos secured his followers’ acceptance of his political stance more 
strongly than would have been possible with just his appeals to ethos alone. If listeners 
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first tuned in for Coughlin’s ethos as a religious figure, then it was his logos that 
cemented listeners’ agreement with this controversial antagonist. In fact, his introduction 
first as a religious leader, then as a logical, critical thinker with strong political opinions 
demonstrates such logos itself and was undoubtedly a carefully constructed approach on 
Coughlin’s part. 
Coughlin’s appeal to his listeners’ logic began well before the United States’ 
entrance into World War II, and only increased in importance as Coughlin sought to 
maintain momentum and the support of his loyal listeners. His critical questioning of 
Roosevelt’s approach to the economy during the 1930s challenged the government’s 
official agenda for re-stabilizing the nation as international tension was mounting in 
Europe. Coughlin sharply disagreed with Roosevelt’s complete overhaul of certain 
economic structures that struck the priest as a threat to the capitalist ideals he supported. 
As Roosevelt worked incrementally to repair the economic damage wrought by the stock 
market crash of 1929, Coughlin noted it was never quite enough to truly fix the disastrous 
effects—Roosevelt’s measures were consistently too conservative (Brinkley 114). In fact, 
from the beginning of Roosevelt’s presidency, Coughlin proved a thorn in his side: 
“Nothing...troubled members of the [Roosevelt] Administration in its first months as 
Coughlin’s intervention in a major banking controversy in Detroit just after the 
inauguration. It was an episode that earned Coughlin national publicity” (192-93). This 
moment simultaneously marked Coughlin as no longer simply a religious figure, but as a 
political analyst with access to technology that would carry his voice across a region. 
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Because he had already presented logical evidence as to why certain—but very crucial 
elements—of Roosevelt’s plans for the nation were ill-conceived and would also prove 
ill-executed, it logically followed (to those who supported Coughlin’s stance) that his 
argument against Roosevelt as the possibility of war loomed was also logically sound and 
could be trusted. 
Father Coughlin’s appeal to the masses did not end with his credentials as a 
religious leader, or with his analysis of political and economic events; he also cultivated 
quite the reputation for his emotional delivery of both religious and political convictions. 
As a priest, an appeal to emotion is expected to some degree.Persuading parishioners of 
their need to repent, to support the local church, to seek out religious authority figures for 
confession, and to tithe regularly depends on one’s ability to convince people that their 
very souls rely on such devotion. Because religious matters are often not up for empirical 
debate (which would rest more on logos than pathos), Father Coughlin had much 
experience and expertise in flexing his emotional muscle—and persuading his 
congregation to comply with the wishes he made from the pulpit. When the United States 
deliberated on an appropriate level of involvement in Europe’s ongoing war, Coughlin 
seized the opportunity to use his position as a religious official who was expected to 
incorporate an element of pathos; in this way, Coughlin presented his countercollective 
stance as a matter of such passion that he was inclined—even morally and spiritually 
so—to discuss such issues with his parishioners and listeners. As a devoted congregation, 
his followers must have interpreted his political discussions as divinely inspired; if some 
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supernatural power had not inspired the priest to speak of such matters, then why would 
this trusted religious official do so? In this way, their understanding of and dedication to 
their faith rested in part on not just tolerating Coughlin’s political talk, but even accepting 
and practicing it themselves. To do anything else would have created a cognitive 
dissonance that brought their faith into question. 
Beyond his motivation for discussing political matters, Coughlin capitalized on 
his listeners’ sense of pathos in the mannerisms of his speech. Coughlin was 
well-rehearsed in using his voice to elicit a particular emotional response. Knowing the 
affordances and limitations of his medium, Coughlin emphasized key traits in his voice 
that would work to soothe listeners and make them feel comforted and secure;thus, they 
would feel confident trusting Coughlin’s advice. By playing on a deep, masculine voice 
with strategically timed tonal inflections, “Coughlin retrained a trace of an Irish brogue, 
which he often exaggerated for effect...to add warmth and color” to a voice well-known 
and an accent comforting to those of the traditional Irish Catholic faith and 
community—the base of his listeners, at least initially (Brinkley 92). 
Because Coughlin was the only major figure—and the only syndicated one, 
though briefly—to make use of regular radio programming to combat Roosevelt’s 
agenda, the novelty of the countercollective using this electronic medium to challenge the 
government’s decisions drew much attention, and made citizens aware that they could 
hold opinions and ideologies that differed from that of the prowar collective and of the 
traditional power structure that was the American government. Although Coughlin was 
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eventually taken off the air because his censures posed too much of a threat to prowar 
morale, the seed of protest had been planted: the public now realized they could use the 
same technology to speak out when they disagreed with their government. 
Coughlin did not stand alone in his criticism of Roosevelt’s policies. Huey Long, 
a Senator from Louisiana, also proved a formidable antagonist to the Roosevelt 
administration and drummed up much unrest with the federal government leading up to 
his 1935 assassination. While he did not live to see the attack on Pearl Harbor or 
America’s entrance into war, Long’s influence on citizen support would outlive him. His 
questioning of the government’s intentions and (lack of) concern for the 
public—especially for the common man struggling to rebuild after the Great 
Depression—created a political environment in which citizens were prompted to 
critically question the government’s policies on all fronts, including decisions regarding 
global war.  
In a similar manner to Father Coughlin, Huey Long capitalized on his 
longstanding ethos as a public figure who had both time and experience in the public 
arena. Long was in some ways the political equivalent of Father Coughlin—he was well 
known to his constituency, he was respected in his field, and he used his public platform 
to openly criticize Roosevelt’s agenda. As a popular favorite of Louisiana voters, Long’s 
ethos was built partly on his larger-than-life reputation—as suggested by his nickname 
“The Kingfish”—as well as his quick ascent from local politician, to senator, to state 
governor. Such notoriety and quick succession to increasing levels of power implied 
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Long possessed the authority and credibility to be in such positions in the first 
place—and if he deserved to be in these positions, then it would follow, at least in the 
minds of many voters, that Long could be trusted, or else he would not have been elected 
to these positions of political power and influence in the first place.  
Long had developed a reputation for being loud, strongly opinionated, and 
unabashed in his political ambition (Brinkley 28). Like Roosevelt and Coughlin, Long 
was highly effective in his strategic use of radio to both inform citizens and to garner 
support, and he was one of the first politicians to make use of radio technology on the 
campaign trail (26). He realized early in Roosevelt’s administration how critical the radio 
would be for both men’s political careers, and 
 
Five days after Franklin Roosevelt delivered his first ‘Fireside Chat’ over the 
radio to explain the provisions of the Emergency Banking Act, Long took to the 
air himself [and] delivered the first of what was to become a three-year series of 
folksy radio addresses to move himself to the forefront of the popular 
consciousness. (62) 
 
 
In one of his earliest radio rebuttals to Roosevelt, Long strategically framed his concern 
with the Emergency Banking Act as a need to assist the President, as he would be unable 
to accomplish the task alone. In suggesting public support, Long presented his strained 
relationship with the President as friendly, even supportive—a move noted by some 
political rhetoric scholars as “cagey” (62). To the average citizen, though, such a 
rhetorical move might suggest a man of character who wanted to help the nation move on 
from the turmoil of the Great Depression. This same rhetorical move could have also 
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struck listeners as one of logos, as Long suggested that the massive overhauls to 
American infrastructure could not be accomplished without some sense of teamwork. In 
his rebuttal broadcast to Roosevelt’s first radio chat, Long disguised his concern by 
implying to listeners that Roosevelt sought a financial plan to rebuild an economically 
depressed America in much the same way Long sought—a plan which was much more 
radical than anything Roosevelt desired to do. Thus, Roosevelt would ultimately 
disappoint those who had been led to expect from him something similar to Long’s 
financial plans for redistributing wealth, so citizen unrest would increase with Roosevelt. 
This disappointment—Long hoped—would put the Louisiana Senator in a more 
favorable position with his constituents who viewed him as the common man’s ally rather 
than a cog in the federal political machine (62).  
As Long established himself as a state and then national political figure, he 
simultaneously established himself as a radio celebrity. Like Roosevelt, he began relying 
on the radio to “bring his voice to millions of Americans so that, using his considerable 
broadcasting skill, he could soothe their fears about him and exhort them to ever greater 
efforts on his behalf,” which led him to become a major contributor for NBC by 1935 
(Brinkley 71). While his flamboyant, even aggressive, demeanor was often considered 
professionally inappropriate, Long’s concern remained from the inception of his political 
career on the common citizen—the one whose own autonomy had been compromised by 
a federal government too big for its own good. Long sought to repair local governments, 
returning power to the voters rather than taking from them and redistributing their wealth 
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to a concentrated power structure in Washington (148). In fact, this power structure 
became one of the most popular tenets on which Long built his career. Though he died 
six years before the United States entered World War II, Long’s impact on Roosevelt’s 
reputation worked against the president, leading many citizens, mostly in the Southern 
states, to question Roosevelt’s intentions, motivations, and rationale for both his 
sweeping social restructuring program of the New Deal, as well as his later call for 
Congressional approval to go to war. 
Father Coughlin and Huey Long are well remembered for their opposition to 
Roosevelt and his collective, yet during the 1930s and 1940s, public opinion of the 
president was also swayed by a highly notable celebrity who is often overlooked when 
examining the political events of this time period. As a third outspoken critic of 
Roosevelt's interventionist agenda, Charles Lindbergh commanded a considerable 
amount of media attention due to his public fame as a celebrated aviator. On September 
15, 1939, he delivered a radio-broadcasted speech as a leader of the foremost isolationist 
network in the nation, the America First Committee. His speech was aired on all three 
major radio networks and was heard nationally. In a second radio-broadcasted speech on 
October 13, 1939, he clarified that he understood that entering the war for political 
reasons was unproductive and ill-advised. However, he personally wanted to get involved 
in the entire affair only because he felt the white race was being threatened overseas 
(David S. Wyman Institute). While he minimized this latter point, Lindbergh’s appeal to 
the public was not based on logos to begin with, so he did not actually need an intricate 
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logos-backed argument in order to persuade citizens to consider the countercollective's 
point of view. As a national hero and celebrity for his daring aviation feats, Lindbergh 
capitalized entirely on his ethos to persuade his audience. Like Father Coughlin and 
Long, Lindbergh relied on his reputation as a professional in his field and on the 
character his listeners assumed he possessed because of it. 
The collective and countercollective clashed and fought for the minds of citizens 
via radio broadcasts, spreading ideologies and sentiments in hopes the public would 
adopt their view and act accordingly. While the radio was heavily dominated by the 
interventionist approach of the collective, the seeds were being sown during World War 
II that would later grow into a more apparent and powerful phenomenon threatening to 
shake up the power structure with nationwide protests during the following heavily 
mediated war. Without radio, the multiplicity of voices would not have reached 
Americans with the same velocity and impact; electronic technology’s affordances are 
what created a public that had the possibility to separate into multiple collectives, each 
with their own desires concerning the war. Moreover, these multiple collectives also had 
the possibility to make their desires nationally known, to all citizens simultaneously. 
But the “conversation” enabled by radio was not a two-way street, as the 
government still held syndication rights, making all radio programming subject to their 
approval. It was their disapproval of Father Coughlin’s program that eventually took him 
off the air, stripping the countercollective of their most popular and only truly 
nationally-heard representative. In this instance, the prowar collective retained their 
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power and upheld the traditional power structure of the nation, with the president and his 
administration still controlling the agenda and what citizens heard. Coughlin’s loss of 
airtime privilege—and the fact that airtime was a privilege at all, not a 
right—significantly weakened the potential threat the countercollective posed to the 
traditional power structure of the American government. Because the government still 
controlled syndication, the only way for citizens to express dissatisfaction or 
disagreement—or even satisfaction and agreement—was to write letters to the radio 
stations themselves or the White House directly. Though this often did nothing, as the 
stations were held by law and subject to the government, and they might still choose not 
to discuss countercollective sentiments mailed to them. While these letters may have 
influenced radio programming to some degree, they were not shared with the rest of the 
nation. So, while citizens across the country heard collectivist programming, only those 
working for the radio stations and the government had access to read the letters sent in 
from citizens who identified as part of the countercollective. The only nationally-heard 
conversation was not a conversation at all, because it was dominated by prowar efforts, 
creating the illusion that the collective voice was the only voice. 
The Medium and The Public 
The uneven power struggle of the airwaves created tangible results in how 
American citizens responded to the war effort. With the majority of radio programming 
supporting the collective agenda, it is no surprise that history has not noted any major 
upheaval or resistance to World War II on the part of American citizens, save for those 
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few key figures previously discussed. The radio as a technological medium of mass 
communication possesses a power that had not been tapped into during the previous war 
world, and its use as both collective and countercollective unifier was unanticipated. 
Marshall McLuhan considered radio a unifying medium that worked its technological 
magic to bring individuals back together following the prevalence of the written word: 
“Radio affects most people intimately, person-to-person, offering a world of unspoken 
communication between writer-speaker and listener...The subliminal depths of radio are 
charged with the resonating echoes of tribal horns and antique drums” (​Understanding 
Media​ 401). His argument hinged on radio functioning as an extension of the human 
central nervous system, with the power to “create depth involvement for everybody” who 
shared in a common listening experience (400). In a literate society where citizens were 
accustomed to reading newspapers independently, and often in the privacy of their own 
homes, the importance of radio during World War II, as well as in the years leading up to 
American involvement in it, deeply impacted the social structure of both citizen support 
and protest as a return to some degree of retribalization began to take hold. People were 
not reading separate newspapers at separate times in separate locations during this war; 
they were collectively tuning into Roosevelt’s live ​Fireside Chats​ at the same time, on 
the same day. They knew they were collectively participating in an activity. While they 
still may have been in their individual homes, the power of radio’s immediacy and 
synchronicity brought people a step closer when learning national and global news in a 
way that they had never before experienced. 
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The radio created a common national identity for American listeners largely 
through the technological affordance of information centralization: “radio’s centrality to 
national identity, its powerful claims on public and private registers of experience, and its 
displacement of older social institutions” brought the mass public together in a way 
previous media had been unable to (Hilmes and Loviglio xi; Loviglio 89). As the public 
began tuning in to popular radio programming in larger numbers, broadcasters picked up 
on the rhetorically effective strategy of reflecting the “American identity” back to the 
listeners by “reformulating American history to stress ordinary people, rather than 
powerful and wealthy politicians and business leaders, as the inventors and sustainers of 
American democracy” (Smith 210). This tactic of reflecting the identity of the collective 
also encouraged citizens who disagreed to remain relatively quiet. As the minority, the 
countercollective would have felt pressured to reconsider their own stance or to at least 
visibly conform to social expectations regarding war support, as potential ostracization 
from the rest of the collective may have been a consequence that persuaded dissenters to 
refrain from speaking out against the war too loudly (Jowett and O’Donnell 184). In fact, 
faction among citizens was more or less quelled if judged by radio programming: “radio 
waves and their impervious mobility across social boundaries […] served as an ideal 
symbol for national togetherness” (Hilmes and Loviglio xi). By all appearances, a 
collective of supporters had been brought together by a centralized medium. 
Understanding the impact the radio had on the nation involves more analysis than 
that of the messages themselves; beyond the words spoken, the medium itself shaped how 
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American citizens responded to the war effort. McLuhan notes that “It’s not the message 
itself that’s important in the electric age—it’s the effect it creates, the change it 
instigates” (​Understanding Media​ 43). According to McLuhan, the radio served to 
centralize the public into a singular collective where “social interaction [is] characterized 
by the intense mutual involvement of the members of the community and [is] the 
opposite of the detached individualism and private identities characteristic of a literate 
culture under mechanical technology” (567). The home was no longer a private dwelling 
once the voices of Roosevelt and Coughlin were invited in; they now spoke, in real time, 
directly to Americans as they appealed for support either for or against the war. McLuhan 
suggested that the “person to person directness that is private and intimate” is what 
created a sense of identification between American listeners and the voices they heard on 
the radio (​The Book of Probes ​188).  
Beyond the words spoken and their effect of creating the collective and 
countercollective, the radio’s success in restructuring the nature of society in wartime lies 
in part in its quick delivery. The speed-up in dispersion of information and 
opinion-formation demonstrates how instantaneous the radio was in shaping Americans’ 
responses to these figures and their respective collective or countercollective. In fact, 
McLuhan suggested that the radio was, in some sense, a violent means for creating a 
collective and countercollective consciousness. Though rather than one unified national 
collective, American citizens found themselves choosing between two camps: “Just 
before the war, Roosevelt discovered the means of making the radio fireside chat a kind 
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of firing line, a new kind of political violence to recover the sense of identity” (​War and 
Peace ​134). Coughlin, Long, and Lindbergh, too, discovered that they could use the radio 
as their own firing line. With one hour each week, both the collective and 
countercollective fought for the attention and sympathies of the American public, 
suggesting that war was taking place both in Europe and at home. The radio itself was a 
battleground. 
Beyond the creation of a collective and countercollective centralized through the 
radio, McLuhan’s framework also draws attention to the role the ear played in engaging 
citizens politically and publicly in a way it had not since pre-print literacy days. The way 
the brain interprets information as internalized through the ears rather than through the 
eyes changes the way individuals respond and the cues to which they respond. Print 
sources presented information linearly, asynchronously, and statically. Radio 
programming, however, was not held to linearity, was synchronous in presentation 
(Roosevelt always spoke at ten o’clock on Sunday evenings, for example), and it was 
dynamic, as broadcasters could change their scripts at a moment’s notice based on 
incoming information. In her argument that radio played an even more pivotal role than 
television in shaping American culture during wartime, Susan J. Douglas mentions that 
part of what made this medium so persuasive in capturing citizens’ attention was “the 
bringing of national and international news, with the actual sounds of political rallies, 
air-raid sirens, or gunfire, right into people’s living rooms, bedrooms, and 
kitchen...Listeners were transported to different places and times by radio” (162). 
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Douglas also notes that while informational news broadcasting has always had a 
reputation as being delivered in flat tones, that broadcast journalism—which was itself a 
novelty in the late 1930s and early 1940s—emphasized a more imaginative delivery that 
can best be described as “dimensional listening, as people were compelled to conjure up 
maps, topographies, street scenes in London after a bombing, a warship being 
dive-bombed by the Luftwaffe” (163). In other words, the radio afforded citizens a 
chance to “participate” in what felt, to some degree, like a conversation that included 
them in real time, and even in “real place,” as they were led to imagine the scenes being 
reported as if witnessing them for themselves. Moreover, reporters played a role in 
helping listeners set up these imaginative scenes by subtly influencing their interpretation 
of the events and places being reported. In her examination of news reports during 
wartime, she notes a pattern of “certain radio reporters subtly leading public opinion 
toward a less isolationist stance, a worldview more sympathetic to mobilization and, 
eventually, engagement” (163).  
While history may focus primarily on the justification and support of the Good 
War, the time period leading up to the conflict and the four years of American active 
engagement in it were not unmarked by a protest movement. The radio played a key role 
in American protest during World War II, though both collective and countercollective 
radio programming was ephemeral and many of the broadcasts were not recorded for 
posterity. From the extant broadcasts that do survive, it can be noted that the same 
qualities that made the radio apt for creating a patriotic, war-supporting national identity 
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also lent themselves to the creation of a countercollective: “Radio often played with the 
subversive potential of unseen voices, challenging and even mocking conventional social 
norms. It also allowed specialized arenas of American culture to reach a wider public,” 
including providing a wider public platform from which minorities—especially of the 
political nature—could vocalize their messages to the wider public (Hilmes and Loviglio 
xiii; Hilmes 3).  
Although radio was still technically a unidirectional form of communication in 
that the public was the audience, listening to the speaker without a chance to directly talk 
back, the radio rhetorically worked to increase tribalization across America in two 
significant ways: it necessitated the sense of hearing which had taken a back seat in a 
highly literate society, and it accommodated a wider audience in any given moment than 
its major competitor for newscasting, the newspaper, as many people could gather around 
a single radio set to listen to the same program at the same time, and newspapers were not 
easily shared by multiple readers at once. These changes suggested to radio listeners that 
what they encountered on the radio was somehow more interactive, more immersive, than 
reading a paper. McLuhan argues that the radio was itself a “hot medium,” meaning that 
it provided all the necessary information for listeners by “extend[ing] one single sense in 
‘high definition’” or emphasizing its use more than that of other senses (​Understanding 
Media​ 39). In comparison to later media such as the television and Internet, the radio is 
indeed a hot medium, as it does not allow for the same type of interactivity of multiple 
senses. However, compared to the previous most popular news source—the 
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newspaper—the radio is cooler in that it presents its content as if it were a conversation, 
though listeners cannot respond directly back to the voice on the airwaves. Its “aliveness” 
made the radio appear more participatory than it actually was. Its novelty as the leading 
news source combined with that “aliveness” created an environment wherein citizens felt 
more engaged in discussion concerning the war, thus contributing to a feeling of 
collectivism and active engagement in public matters. 
World War II truly was the radio war. A vehicle of entertainment by day and 
wartime news informer by night, the radio introduced the nation to a novel sensory 
experience that intrigued the brain by way of ear—and in turn created a new social 
structure that encouraged participation in a more communal way than the newspaper ever 
did. What is more, the accessibility of the radio, with its mass production and relative 
affordability, created an environment in which the public en masse could virtually come 
together over the airwaves in their role as audience when the president or his critics 
delivered their messages concerning the nation’s next steps. While rhetors have always 
sought public audiences, the use of the radio as the prime medium changed the landscape 
of mass communication because it permeated the traditional civic boundaries, moving 
now through both the public and private spheres. The technology was ripe for rhetorical 
ownership, and Roosevelt and Coughlin most notably made strategic rhetorical use of this 
new technology. However, it was Roosevelt who proved most savvy with his appeals to 
the public, as not only did the nation indeed engage in war, but the public at large 
responded with overwhelming support. Yet, Roosevelt’s detractors proved no small 
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challenge to the charismatic and persuasive president; indeed, Father Coughlin, Huey 
Long, and Charles Lindbergh paved the way for protestors in the electronic age by 
modeling an intelligent strategy for inciting protest. By mimicking the rhetorical stylings 
of President Roosevelt, Coughlin and his peers competed with the official prowar agenda 
in a most subtle way—by conveying messages laden with ethos and pathos that were so 
similar to those they were countering. Their strategy ultimately fell short, as the protest 
movement against the prowar agenda failed to take hold in a meaningful way on the 
national level. Albert Fried argues that this shortcoming was due largely because 
“Roosevelt knew America to its depths, and his enemies and critics and the leaders of 
radical movements and sects did not” (9). While both Roosevelt and his detractors knew 
how​ to speak to the public, Roosevelt proved to be the most adept at also knowing ​what 
to say that would convince his listeners most assuredly. Roosevelt offered what his critics 
could not: a political ethos that overrode the religious and otherwise fame-backed ethos 
of figures like Coughlin, Long, and Lindbergh; a logos entrenched in military, financial, 
and international policy that provided certain action plans for the present and future of 
America; and a pathos that pitted Americans against the antiwar agenda as a means of 
safety, security, and national and cultural preservation following the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE VIETNAM WAR: AMERICA’S FIRST TELEVISION WAR 
 
 
A new form of “politics” is emerging, and in ways we haven’t yet noticed. The 
living room has become a voting booth. Participation via television in Freedom 
Marches, in war, revolution, pollution, and other events is changing ​everything​. 
Marshall McLuhan, ​The Medium is the Massage​ 22 
 
 
From 1955 to 1975, the United States fought a highly controversial war that 
carried a price tag of 58,220 American bodies (National Archives). The Vietnam War 
began quietly, dragged on languidly, and ended, as T.S. Eliot would have said, “not with 
a bang but with a whimper” (65). The generation of soldiers who had fought and won 
World War II for the Allied forces now watched as their children enlisted—and later, 
were drafted—into a major conflict that, if not won, posed an ominous future for the rest 
of the globe. Fearing the Communism that had been spreading in Asia, the United States 
proactively engaged in a conflict to prevent domination by outside forces so as not to 
present an opportunity for the world’s next Hitler. No clear victory—at least for the 
United States—has become evident in the four decades that have passed since.  
The conflict in Vietnam was shaped by, and in turn shaped, particular events that 
produced an experience drastically different from that of World War II. The newest, most 
popular form of mass media communication was the television, where the war would 
play out in front of the American public. Citizens read and heard about—and for the 
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first time in history, ​saw​—the war from afar, in their own homes. ​Television 
programming showed prowar messages via presidential addresses and newscasts that 
often relied on logos and ethos, but countercollective views subtly crept in and raised 
questions about both the success and ethics of American military action in Vietnam, often 
expressing frustration with the war via pathos-infused demonstrations. ​Unlike the days of 
World War II, those of the Vietnam War saw more citizens questioning the government 
they had trusted just twenty years earlier as the public at large became increasingly 
exposed to the dark realities of war of which they had not been privy to during the Good 
War. 
For it was the Good War that created a widespread belief that because the 
government had acted justly in retaliating against Axis forces, it could be trusted as an 
institution to judiciously choose when and how to engage in military action (Hamilton 
11). In fact, the overwhelming public support for World War II has been argued as the 
historically “best example of wartime consensus in this country” because the public had 
been convinced that war was the only logical response to the Axis threat (Gustanis xv). 
This public sentiment persisted through the 1950s, but began to erode in the 1960s due to 
rising political tensions as American body counts continued to grow when no end for the 
Vietnam War seemed to be in sight. This tension took on a heightened degree of 
seriousness in 1968 when American forces were caught off guard and their security 
dramatically compromised during the Tet Offensive (Hamilton 299; Moorcraft and 
Taylor 82). The myth that Vietnam was a winnable war shattered following the Tet 
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Offensive; no longer did the American public by and large buy into the official story 
being told to them by the government (Cumings 83). This atmosphere of domestic unrest 
following the attacks readied a portion of the American public to participate in protests 
the likes of which had been unheard of during World War II.  
However, the public’s frustration with the war had been mounting even before the 
Tet Offensive. The military-press relationship had been strained since the Eisenhower 
administration, which had created an atmosphere of distrust and persuaded many citizens 
that the government either withheld information about, or misrepresented, American 
military action abroad (Wyatt 33).  Multiple mishandlings of media relations on the part 11
of four American presidents continued to mar the public’s perception of the war. 
However, the military-press relationship, political missteps, and rising causality numbers 
may have been better received by the public had not one particular force been present to 
make sure American citizens kept talking about Vietnam (and particularly about its 
increasing drawbacks)—the television. 
The Vietnam War escalated during the Kennedy administration and drew more 
domestic and international attention than it did at its start during the Eisenhower 
administration, forcing Kennedy to create a media policy that would prove effective and 
favorable for his own administration, as well as for the unfolding international relations 
between the Free World and the Communist Bloc. In attempting to attract domestic 
11 ​As Wyatt points out, the press had a relationship with both the government and the military. Though 
these are two separate entities, their stance is always the same in terms of actions in Vietnam. Thus, for the 
sake of convenience, I will refer to the relationship among all three as simply the military-press 
relationship, with “military” connoting both itself and the government.  
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support while also keeping the Vietnam conflict from escalating any further, Kennedy 
designed a strategic plan to use the media in a way that would shed favorable light on his 
administration and policies when they proved successful, while simultaneously framing 
more negative results (or total failings) as unforeseeable, unpreventable situations set in 
motion before he took office. By the time Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency, the 
Vietnam War had escalated to a point that was nearly impossible to hide from the media, 
though Johnson tried to keep a tight rein on reporters and journalists. The limitations put 
on media personnel by the American government—orders often coming directly from the 
sitting president—ultimately created an atmosphere of distrust between the military 
hosting the press, the press itself, and the public (Paul and Kim 36). This tense 
relationship played a more rhetorical role than has been given treatment previously. 
While many studies of the military-press relationship exist, they typically examine the 
issues between freedom of information and military security. Emphasis has previously 
centered on the way the media portrayed the war itself, but not necessarily the domestic 
fallout that was a very real part of daily life during combat time. Such previous studies 
have also not produced much by way of explaining how this military-press relationship 
psychologically impacted the way the American public received news of the war or how 
the public then used that news to shape their own responses—including antiwar responses 
such as protests. In short, the ​rhetorical ​impact of the Vietnam War reporting on the 
American public has been historically overlooked. Such a rhetorical analysis is important, 
though, as the Vietnam War era experienced the novelty of the television as a war news 
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medium. The television’s affordance to show images of combat reality directly to 
American citizens undoubtedly worked as a rhetorical vehicle to persuade individuals 
into certain frames of understanding and reacting to the Vietnam War. While there is a 
dearth of extant research to prove such causation, logical assumption suggests a 
correlation between the press coverage of the war and the increasing waves of protests as 
compared to American’s involvement in World War II. 
Antiwar protest did not begin immediately with televised combat coverage; to be 
persuaded to dissent the government’s wartime decisions would have been too extreme a 
step to make in a single bound, especially following the victorious Good War and the 
overwhelming public support given for it. Rather, dissension among citizens grew 
gradually as strains in the military-press relationship became increasingly evident. Media 
coverage of Vietnam began so quietly that most citizens did not even notice, occupying 
only a few minutes (if any at all) to brief the nation on political developments as read by 
a news anchor (Gustanis xv). Coverage also began not with television, but through radio 
and newspapers, and only gradually shifted to television. Thus, the early stages of the 
Vietnam War seemed much like a watered-down version of previous wars and focused 
mainly on political negotiations void of violent combat. The American public interpreted 
the Vietnam discussion as largely innocuous and, therefore, had no reason to panic or 
protest at the beginning. In fact, this conflict was presented to the public not so much as 
war but as a preemptive means of avoiding future hot wars and potential Communist 
domination. During a press conference in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose 
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own ethos as a World War II general bolstered citizens’ confidence in his knowledge of 
how to handle such a situation, urged American involvement (though minimal) because 
of the “domino theory.” He expressed concern that if Communist forces were not 
suppressed in Vietnam, that country would fall to those forces, and then the remainder of 
the Asian countries would as well (Gustanis 9). Eventually, Communism could pose a 
viable threat to the United States itself. The American public largely appeared to support 
involvement in Vietnam because of this theory, which they mainly heard about over the 
radio waves or read about in newspapers. Initially, this war looked more like a way to 
prevent another Pearl Harbor more than it did the beginning of a long drawn-out conflict, 
and the media felt no pressing need to relay information that seemed mostly like security 
patrol of Southeast Asia; thus, little to no television coverage treated the conflict. 
Television’s ability to relay news as the primary information conduit, and its ability to 
encourage mass dissent, still lay years ahead. 
For the first few years of the conflict, media coverage was virtually nonexistent 
and remained confined mainly to newspaper reporting. While the Kennedy administration 
did appear to grant the press freedom to ask questions and request information about 
Vietnam, the White House still fed the media its content and carefully managed the 
image the public received about the success of American military action (Wyatt 30). 
Following Kennedy’s assassination, the White House’s stance on the press remained 
seemingly open, manufactured though it was. The amount of coverage increased 
following the Gulf of Tonkin incident and as the press began to see the difference in their 
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goals for coverage and those of the White House. The accounts provided by reporters and 
the accounts detailed by the White House differed enough that the public began to notice 
that what the reporters said was happening in Vietnam and what President Johnson 
reported were happening in Vietnam were at drastic odds (Gustanis vxi). If “honest” 
reporting of the events were what the public sought, then both media personnel and 
government personnel were going to have to either agree to what the truth of the conflict 
was, or they would have to compete for the support of American citizens. 
The Collective 
Five presidential administrations exercised their authority during the twenty-year 
long conflict, and, while each administration made use of the media in idiosyncratic 
ways, some notable patterns emerged as each of the presidents rallied troops and courted 
citizens to support the war. As the first president to engage in what would become a 
seemingly unending war, Eisenhower did not anticipate the Vietnam conflict growing 
into something that would dominate American media, and he likewise could not have 
predicted the attention that both supporters and protesters would receive via the 
television. Because Eisenhower’s presidency covered only the initial years of the 
conflict—before it became a hot war—and because televisions were not nearly as 
common in American households as they would be by the end of the war, Eisenhower's 
rhetoric was not created to reach audiences via a visual medium, but rather, an aural one. 
Eisenhower strategically mirrored Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of the radio by employing 
the same brand of ethos that Roosevelt often used: prophetic dualism (Wander 343). This 
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persuasive strategy invokes religious tradition by appealing to the Protestant background 
of the United States. During the early stages of the Vietnam conflict, there was a 
 
prominent and recurring argument supporting American policy in Vietnam [that] 
concerned America's moral or spiritual superiority. Religious faith, moral insight, 
a respect for the laws of God formed a set of virtues attributed to the nation 
which...could be called upon not only to explain why those in power deserved to 
be there, but also why the United States should engage in certain kinds of action 
abroad. (342) 
 
 
By framing a call to war in terms of submitting the nation to a higher power’s design for 
the country, government leaders who choose this method to garner support play into a 
time-proven effective rhetorical strategy of aligning their own agendas with that of divine 
providence. Debating the nation’s most prominent and widely practiced religious 
tradition during the 1950s was so uncommon on mass media channels that little protest 
would have been expected—and little protest to such rhetoric was noted. Rhetoric 
steeped in religious tradition offers both a sense of familiarity and belonging to the 
audience, but also suggests a particularly trustworthy ethos of the speaker. Eisenhower’s 
use of prophetic dualism helped him create a reputation as a chosen leader with wisdom 
beyond that which the “ordinary” citizens might possess—possibly even a supernaturally 
granted wisdom—and thus resisting his agenda was unChristian as well as unAmerican.  
While prophetic dualism might have appealed to the nation’s historical religious 
ties, it also reached into the secular arenas of American society by emphasizing a 
humanitarian desire for peaceful international cooperation—cooperation that directly 
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involved American citizens just as much as it involved Eisenhower himself. 
Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” campaign following the death of Joseph Stalin 
highlighted his adamance in denying Communism an opportunity to thrive in the free 
world (Parry-Giles 118). Rather than adhering to a policy that merely contained 
Communism in its previously existent countries, Eisenhower’s policy following Stalin’s 
death grew into a more aggressive call to eliminate Communism altogether so as to 
protect global peace (120-21). His public rhetoric matched this shift of increasing 
attention to the Communist threat and how this form of government lacked the 
humanitarian goals upon which American culture was supposedly founded, ones which 
Americans had fought to defend in World War II. In turn, Eisenhower primed the 
American nation to condone—though gradually and under the premise of ensuring 
long-term peace—participation in a conflict that would ultimately grow into the Vietnam 
War.  
After establishing his religiously-grounded ethos as a humanitarian and 
Protestant, Eisenhower created a feeling of community across the nation via his appeal to 
citizens’ pathos. On the evening of April 7, 1954, Eisenhower delivered a radio address 
from the White House that invited Americans to consider their role—alongside his 
own—in creating a world where good (read: the United States and allies) triumphs over 
evil (Communist nations). In this address, Eisenhower asked Americans within the first 
four sentences to reflect on what they could do and what he could also do, to ensure 
military, economic, intellectual, and spiritual strength remained strong (“The Domino 
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Effect”). These four particular areas of national life stood in stark contrast to those of 
Communist nations, were military participation was expected in a way unlike it was in 
the United States, where economic equity differed from the market competition of 
capitalism, where intellectual endeavors tended to trail behind other industrialized nations 
by a matter of years or even decades, and where spiritual independence was limited in 
favor of a state-sponsored belief system. Moreover, Eisenhower was prompting American 
citizens to consider how they might support one another in the face of a Communist 
enemy. Such support, of course, could take the form of military service, or encouraging 
others to engage in it. Based on the lack of protest or citizen rebuttal of action in Vietnam 
during Eisenhower’s presidency, one can assume his rhetorical strategies proved effective 
in creating a sense of national support for preventing the spread of Communism.  
When President Kennedy’s term began and the Vietnam conflict continued to 
escalate, the ethos-based prophetic dualism of Eisenhower was replaced with logos-based 
“technocratic realism”—a manner of persuasion that “finds the modern world much too 
complex for old time religion. Not the prophet, but rather a skilled, tough expert is what 
is needed...one who is wise, analytical, precise” (Wander 349). Kennedy’s rhetorical 
approach re-examined the conflict as one in which two nations disagreed about the values 
that shaped each other’s driving belief systems. He thus presented the war as one in 
which America would compromise not as a religious superior suddenly proven mistaken 
about its belief in favor from a higher power, but rather as an entity that could calculate 
the need, cost, and outcome of war and could also justify the need to at least attempt 
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negotiation. In reframing the conflict’s narrative as one in which the United States 
could—and even should—take a calm, logical, and calculated approach to its continuing 
involvement, Kennedy moved to quell emotional responses from citizens at a time when 
emotions would have proven a hindrance to advancing the government’s agenda. After 
all, if the Vietnam situation had only been escalating since the Eisenhower administration 
and showed no signs of becoming a total American victory, then how could citizens 
justify their support for such an endeavor? Eventually the emotional fuel of pathos 
appeals would run dry, and citizens would be left frustrated at the lack of a clear victory. 
Introducing discourse centered on progressive advancement of technology, international 
relations, and scientific possibilities would be the new rhetorical pathway to securing 
public support. Kennedy, then, de-emphasized appeals to pathos and ethos (though they 
were still present to some degree) and emphasized appeals to logos. 
Upon his inauguration, Kennedy set a straightforward, no-nonsense tone for his 
presidency that clarified for both the nation and the world what his goals were for his 
time in office. In one of the opening lines of his televised inaugural address, Kennedy 
asserted some of the major problems threatening the United States, whether directly or 
indirectly (through their existence in other nations): poverty, lack of liberty, tyranny, war, 
and disease (Brands 175). He offered a simple solution, though “simple” does not 
necessarily equate to “easy”: “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any 
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty” 
(“Inaugural Address”). Kennedy seized this opportunity, only minutes into his 
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presidency, to set a logical, goal-oriented tone for the country that relied on practical hard 
work in addition to a spiritual source of power, thereby linking his own presidency with 
the ethos of his predecessor. While Kennedy did still appeal to the religious tradition 
upon which the country’s founding documents allude, his initial appeal to logos before 
pathos or ethos suggested a rhetorical shift as he prepared to confront the growing 
challenge ahead of him. Yet, knowing that his inauguration alone was not enough to 
ensure bipartisan support when dealing with any political situations—especially a cause 
like Vietnam—Kennedy still infused his inaugural address with religious undertones, and 
strategically decided against privileging or isolating any particular mode of persuasion.  12
Following his inauguration, Kennedy oversaw an administration that heavily 
engaged in the Space Race and that sought to solidify the United States’ position as an 
industrialized world leader via stronger scientific advancements. He adamantly advocated 
for the nation’s need to approach domestic and international problems alike through a 
problem-solving akin to the scientific method. Although he never delivered an address 
specifically focused on the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, his approach to 
another international situation highlighted his logos-based rhetoric when informing 
American citizens of the Communist threat in Cuba. In his September 1962 speech at 
Rice University, Kennedy clearly stated that decisive action was necessary when 
combating the threat from the Soviet Union as it co-opted Cuba as a missile base. One of 
Kennedy’s earliest hints that the situation in Vietnam could erupt into something more 
12 ​Kennedy’s caution in using religious rhetoric reflects his recognition and careful handling of being the 
first Catholic president elected to office—a controversial factor during his campaign. 
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than just a possible threat requiring sanctioning was expressed in his Rice University 
address as he emphasized the logical reasoning behind taking a defensive stance against 
the Soviets in Cuba: American 
 
history—unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II—demonstrates 
that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our 
system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to 
living daily on the Bull’s-eye [sic] of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R or 
in submarines. (“Quarantine against Cuba”) 
 
 
Reflecting a small degree of the “us versus them” mentality his presidential predecessor 
had exercised in the years before, Kennedy combined that well-known rhetoric of 
defending against a threat to launch his own logos-based approach to potential combat 
with Communist forces. While his speech at Rice University is most remembered for 
marking the start of the Space Race, it is Kennedy’s tone in this address that contributes 
to its memorable quality. His tone denoted the shift in national thought—and in 
presidential rhetoric—that Communist forces needed to be met with force because of the 
threat they posed. Absent in his speech were emotional diatribes against the enemy; 
rather, Kennedy focused on the tangible future improvements the United States could 
contribute, rather than emphasizing feelings of anger or fear as the nation moved forward 
scientifically: “We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass 
destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding” (“Quarantine against 
Cuba”). Even when reinforcing the need to confront the Soviet Union about their threat to 
the United States, Kennedy framed that conflict as one that needed to be approached 
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through science, as he noted how the United States was accumulating more knowledge of 
space than the Soviet Union—and, according to Kennedy, more knowledge of space, the 
next frontier ripe for exploration, equated to more power to reset the state of international 
relations. The American conflict with the threat of spreading Communism was going to 
be solved through a knowledgeable, objective, and scientific approach. Kennedy’s Rice 
University speech, then, marked both the start of the Space Race and the beginning of the 
shift in American presidential rhetoric concerning Communism; it was now a task to be 
logically undertaken and a threat to be battled because it was objectively unproductive, 
even dangerous, for the United States. 
While Kennedy has a convoluted relationship with the press, his influence on 
American citizens suggests his rhetorical appeals for support in combating Communism 
were answered positively (Heyse and Gibson 26-28). Extant research examining the 
correlation between his speeches and public response is limited; however, contemporary 
examinations of his lasting legacy suggest a largely supportive public. Without a strongly 
positive acceptance during his presidency, it is unlikely his posthumous reputation would 
be as positive as it is today, despite unsavory and controversial facts that have come out 
since his death (Brinkley, “The Legend”). While no firm causation can be concluded 
between what he said and did while in office and the public’s perception of him, a 
correlation can be suggested that his speeches, such as his inaugural speech and the one 
he gave at Rice University in the fall of 1962, prompted American citizens to support his 
plans concerning Communism and mainly through appeals to logos. However, American 
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military action in Vietnam was still in the developing phases of a hot war, and the 
American people were not as concerned with this conflict as they would be during the 
next presidential administration. 
It was not until Johnson’s presidency that the situation in Vietnam escalated into a 
full-blown hot war that dominated newspapers, televised newscasts, radio programming, 
and public conversation. As he inherited a challenge that had been years in the making, 
Johnson stuck closely to the same logos-based rhetoric that his predecessor and 
presidential running mate had, opting to emulate Kennedy’s practical approach to 
problem-solving when addressing the public on the Communist threat in Southeast Asia. 
In his televised speeches regarding the war, Johnson often focused on the facts and 
figures of war and used military strategy to explain the current state of war while 
predicting the effects of the next move. In his televised April 1965 speech “Peace with 
Conquest,” Johnson explained the Vietnam War with matter-of-fact and 
straight-to-the-point reasoning, explaining to the American public why the United States 
was involved in the conflict, how it had been unfolding, and what could be expected next 
if the US was to win the war. By describing the objective of the war as securing freedom 
for the South Vietnamese and preventing the fall of all of Asia to Communism, Johnson 
reiterates the logic that had been offered by both Eisenhower and Kennedy before him 
(Johnson). If three presidents had all felt the same way regarding the importance of 
preventing a domino fall to Communism, then there must have been a logical reason for 
continuing to support the war. Based on the information in his speech, citizens were led 
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to infer that active combat in Vietnam was the only logical option for quelling the spread 
of Communism. 
Although stoic in appearance and often characterized by his appeal to logos rather 
than pathos, Johnson did sometimes defer to an appeal to emotions to persuade American 
citizens to support the war—or at the very least, to support whatever decision the 
American government made concerning the war. While mostly logos-based, his “Peace 
with Conquest” speech did also make use of an appeal to pathos. Johnson opened by 
calling on Americans to choose the path they wanted to walk in light of the growing 
casualties in Southeast Asia. He framed this call almost as a plea to Americans, as if what 
they wanted—to stop the deaths he had just mentioned—was what could be, regardless of 
military developments, political ramifications, and the impracticality of immediately 
withdrawing troops. However, to prevent what began as an apparent incongruity in 
reason, Johnson quickly shifted to how despite what the publics of both the United States 
and Vietnam wanted—an end to the countless deaths—the “sons'' of the nation were 
overseas, in unfamiliar guerilla territory, defending the traditions and principles upon 
which the nation was founded. Moreover, he used descriptors such as “young” and 
“bursting with opportunity and promise” when referring to the soldiers who were 
valiantly fighting a “dirty and brutal and difficult” war (Johnson). Invoking death and 
then the valor of American soldiers, Johnson opened his speech by first softening his 
audience with the awareness of the human cost of war in hopes that if they recognize how 
American lives are already at risk, they will naturally support whatever cause will bring 
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those soldiers home safely. The most obvious way to bring them home, of course, was to 
quickly win the war. While an appeal to pathos was not Johnson’s go-to rhetorical device, 
he did incorporate it with logos, at least in some moments, to ensure he reached as many 
American citizens as he could. 
As late as the spring of 1968, public opinion polls reflected citizen support for 
Johnson and his handling of Vietnam; however, the media’s emphasis on the 
unexpectedly long duration of the war overshadowed both Johnson’s public rhetoric and 
the support he successfully garnered from Americans (Schandler 194). Unfortunately for 
Johnson, his ability to solicit citizen support for the Vietnam War dwindled as the war 
continued, eventually resulting in his decision not to seek re-election, announced on 
television in March 1968. His decision reflected a dramatic historical shift in public 
support for a presidential administration during wartime that was notably not 
characteristic of American society during World War II: the voice of the collective, and 
its presidential leader, was taken over by the voice of the countercollective. 
The Countercollective 
During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, news coverage of the war 
reflected only the official, government-backed account of political and military events, 
though the practice of formal censorship was officially rejected by the White House 
multiple times (Pach, Jr. 451; Wyatt 7). Because there was no initial reason to suspect 
any falsehood in these accounts, citizens were apt to believe them. Soon, though, the 
façade started cracking, and the limitations became clearer—most noticeably following 
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Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester’s failed attempt to conceal 
American involvement in supplying the South Vietnamese forces with weapons early in 
the war (Pach, Jr. 451). Additionally, news coverage produced by a few key reporters on 
location in Vietnam chipped away at the government’s official story (451). Once such 
footage of the war aired and the public saw the reality of the war, they began questioning 
why the film reels contradicted the comparatively tame reports they had been receiving 
from the government about American military action. A noticeable pattern emerged: 
when reporters were prohibited by the White House from airing their footage of events in 
Vietnam, public support remained relatively stable; when reporters were able to air their 
footage, public support began dropping. Not only was the public losing trust in their 
government, but so were the reporters who realized the charade of which they had been a 
part before capturing and sharing the controversial reality of the war (Paul and Kim 37). 
While the complexities of countercollective responses to the Vietnam War involve much 
more than just the televised press accounts that countered the official Vietnam narrative, 
the television’s presence as a new rhetorical agent with persuasive psychological 
consequences on the American public is undeniable and served to further undermine the 
tension-filled military-press relationship. Several key figures of the countercollective 
exercised persuasive influence over American citizens in part due to their ability to report 
their accounts on television to the entire nation. 
The most infamous of these reporters was arguably Morley Safer of CBS. His 
1965 segment of American soldiers in action appealed to citizens through a combination 
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of pathos and logos that showed the cruel reality of war, which in turn elicited an 
emotional response. Safer’s footage depicts American marines needlessly burning the 
Southern Vietnamese village of Cam Ne, destroying approximately 150 homes (Pach, Jr. 
451). As they ignited the huts, screaming families fled from them, looking back in horror 
as their homes and all their possessions burned to the ground. Safer’s footage captures 
women, children, and elderly villagers escaping with their lives, defenseless and scared. 
Compounding the shock of the fires themselves and their vulnerable victims was the 
startling—and painfully obvious—fact that the marines were not under fire from the 
enemy when they set the houses ablaze. These villagers were not armed, had not 
instigated a confrontation, and pleaded in their own language for what can be assumed to 
be an end to the attack. This footage illustrated for the public not only the fires and the 
newly homeless families, but also the unethical actions in which American troops were 
apparently accustomed to taking in the name of “war” (451-52). Particularly damaging to 
the collective’s support for this war was Safer’s opening line of the footage: “This is what 
the war in Vietnam is all about” (451).  
Safer’s coverage contributed to both presidential and public reaction. Johnson was 
so infuriated with Safer’s coverage that he personally called the president of CBS to 
complain and questioned Safer’s possibly Communist intentions (Dallek 286). Johnson 
knew that with increasing coverage like that of Cam Ne came decreasing public support 
for the war—even increasing support for protest of it. Numerous antiwar groups did 
indeed rally against military action in Vietnam. These countercollective groups amassed 
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for various reasons, ranging from environmental protection in an age of nuclear 
capability to moral and religious beliefs against violence. Regardless of any particular 
group’s motive, what came to be the aggregate countercollective pushed for an 
alternative national message regarding war and eventually threatened government 
decision-making through the electorate when sympathetic individuals took office and 
revised policies regarding Vietnam (Chatfield 399). 
Although the multitude of countercollective groups lacked a singular organization 
and represented an array of issues prompting dissent, several notable groups comprised 
college students and other young adults. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) stood 
out as one of the most successful countercollectives during the Vietnam War. This group, 
though relatively small, was deemed as the most impactful collective to challenge 
traditional government authority (Hamilton 292). While this politically unaffiliated group 
originally grew from the League for Industrial Democracy for the purpose of pursuing an 
agenda focused more on civil rights issues than labor union ones, SDS eventually 
developed into the most well-known of the Vietnam War countercollectives (Hamilton 
292). What solidified their place in American history as one of the most powerful antiwar 
protest groups was their Washington, DC march in April 1965 that brought together 
approximately 25,000 protesters (292). By the end of that year, SDS boasted over 4,000 
members across 124 college campus chapters (293). However, despite the promise for 
this group’s longevity predicted by the April peace demonstration, SDS failed to gain 
much more traction following 1965 because of its lack of centralized leadership. Because 
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SDS allowed its college campus chapters to determine their own agendas, SDS’s group 
identity remained fragmented, stunting its overall long-term productivity beyond what 
was accomplished at Washington, DC Yet, SDS stood apart from other countercollectives 
because it drew the attention of a large base of young adults and subsequently gave rise to 
smaller protest groups that splintered off from SDS, such as Weather Underground and 
Third World Marxists (292). 
While SDS did make socially accepted strides in publicly speaking against the 
war, the group also enacted extreme theatrics that demonstrated an appeal to the nation’s 
sense of pathos—and sometimes violently. While SDS’s reputation as a countercollective 
is to an extent marred by how it “got carried away with leading students in power 
tantrums,” the focus of the group was always to enact social change on multiple levels, 
but with resisting the Vietnam War in particular (Adelson ix). Because of the numerous 
chapters of SDS that existed at colleges and universities across the country, it is difficult 
to pin down any particular rhetoric that could be said to characterize the entire group. 
However, the Port Huron Statement emphasized the group’s premise and goals as a 
singular countercollective. The Statement appeals largely to pathos in its opening 
paragraphs, noting how the America these students had known as children either no 
longer existed or potentially never did. While the problematic elements of American 
society discussed in the Statement are factual (such as racial discrimination and inequity, 
unchecked nuclear power and its threats, etc.), the message of the document is itself 
meant to move one’s emotions, to lament the current state of affairs, and to wish for a 
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different reality. SDS called for the valuing of human life and a participatory democracy 
and challenged economic restructuring so that life had meaning beyond financial and 
social incentive. With such ambitious aims, SDS’s Port Huron Statement served to attract 
other progressive thinkers, even if it did fall short of proposing practical guidelines for 
accomplishing the stated aims. 
Veterans Against the Vietnam War (VVAW) was another key countercollective 
that challenged the collective’s prowar agenda. As a group often compared to the 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), VVAW shared a common goal with SDS in 
that both organizations sought an end to war by relying on the determination and grit of 
its (typically) young adult members. Whereas the SDS began on college and university 
campuses, VVAW comprised soldiers who had experienced the war firsthand. These 
veterans described the brutal realities of combat, often highlighting the seemingly 
unwinnable nature of the war. One of the most prominent figures of VVAW was John 
Kerry, who delivered a televised speech before the Senate Committee of Foreign 
Relations in April 1971. Speaking as a soldier who had direct information regarding the 
war, Kerry wasted no time in establishing his ethos and opened his speech by citing the 
war crimes that he knew to be true based not only on what he had witnessed himself, but 
what “over 150 honorably discharged, and many very highly decorated” soldiers had also 
reported (Kerry). While his testimony was highly emotionally charged, such an appeal to 
pathos would likely have fallen flat without the ethos Kerry carried as a veteran of the 
Vietnam War. Throughout his speech, he details the gruesome activities of war that he 
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and his fellow soldiers experienced, noting that the American public—and maybe even 
the American government—did not truly know what was happening in Vietnam:  
 
In our opinion, and from our experience, there is nothing in South Vietnam, 
nothing which could happen that realistically threatens the United States of 
America...I want to relate to you the feeling that many of the men who have 
returned to this country express because we are probably angriest about all that 
we were told about Vietnam and about the mystical war against communism. 
(Kerry) 
 
 
Kerry continues his testimony to Congress by explaining the realities of the war: how the 
Vietnamese people were engaged in a civil war as well as one against colonization, 
including from the United States and how soldiers returning from war were looking for 
strong national leadership that they felt had failed them overseas. While some of his 
statements produce emotional reactions and while all of his historical accounts of the war 
are arguably based in fact, the entire testimony rested upon one key component—Kerry’s 
ethos as a veteran. 
While few countercollective figures or groups were treated with much sympathy 
by the silent majority of Americans who supported the war, none was treated with the 
same degree of criticism as were the Weathermen, a radical countercollective group who 
drew attention to the violence of war by employing violence themselves. Their extreme 
tactics capitalized on destruction of property and threatened citizens’ safety. In fact, their 
ethically suspect activities set them apart from other countercollectives who did not wish 
to be conflated with this particularly subversive subset of the protest movement. The 
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Weathermen’s message of violence’s total disruptive power and its unethical use in 
Vietnam was overlooked as newscasters were more concerned with trivial, superficial 
characteristics of this, and other radical groups: 
 
Critics of the war hardly fared as well [as supporters]...reporters concentrated on 
the number of demonstrators of their appearance, rather than the arguments they 
made against US involvement in Vietnam…Radical critics got treatment that was 
far more brusque (Pach, Jr. 453).  
 
 
However, while the Weathermen and other protesters may have been criticized by voices 
of the prowar collective, the fact that the countercollective existed at all and received 
media attention is significant, as even the most extreme antiwar demonstrations suggested 
to citizens nationwide that dissent was indeed an option and that if others were protesting, 
so too could they. 
The Medium and the Public 
Such public dissent was demonstrated by the 1967 march on the Pentagon and the 
1970 protest at Kent State University, which both drew heavy media attention (Hallin 
163; Hoerl 108-09). Moreover, participants in these demonstrations had the opportunity 
to speak directly to the American public via on-camera interviews or through picketing 
posters or simply through their presence, now televised directly into the homes of the 
public and reaching potential protesters. Rather than just ​hearing​ about these protesters, 
American citizens were afforded the opportunity to ​see ​them as they staked their case 
against American involvement in Vietnam. This new widespread level of visibility acted 
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as retribalization device by depicting a collective communicating with one another and 
with those they wished to draw into their ranks. Unfortunately, as Neil Hamilton notes, 
no statistics were recorded during the Vietnam War that offer an explicit analysis of the 
scale of impact television had during the 1960-70s (300); however, the number of antiwar 
demonstrations that took place following televised reports of such events as the Tet 
Offensive and the shootings at Kent State University suggest that the medium played 
enough of a role to at least agitate the public to the point of questioning their support for 
American involvement in Vietnam.   13
Growing public agitation signaled a shift in the American public, as the nation 
was not wholly unified in support of the war as it had arguably been during World War 
II.  According to Kenneth Burke, war is the ultimate manner of creating a sense of 14
unification, or collectivism (​Rhetoric​ 22). If one can identify those with whom (s)he 
disagrees, then so too can (s)he identify those with whom (s)he agrees. During times of 
war, the government’s official agenda seeks to unite citizens on the grounds that their 
commonality of citizenship is enough to bond them into a collective that remains united 
in the face of war, even though individual citizens may have various reasons for doing so. 
However, the Vietnam War presented a predicament for the creation of this type of 
unification. With the military body count constantly increasing, tragic casualties being 
13 Daniel C. Hallin notes that 20% of CBS’ coverage of the Vietnam War centered on the antiwar 
movement. 
14 Of course, not every American citizen supported military engagement in World War II, and a 
countercollective did exist, though small. Boadnar notes in his 2010 ​The “Good War’ in American Memory 
that initial protest to American involvement was much more popular than history would have us think, and 
such sentiment was eventually overshadowed by the lasting narrative of World War II as justified and 
heroic. 
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discussed on television regularly, the impossibility of a clear victory, and the growth of 
the countercollective, the unification the collective agenda sought to procure dramatically 
weakened. In protesting the war, citizens could identify themselves as both against the 
war, but in support of one another, and in the values they established as the protesting 
group: a desire to avoid apparently needless death, to resist being conscripted into violent 
military service, and to shift the national political agenda to one that focused more on the 
welfare of humanity than establishing or maintaining authority over other nations. Rather 
than forcing global peace through war, this particular segment of the American 
population sought to win global peace through peace—a move drastically different than 
their predecessors were called to do during World War II. Ultimately, identification as a 
dissenter lured enough young Americans to rally behind the protest movement rather than 
the national agenda of voluntarily (or, for some “draft dodgers,” involuntarily) serving in 
the war. In identifying with one another, protestors identified an anti-governmental 
agenda as antiwar, but were in some cases labeled anti-American (Hallin 198-200). 
Regardless of negative labels they may have received, as a unified collective of citizens 
who identified with one another as antiwar, members of the countercollective identified 
and bonded with one just as those in the collective did. 
Finding like-minded individuals with whom to identify is part of the rhetorical 
process involved in supporting or opposing a war. During the Vietnam War, watching 
television to learn more about both groups became commonplace—so  much so that this 
war is typically discussed in the framework of its televised nature (Hallin 11). When 
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watching televised protests during the Vietnam War, citizens—potential protestors—are 
inherently involved in the events they witness as they are called on to supply their own 
reactions and understanding to their fellow citizens’ actions. Watching a televised protest 
event also electronically situated the viewer into a position where (s)he could imagine his 
or her own involvement in what (s)he witnessed on screen. A feeling of identification, 
whether in agreement or disagreement with the televised protest, draws the viewer into 
fulfilling their role as audience, as public citizen, and as either a supporter or protestor of 
the war. The television aided identification by supplying information on what to do and 
with whom to identify. 
Marshall McLuhan identified television as a cool medium, where audience 
participation is required by their supplying of information or by providing those 
assertions and logical chain of thought as they read between the lines. What makes 
television cool is that the amount of physical sensory input required by the viewer is 
higher than for other, hotter media (such as radio, where all information is audibly 
presented and listeners are not asked to infer in the same way). The way this medium 
worked on the psyche of American citizens demonstrates its rhetorical power to impact 
the political atmosphere by drawing in audiences with a sense of tactility, yet also with a 
lack of explanation and analysis; in other words, the sensory stimulation is high, but the 
content is limited (McLuhan, ​War and Peace​ 76-77; Hallin 109). Citizens could hear 
about and see the war as it unfolded, but even news reports could not fully explain 
lingering questions many citizens had about the necessity of the war, especially as it 
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dragged on and produced no clear signs of victory for either side (Hallin 109). In an 
attempt to make sense of an apparently senseless war, Americans devoted more 
intellectual energy to finding the answers than they would have needed to do during 
World War II, when Roosevelt fed answers to citizens in language they could understand 
on a weekly basis. The coolness of the television medium left open room for individual 
interpretation, analysis, and response; in doing so, the American citizenry created both 
the collective and the countercollective. 
This, then, is the difference between the “radio war” and the “television war”: 
tactility. McLuhan argued that cooler media were more characterized by their 
synesthesia, or use of multiple senses, than their technological predecessors. Vietnam 
War news reports involved the newscaster describing the situation as the most current, 
up-to-date images appeared on citizens’ screens, illustrating violence, suffering, and 
death. If images are tactile, then the combination of spoken word reporting and visual 
images together resulted in synesthesia; war ​felt​ much more real when delivered through 
the television as opposed to its radio predecessor. Citizens would have felt more involved 
in war they had seen ​and ​heard than a war they had only heard. Without being fully 
aware of what was taking place, says McLuhan, Americans were beginning to feel the 
distance between themselves and war—even a war fought on the other side the globe—as 
less distance than it actually was and less distance than they felt during the radio 
broadcasts’ coverage of the London Blitz or Dresden bombings (​Understanding Media 
80-81). The jungles of Southeast Asia were now in American living rooms. This 
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decreasing sense of distance resulting from increased synesthesia was what McLuhan 
termed the “global village.” When citizens feel themselves part of the global village, they 
participate in retribalization or a new configuration of their loyalties into a collective or 
countercollective (78). 
The emotions of war—in regards to both support and protest—always run high. 
The television aided emotional responses, and potentially even exacerbated them, by 
showing (rather than just simply telling) the gruesome horrors of war. Hearing about the 
wounded and dead is quite a different experience than seeing the wounded and dead. The 
way that the comparatively more synesthetic response to the cooler medium of television 
resulted in collectivism in that like-minded people—whether in support or in 
protest—connected and banded together to share, interpret, analyze, and respond to the 
events of the Vietnam War. Protestors in particular benefitted from television’s ability to 
visually portray war’s atrocious costs, and the visual affordance of this medium suggests 
a reason as to why a countercollective existed during the Vietnam War that did not during 
World War II, when citizens heard, but did not see, the facts of war. While the footage of 
ransacked villages, injured soldiers, and murdered peasants was often limited by the 
government’s pressure and restraints on the media, the reality of war was still enough to 
inspire a protest movement that eventually grew to characterize the Vietnam War more so 
than national support for it. The Vietnam War’s televised nature would heavily affect 
how both the collective and countercollective responded to the following mass mediated 
war. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991: THE FEAR OF REPEATING VIETNAM 
 
 
The most effective censorship of all is not the deleting of words, sentences, and 
paragraphs but the denial of access.  
Hedrick Smith, ​The Media and the Gulf War​ xi 
 
 
The Gulf War is among one of the shortest-lived international conflicts, spanning 
only from August 1990 to February 1991. Though this war looked quite different from 
World War II and the Vietnam War in many ways, it shared with these predecessors a 
co-opting of the latest electronic mass media communication technology to influence 
both what citizens knew of the war and how they responded to it. While the Gulf War 
was later noted to be largely one-sided and more of a heavy-handed slaughter than battle, 
the White House and the Pentagon sought to control media depictions of the activities in 
Iraq in large part due to anxiety over repeating the media mistakes of the Vietnam War, 
with its resultant losses of public morale and trust in the government’s wartime 
decision-making. While these two wars were fought for drastically different purposes, in 
drastically different settings, and facing drastically different enemies, their shared use of 
television-as-educator for the public threatened the government with the possibility of 
repeating negative press coverage as took place during the Vietnam War—especially 
since the sour taste of media repression following Vietnam had persisted in the mouths of 
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journalists throughout the conflicts in Grenada and Panama. Thus, tension between 
reporters and the government continued to swell following the Vietnam War; the Gulf 
War was an apt moment for this tension to resurface. The tug-of-war between the 
Pentagon and the media represented the conflict between the collective and the 
countercollective. The drama between these parties would play out, yet again, on 
television.  
To preemptively counter the possibility of engaging in a war that the public would 
not support, and to prevent the formation of countercollectives such as had marked the 
Vietnam War era, the Pentagon adopted a more authoritative, ethos- and logos-based role 
in their dealings with the media, which the White House supported. Rather than allowing 
the media the same freedom of access they had during the Vietnam War and rather than 
completely shutting the media out as they did during the conflicts in Grenada and 
Panama, the US government struck a more balanced approach with the use of the media 
pool system, wherein small groups of reporters would cycle in and out of allotted zones 
during combat. While the government saw the pool system as a gesture of goodwill in 
that they were permitting the media access to military personnel, events, and reports, 
journalists and news stations regarded the pool system as censorship, and questioned 
whether the government was trying to hide facts from the public. As a result, the Gulf 
War became characterized more by the protest of reporters, and to a smaller extent, 
citizens, against media censorship than against the premises of the war itself. If the 
Vietnam War was the television war, then the Gulf War was the state television war. 
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Media outlets had comparatively little freedom to join the front lines of battle, to 
document firefight directly, or to relay unedited, uncensored information to the public. 
Failure to adhere to the Pentagon’s wishes compromised a reporter’s invitation to 
participate in the pool system, and thus threatened their respective news outlet’s 
profitability as it would be unable to publish stories from the battlefield. To maintain 
their position in the pool, reporters had to play by the government’s rules—to document 
and publish the need for the United States’ intervention and to refrain from documenting 
that suggested otherwise (Ottosen 139). In order to gain entrance into the pool system, 
journalists had to agree to a list of rules and guidelines which dictated that upon their 
registration into the pool system. These rules dictated that they would work under the 
guidance of a pool commander from the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), 
that they would submit their products to the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) for review 
(and possible censorship if the products contained sensitive information), and that they 
would refrain from carrying a personal weapon (Williams 8). “Sensitive information” 
related to anything that identified military plans, specific details of casualties, 
information describing how (in)effective enemy tactics had proven, methods and 
outcomes of information and data collection about the enemy, specific locations of 
military units and personnel, and the number of military troops present in any given 
location or operation (7-8). Reporters were also instructed not to participate in 
“spontaneous interviews with servicemen and women in the Gulf; off-the-record 
interviews with troops in the field” because of fear they would leak sensitive information 
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to enemy forces (Taylor 35). Reporters were also prohibited from filming or taking 
photographs of injured, traumatized, shocked, and deceased soldiers so as to prevent a 
loss of public morale akin to that which took place during the Vietnam War (35). As a 
result, the public voice of the government—particularly the Bush administration and the 
Pentagon—was a louder one than that of the countercollective during the Gulf War, as it 
was this official voice that dictated what information had the possibility of being 
transmitted from the warzone.  
Such restriction (if one adopts the government’s agenda) or censorship (if one 
adopts the media’s agenda) undoubtedly influenced public collectivism during the 
conflict, as it raised questions about two simultaneous conflicts: that of the United States 
versus Iraq and that of the United States government versus the media and its claim to 
freedom of press. Identifying with the countercollective would negatively shape one’s 
opinion of the war—if a citizen felt that the government was hiding potentially unethical, 
inhumane acts committed against Iraq, then how could (s)he support the war itself? Thus, 
one could identify with the countercollective, in favor of the media and against the war, 
or one could identify with the collective, in favor of the Pentagon and in favor of the war. 
To support the countercollective could be seen as a stand for freedom of speech and 
press; to identify with the collective could be seen as a stand for military and national 
security over personal and press freedoms. Simply put, the Gulf War was fought between 
two nations, but also between citizens negotiating the boundaries between national 
security and citizens' constitutional right to freedom of the press. 
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Doris Graber notes in her examination of media’s role in contemporary wartimes 
that the context provided, the questions asked, and the stories covered are selected by 
participatory audiences and not handed to them by reporters who often cover what media 
channel owners dictate (451). These characteristics first became apparent during the Gulf 
War. Major networks like CNN created a particular version of the Gulf War by featuring 
live coverage and moment-by-moment documentation of events happening in the Middle 
East. Citizens were invited to call in and express their views on what they were watching, 
and could comment on the views expressed by other callers. However, all day, everyday, 
news coverage was not nearly as democratic and unbiased as it appeared on screen. 
While the most logical presupposition is that with more coverage comes more diverse 
viewpoints and a fuller picture of reality, this does not appear to be the case with 
American reporting of the Gulf War. Rather, the most publicly popular televised news 
stations—CNN—proved to be a case of an elite source privileging very particular 
information, while also staying in line with the official government agenda, and also 
using twenty-four-hour coverage to create the image of unbiased reporting (Vincent 
181-82). At the expense of American citizens, media information was so suppressed and 
limited leading up to, during, and for some time after the war that an even relatively 
unbiased, mostly accurate portrayal of the war and its casualties has been prevented from 
being shared with the mainstream American public, though the public thought otherwise 
as the Gulf War unfolded (Ottosen 137). Additionally, the news media proved ineffective 
as a tool of strengthening true participatory democracy. Audiences were being handed 
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information on a constant and rolling basis, but not participating much, though the nature 
of around-the-clock broadcasts suggested to viewers that they were actually participating 
somehow, as they were under the impression that they knew all there was to know 
regarding the war’s development the moment any event took place. Citizen participation 
during the Gulf War retained some similarities from their counterparts during the 
Vietnam War, but diverged significantly in the expanded scope of possibilities afforded 
to citizens through developments in television.  
Ultimately, what several scholars have concluded is that this type of coverage, 
though seemingly helpful on the surface, in reality only served to fill a good amount of 
air time with repeated information and little analysis of the causes and consequences of 
events. Moreover, its bias prevented a good deal of fact from reaching the public, and in 
turn fostered an environment of involuntary ignorance. However, the role of newscasters, 
reporters, and journalists during the Gulf War was limited not by their own choosing; 
while CNN’s coverage proved biased and limited, the Bush administration’s and the 
Pentagon’s orders provided few other options if the media desired to relay any coverage 
at all. This limitation was the direct result of lessons learned during the Vietnam War, 
when journalists had more freedom to report what they saw, but at the cost of public 
support for the official government agenda. If television’s use during these two wars 
suggest anything, it is that it is potentially impossible to balance accurate war coverage 
and media freedom simultaneously. The impossibility of such a balance is reflected in the 
formation and rhetoric of both the collective and countercollective. 
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The Collective 
The government and the media shared a stressed relationship before troops were 
committed to the Persian Gulf on August 7, 1990. The media sharply criticized the 
government’s decision to strictly limit media access to near-nothing during the Invasions 
of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989-1990. While the government claimed such 
secrecy was in the best interest of military operations and safety, the media questioned 
whether or not the government had been truthful with them—and with American citizens. 
When tensions began arising in the Middle East with Iraq’s accusations against Kuwait in 
July 1990, the government and media again had to negotiate how much information to 
share with the public and how much to withhold for national security purposes. Though 
many figures played some degree of importance in determining how the media would be 
allowed to interact with the military (and vice versa), several figures proved pivotal in 
designing and implementing the rules and guidelines by which the media was 
contractually obligated to report: President George H. Bush, General Colin Powell, 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete 
Williams, and Commanding General of Operation Desert Storm Norman Schwarzkopf. In 
addition to creating the rules by which reporters had to play if they were to be allowed 
access to the combat zone, these men also shaped public opinion by how they carefully 
chose to deliver their media rules and guidelines to the public. When reporters cried foul 
and implied censorship that had not been seen since Senator McCarthy’s Red Scare, these 
four figures exercised strategic rhetoric to convince their audience of the American 
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public—as well as media outlets and reporters—that the military operations were ethical, 
transparent, and in the best interest of all involved. Of these key collective figures, 
Cheney and Williams stood out as rhetors who routinely addressed the public concerning 
both collective goals for the war and countercollective protest about it. 
The government—particularly the Pentagon and Defense Secretary  Cheney—was 
overly cautious about how much access they granted the press due to the flagging citizen 
support during the Vietnam War, and the extent to which the media influenced civil 
unrest with military operations in Southeast Asia. Cheney reported that protecting the 
government’s ethos was one of two main principles by which he designed the media 
policy during the Gulf War, highlighting how starkly different the press would be 
allowed to interact with the military’s efforts in the Persian Gulf (Cheney 31). Ethos, in 
fact, became arguably the most critical and strategic rhetorical appeal which the 
government constantly stressed as they explained both the decision to actively combat 
Hussein’s Iraqi forces and the decision to limit the media by dictating they operate in 
pools and under certain rules and guidelines. 
Secretary of Defense Cheney realized early in the conflict how far ethos could 
carry a rhetor into his audience’s good graces. He noted at the very onset of the ground 
conflict that he both recognized and respected the government’s obligation to keep 
citizens informed of military developments (Cheney 27-28). Such an explicit 
acknowledgement in his statement to the press on the first day of the ground war 
suggested that Cheney could be trusted as a component Secretary of Defense—one who 
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knew he operated not just as military personnel, but as someone in service to American 
citizens. In fact, Cheney appeared to take this responsibility very seriously, as he repeated 
this sentiment again at the close of his statement to the press when he noted that keeping 
the public abreast of ground developments would be second only to ensuring the success 
and safety of the troops involved in the newly-forged ground war (32). While Cheney 
more often relied on an appeal to logos than to ethos, his early use of ethos helped to 
portray him as honest and fair as the outset of the war—an image that Americans could 
appreciate in itself, and because it also implied his assistant, Williams, operated under the 
same ethical principles.  
Williams, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, delivered 
many news briefings related to both the war itself, as well as to the relationship between 
the military and the media. His reliance on ethos was consistently seen in his attempts to 
be transparent with the public as to what rules and guidelines for the media had been put 
in place and why they had been instituted in the first place. In February 1991, Williams 
delivered a statement to the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
regarding the pool system he and Secretary of Defense Cheney had designed especially 
for the Gulf War (DeParle 20; Williams 33-45). Williams even noted that while he and 
Cheney firmly believed in the pool system, it was not necessarily foolproof; he quoted 
Henry Tomlinson’s observation that “The war the generals always get ready for is the 
previous one” (Williams 33). Yet, he and Cheney designed the best plan they possibly 
could, according to knowledge that could only be gained in hindsight after the conflicts in 
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Vietnam, Korea, Grenada, and Panama. Acknowledging that there was no way to 
absolutely determine the best plan of action for either military or media in the current 
conflict in Iraq, Williams used an appeal to his character as a transparent and honest man 
in order to elicit a degree of understanding and support from those Americans attuned to 
his statement on C-SPAN or from those who would read the reports written of it in the 
nation’s leading newspapers the next day. 
In fact, Williams noted how pervasive and transparent such media outlets could 
be—and quickly emphasized how such transparency could damage the war effort. He 
noted in his nationally televised statement before the Senate that enemy forces had access 
to CNN and could see the same live updates that Americans could. This potential threat 
to military operations and personnel could instantly and completely upend the carefully 
laid plans to keep the Gulf War quick and relatively painless (Williams 33). Yet, despite 
the risks, Williams still made it clear that in his role in the Pentagon, he wanted to ensure 
that the media still had enough access to provide “as much information as possible to the 
American people about their military without jeopardizing the lives of the troops or the 
success of the operation”—a goal which was identical to his predecessors during both 
World War II and the Vietnam War (33-4). By aligning himself with reporters in such a 
way as to highlight their importance, while also maintaining his own role as one who held 
responsibility for ensuring that the media and military did not compromise each other’s 
safety, Williams placed himself in a sympathetic position as a man who, unable to please 
one side or the other completely, could at least please both to some degree by designing 
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the compromise of the press pool. In admitting that he wanted both sides to be safe and 
satisfied, Williams portrayed himself as a relatable figure—not as an extremist in a sense, 
for he was neither a rigid military figure nor a military-bashing journalist. He was stuck 
in the middle—a position to which many citizens can presumably relate. 
Moreover, Williams smartly emphasized how dedicated he was to maintaining the 
integrity of the freedom of the press as was reasonable in a war situation by recounting 
the events of sending the first pool of reporters to the combat zone: “I took them to the 
Saudi embassy myself that afternoon, where the appropriate staff had been brought in to 
issue the necessary visas. One reporter had run out of pages in his passport, so we carried 
it across town so that the State Department could add some more” (Williams 35). Not 
only was Williams supportive of the reporters in principle, but he was actively engaged in 
ensuring they were able to get to Saudi Arabia in the first place, though it required him to 
go beyond the duties of his office. As a finishing polish to his account of that day, he 
added the fact that this particular group of reporters flew from Washington, DC to 
Florida, where they briefly spoke with General Schwarzkopf, who had not yet left the 
United States for Saudi Arabia (36). Williams implied that his commitment to upholding 
the rights of the press to access the war zone could be trusted because he even went as far 
as to fly the reporters to Riyadh before the commanding general arrived there. The 
reporters, then, were granted privileges and accommodations so as to better perform their 
jobs. However, when situations arose in the war zone that prevented journalists from 
traveling or interviewing independently, Williams assured both Congress and the public 
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that the reporters understood why the rules and guidelines were in place and that the 
dedication to safety and security the military expressed was also shared by the media 
(39). Moreover, Williams assured his audience that the reporters were operating under a 
military policy that had been set during previous wars in an effort to protect all 
involved—not a policy designed to prevent reporters from publishing stories that might 
embarrass the military or draw their motives and actions into question as unethical or 
unpatriotic (38). According to Williams, safety and security were the first priority, though 
journalists' access was a close second. In fact, their access to unfolding events was so 
important to the Pentagon, according to Williams, that they had been granted the ultimate 
decision to publish any given story even if the military pool escorts suggested revision 
(39). To demonstrate to the public his serious commitment to providing as much agency 
to the reporters as possible, and thus to imply his own trustworthy character and that of 
the military he represented, Williams noted that  
 
The reporters covering World War II wrote their stories and submitted them to a 
military censor. The censors cut out anything they felt broke their rules and sent 
the stories on. The decisions of the censors were final. There is no such system of 
censorship in Operation Desert Storm. There is, instead, a procedure that allows 
us to appeal to news organizations--before the harm is done--when we think 
material in their stories would violate the ground rules. And the final decisions 
belong to journalists. (39) 
 
 
By drawing a distinction between military policy of the past and present, Williams 
strategically pitted himself as a more open-minded supporter of journalists—even 
allowing them to make the final judgment about their stories—than his predecessors who 
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oversaw the media during the last major war overwhelmingly considered victorious. How 
then, could the American public distrust such a military official who desired journalistic 
freedom and agency almost as much as military safety and security? With his 
ethos-centric line of reasoning during his statement before the US Senate Committee for 
Governmental Affairs, Williams portrayed himself as a bureaucrat who could be trusted. 
If he could not be trusted, then why was he choosing to be so transparent? 
 While ethos may have been Williams’ first choice of rhetorical appeal, no person 
employed in the Pentagon and charged with the task of delivering news briefings to the 
American public can completely forego their responsibility to appeal to logos, for it is the 
explanation rooted in fact that often takes precedence in military strategizing, political 
negotiating, and historical accounts. Williams simply delivered facts to the public, often 
choosing to do so with brief, unadorned statements. Consider when, during his statement 
to the U.S Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs, he explained that a major reason 
for employing the pool system was due to location. Because reporters and military alike 
were stationed in Saudi Arabia, they had to play by their host country’s rules. Saudi 
Arabia had not yet made a decision as to how many reporters they would house, and thus 
Williams and Cheney decided to activate the pool system (Williams 34). While citizens 
may have been simultaneously hearing complaints from reporters and journalists 
regarding the constraints of the pool system, Williams’ simple explanation as to the 
reasoning behind needing to use the system made logical sense and was difficult to 
counter. 
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In an additional appeal to logos, Willaims noted during his statement to the Senate 
in February 1991 that seventeen reporters were in Saudi Arabia as of August 1990; by 
December, that number had grown to 800 (Williams 36). Even if one had found reason to 
dispute Williams’ appeals to ethos, it is difficult to imply he was not supportive of 
providing reporters with opportunities if he had been willing to send nearly one thousand 
of them to the war zone—even if they did have to operate in pools. Moreover, as logical 
proof that Williams, and the military on behalf of which he spoke, supported the 
journalists’ endeavors were some well-chosen examples of how the military had provided 
for and accommodated the reporters. While Williams had described at one point in his 
statement before the Senate Committee how he had personally ensured a reporter who 
needed more passport pages was still able to fly to Saudi Arabia, this initial example 
came at a point in his discussion when he was building his own ethos and 
credibility—ensuring the public knew he was determined to help the reporters nearly as 
much as he was to secure victory and safety for the troops. When he later provided a 
second example of how far out of their way the military had gone to accommodate 
reporters, it added to his logos as a tangible fact that could be validated by others. 
Williams explained that  
 
A U.S. Air Force C-14 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force base on January 17, 
the morning after the bombing began, with 127 news media personnel on board. 
That plane left at the onset of hostilities, during the most intensive airlift since the 
Berlin blockade. The fact that the senior military commanders dedicated one of 
their cargo airplanes to the job of transporting another 127 journalists to Saudi 
Arabia demonstrated the military’s commitment to take reporters to the scene of 
the action so they could get the story out to the American people. (37) 
138 
 
By emphasizing that he was reiterating a “fact” and stressing that the cargo plane was 
carrying “another 127 reporters,” Williams strategically suggests that the military was 
willing to treat the media as part of their own body, accommodating wave upon wave of 
them with their own modes of transportation. How could the public hear such facts and 
remain unconvinced that the military had done much to help the media capture the stories 
they wanted and needed?  
Williams also laid bare some key facts regarding the actual access journalists had 
to war zone events when he compared and contrasted the initial assumptions the media 
made to the pool system as it actually operated. Whereas the news organizations were 
concerned they would not be able to gather enough accurate information to release 
substantial stories, Williams asserted that the reporters were among the first to not only 
know, but also witness, even the earliest combat actions:  
 
as viewers, readers, and listeners know, we had the pools in place before the 
operation started. Reporters were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea to witness 
the launching of air strikes, onboard a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the 
first cruise missiles ever used in combat, on the air force bases where the fighter 
planes and bombers were taking off around the clock, and with several ground 
units in the desert. (Williams 40-41)  
 
 
Because these initial moments of the war and their own access to them were difficult, 
even impossible, to contradict—as they had been made public—reporters, as well as the 
American public, had to admit that despite being mandated to work within the pool 
system, the news media had been granted necessary access to wartime events so as to 
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relay information to their audiences. Williams admitted he both knew about and 
understood how frustrating the pool situation was for the journalists, but when balancing 
their frustration with the facts of a need for safety and security, as well as their firsthand 
experiencing of the outbreak of war, it becomes logically difficult to criticize Williams’ 
or the Pentagon’s actions in the matter. 
In military matters, an appeal to logos can often carry a rhetor’s argument further 
than any other appeal might. Williams provided statistics about how little the military 
impeded the media in a clear and convincing argument that the Pentagon was doing more 
than was expected of them in light of the fact that they were inviting as many media 
members as they could process while still maintaining safety and security of the troops. 
As of his statement before the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs on 
February 21, Williams explained that 820 print news stories had been written by the pool 
since the onset of the war. Of that 820, only five had been flagged by the Pentagon; of 
those five, only one had gone so far as prompting the Pentagon to call a media outlet’s 
editor-in-chief to discuss the report. In this particular case, the editor-in-chief agreed with 
the military that too many sensitive details had been included in the report, thereby 
compromising the outlook of the mission. The editor-in-chief agreed with the military, 
and the details were revised—and the story still made publication. In this specific 
scenario, Williams highlighted how little the military actually interfered with media 
reports, and thus announced those who criticized the military’s rules and guidelines as 
unnecessarily critical, even to the point of exaggerating militaristic censorship. By 
140 
 
emphasizing how the facts had been misconstrued, Williams not only reasserted his own 
logos-centered approach, but simultaneously drew the ēthē of some dissenters into 
question.  
While his reliance on an appeal to logos provided statistics and facts that were 
both hard to dispute and convincing, Williams also demonstrated his rhetorical savvy by 
intertwining logos and his lesser-used choice of appeal, pathos. As he explained the 
reasoning behind designing and implementing the ground rules and regulations of the 
pool system, Williams also ingratiated himself with reporters and their sympathizers by 
noting that  
 
Most of the reporters, the good ones anyways, want to be out there where the 
action is, just as they’ve done in previous conflicts. But with hundreds of fiercely 
independent reporters seeking to join up with combat units, we concluded that 
when the combat started, we’d have to rely on pools. (Williams 40)  
 
 
In this statement, Williams not only articulated that he understood what reporters 
desired—easier and closer access to the action—but that he even expected it of them 
because they wanted to be the best reporters they could be. The same reporters who may 
have criticized the pool system for its seeming restrictions on their agency were the same 
ones Williams was indirectly complementing before Congress and the American public. 
Such a statement was arguably designed to place reporters in a position of cognitive 
dissonance: how could they continue to critique and complain about the pool system 
when Williams was acknowledging that in order to do their job well, they would most 
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likely, and very understandably, critique and complain. Yet, the facts of the situation 
remained unchanged; reporters could not risk their own safety or that of the military, and 
especially not the victory against Iraqi forces. In Williams’ use of both logos and pathos, 
he is soothing the media’s unrest by reminding them that they, much the same way as the 
military, are called to sacrifice in the nation’s time of need. 
Williams again turned to pathos during his February 1991 statement before the 
US Senate, when he made his respect for reporters publicly known by celebrating their 
commitment to professional and ethical standards: “American reporters understand the 
reasoning behind these ground rules. They are patriotic citizens, and they don’t want to 
endanger lives” (Williams 39). While making such a statement may have generated a 
friendly reception from his audience, and even possibly softened the criticisms of the 
reporters who often critiqued the pool system, Williams was simultaneously challenging 
the reporters to live up to that ethical, patriotic standard by encouraging cognitive 
dissonance if they did not .In this brief statement, he then accomplished those two tasks 
of endearing himself to the public and issuing a call for reporters to consider how ethical 
and patriotic their service was as they reported potentially sensitive information to the 
public—and to enemy forces. 
The Countercollective 
Due to the swift nature of the war, the public had relatively little time to learn 
about the conflict in detail and then make a concerted antiwar effort; thus, the number of 
Gulf War protestors were comparatively fewer than those of the Vietnam War. In such a 
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situation as this, those who spoke most loudly against the war proved to be those who 
were speaking the most ​about ​the war as they explained it to their fellow citizens in the 
first place: wartime reporters. During and following the Gulf War, press members spoke 
against the war in two notable ways: to critique and question military action as it 
unfolded, and to critique and question the government's actions taken against the press 
and, in their understanding, against the freedom of speech. 
The most vocal countercollective figures during the Gulf War were, 
unsurprisingly, reporters. Peter Arnett and Walter Cronkite proved to be among the most 
vocal and recognized critics of the military’s media policy in the Middle East.  15
Throughout the war they attempted to gain greater access to the combat zone and to 
publicly question the military’s seemingly unreasonable secrecy, which itself drew 
further questions about the war’s premises and ethics. Major news networks that featured 
such reporting—particularly CNN and C-SPAN, similarly attracted citizen-viewers 
during the Gulf War because of their reputation for delivering facts as well as a platform 
for Americans to discuss current events. Additionally, Saddam Hussein, though he led the 
enemy forces, publicly shared his take on what was happening overseas. His 
interpretation and depiction of the conflict drew enough media attention so as to become 
a memorable moment of public rhetoric that led some citizens to question their stance on 
the war—or at least the tactics being used to carry it out and report on it. These voices, 
15 Cronkite’s identification with the countercollective during the Gulf War reflected his experience during 
the Vietnam War, which he publicly supported until the late 1960s. His distrust of government accounts of 
military action during the VIetnam War influenced his stance on the Gulf War. 
143 
 
though they represent only a handful of countercollective examples, demonstrated the 
distrust and criticism against which the American government’s collective agenda fought. 
Demonstrating an ethos as professionals who could be trusted with informing the 
public while maintaining military security and national secrets proved to be the most 
important task for reporters. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Williams 
simply stated that while journalists were bothered by the many rules and guidelines they 
felt limited the amount of quality news reporting they were allowed to deliver from the 
battlefield, Williams and the Pentagon “never considered them equal partners” (Williams 
26). Such a statement contradicts the front of ethical transparency Williams often 
presented during news briefings and in his prepared statement before the US Senate 
Committee for Governmental Affairs in February 1990, lending credibility to the 
complaints of journalists that they were not being treated fairly. Moreover, journalists 
presented themselves as playing by the Pentagon’s rules, as strict as they were, thus 
deserving respect for conducting themselves ethically, even when they had more news 
they could have chosen to report. Consider CNN reporter Arnett’s description of how he 
balanced his own responsibility to provide information about the war while 
simultaneously maintaining military security, establishing his ethos as well as indirectly 
suggesting that other reporters shared it: “I was risking my life in Baghdad, but I was not 
prepared to risk my credibility. I accepted the limitations of military security...but I 
needed the freedom to better explore the phenomenon of being in a capital of war” 
(“Why I Stayed” 310). While the Pentagon may have assumed that reporters were more 
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concerned with getting the most information at the quickest speed so that their network 
could be the one to break the headline, they forgot the other part of the ethos equation 
that Arnett hints at in his statement. American reporters were on live television defending 
two ēthē at the same time: that of reporter and that of American. To break all news would 
have meant to risk one’s perception of being patriotic and that was not a hit any 
reporter—or their employing news stations—would have wanted to risk. Because of their 
responsibility to both their profession and their country, it is likely that had reporters been 
granted the freedom they were seeking to travel outside the pools, they would have still 
maintained the type of security the military desired them to, regardless of whether or not 
the stories were being reported live or went through a censorship process first. 
However, this same duty to patriotism that Arnett describes in the form of 
maintaining military security was drawn into question when he sat down to interview 
Hussein. Arnett articulated in his own description of the interview that he felt he needed 
to talk about the war with the leader of the enemy forces in order to shed light as to why 
the war had to happen in the first place. While this could have made both Arnett and 
CNN look sympathetic to the enemy, Arnett felt Hussein owed the world answers (“Why 
I Stayed” 312). Because this was such a rare moment and because Hussein had not 
granted any such interview to American media before, Arnett jumped on the opportunity, 
and live news feeds were a major reason he was able to conduct the interview as he did. 
He noted that one of his concerns was delivering the tape of the interview before the Iraqi 
officials changed their minds and decided to withhold the tapes from him (313). In fact, 
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the Iraqis did prolong the process of reviewing the tapes before giving them to Arnett 
because they were concerned the Americans would track the satellite and bomb the 
interview’s—and Hussein’s—location (313). While Arnett could have potentially 
provided the American forces with sensitive information regarding Hussein from this 
interview, including the location, his responsibility to journalism dictated that he not, and 
thus he maintained his professional ethos. In this moment, he may have been more loyal 
to his profession than to his country, but he was not ​disloyal​ to his country, either. 
However, the Pentagon, as it is directed by responsibility to country first and blends 
dedication to the job with dedication to the nation, would have been suspicious of 
Arnett’s intentions to interview the enemy. Thus, while Arnett’s ethos was intact in the 
opinion of journalists and many American citizens, this moment of ethos on display could 
have just as easily been interpreted as unpatriotic by the military, thereby decreasing their 
compassion for journalists’ pleas to be granted more freedom from the pools. To the 
countercollective of reporters and their supporters, Arnett proved trustworthy; to the 
collective, he could have come across as slightly treasonous.  
Another of the most respected and well-known reporters, Cronkite, could have 
drawn listeners in with his ethos alone, but would have not delivered much of a 
convincing argument as to why the press needed greater access to the combat zone 
without a supplemental dose of logos. In his statement before the US Senate Committee 
for Governmental Affairs, and in rebuttal to Williams, Cronkite called out to the 
American public by reminding them the government owed them—the voters—honest, 
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accurate, and thorough explanations as to what was happening overseas; the voters thus 
had a stake in this debate between Williams and Cronkite, between the military and the 
media. Cronkite’s line of reasoning was that the citizens voted for the president, the 
president asked Congress for a declaration of war, Congress, also elected by citizens, 
granted the declaration, and now that war was being carried out overseas in the name of 
the American citizens. Therefore, the public were owed the information the military was 
denying them (Cronkite 45). Additionally, according to Cronkite, the Pentagon really had 
nothing to fear in allowing reporters more access: “The Pentagon is acting on a generally 
discredited Pentagon myth that the Vietnam War was lost because of the uncensored 
press coverage. The military would do better to pattern its PR after its handling of the 
press in World War II, a war we won” (45). 
Much like military personnel, reporters often rely more on appeals to logos and 
ethos than they do appeals to pathos; a critical tenet of objective journalism requires the 
reporter minimize feelings and privilege facts then deliver those facts honestly. However, 
also much like military personnel, reporters are not totally immune from capitalizing on 
an appeal to pathos for additional support of their typically logos- and ethos-heavy 
arguments. Such an appeal to pathos can be a risky rhetorical strategy, but can prove 
successful if the reporter has the ethos to support it. For example, Cronkite incorporated 
an appeal to pathos into his statement before the US Senate Committee for Governmental 
Affairs, in response to Williams’ claims that the media had more than enough 
accommodation to do their job thoroughly. Cronkite suggested that the military employed 
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the pool system to keep secret their potentially unethical, even illegal operations, by 
comparing the US military to one that globally elicits negative emotions: that of Nazi 
Germany. Cronkite stated that  
 
After World War II most Germans protested that they did not know what went on 
in the heinous Nazi concentration camps. It is just possible that they did not. But 
this claim of ignorance did not absolve them from blame: they had complacently 
permitted Hitler to do his dirty business in the dark. They raised little objection, 
most even applauded, when he closed their newspapers and clamped down free 
speech. Certainly our leaders are not to be compared with Hitler, but today, 
because of onerous, unnecessary rule, American are not being permitted to see 
and hear the full story of what their military forces are doing in an action that will 
reverberate long into the nation’s future. (Cronkite 45) 
 
 
While such a comparison between Nazi Germany and the United States may have seemed 
far-fetched, Cronkite pitted the two as analogous because in both cases, the citizens 
overwhelmingly supported the government’s (potentially extreme) takeover of the press 
(45). He even argued that such censorship was both unheard of in the United States and 
the result of an arrogant government (45). With his sharp words and implications that the 
government was moving toward media control like that of a dictator the United States 
had fought to eradicate, Cronkite appealed to the nation’s pathos with this shocking 
similarity, in hopes to startle citizens into understanding the seriousness of the situation 
as he and his colleagues understood it. 
Cronkite not only opened his rebuttal against Williams with an appeal to pathos, 
but he also brought his argument full-circle by ending on the same emotional note as that 
with which he opened. Though between his opening comparison of the United States and 
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Nazi Germany Cronkite made other claims and drew on evidence not so rooted in pathos, 
he returned to this appeal by again implying that much like German citizens during 
World War II, Americans were owed an explanation as to why the military refused the 
press the open coverage they desired. He drew attention to such a measure’s suspicious 
nature, asserting that the military would allow greater ease of access in the combat zone if 
they had nothing to hide—a claim which Cronkite used to blend logos into his 
pathos-laden argument and thereby make it appealing on multiple rhetorical levels. Such 
a move also worked because it retains the attention of those in the audience who may not 
be so inclined to pathos. He then ended his argument with this pathos/logos blend by 
reminding his listeners—the US Senate Committee for Governmental Affairs, the 
Pentagon and military, and the American public—that such a move against the freedom 
of the press would only end badly:  
 
What are they trying to hide?...the fact that we don’t know, the fact that the 
military apparently feels there is ​something​ it must hide, can only lead eventually 
to a breakdown in home-front confidence and the very echoes from Vietnam that 
the Pentagon fears the most. (Cronkite 47) 
 
 
A great deal of Cronkite’s, and other journalists’ frustration, was that the press briefings 
the Pentagon offered were not sufficient and lacked the meaningful information reporters 
sought. He even suggested the Iraqis knew more of the war developments than did 
American reporters operating in the pool system (46). By emphasizing that some 
information was common sense almost immediately following an incident, Cronkite 
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implied the military was withholding information for more sinister purposes, or else there 
would be no need to attempt to regulate the reporters so rigidly anyway: “The gulf 
briefings are ridiculously inadequate. Why should we not be told what bridges have been 
hit? Don’t the Iraqis know?” (46-47). 
Individual reporters appealed to the American public largely through ethos and 
logos, but the media conglomerates for which such reporters worked exercised a fair 
amount of ethos as well. As two of the most-watched news channels during the Gulf War, 
both CNN and C-SPAN exercised ethos as a trustworthy source so viewers continued 
watching. In her article about mediated experiences of war, Jean Seaton notes that  
 
The journalism that presents us with the suffering of others is already a more 
complete act of witnessing...as it both observes and articulates the condition of 
distance victims. Thus many of the processes of news-making are really 
concerned to secure the trust of the audience in its accounts—and this is important 
because of how unreliable we all know witnesses can be, motivated by their own 
interests or simply confused about what they have seen. (47) 
 
 
Choosing to tune in to televised news coverage demonstrates the American public’s trust 
in the stations and journalists reporting the news—and it is logical to assume that the 
names of Arnett and Cronkite were enough to entice viewers to take their accounts of 
combat events as honest and authentic. In other words, the very act of watching a 
newscast illustrates a belief in the ethos of those presenting the news. 
While unrest among reporters created much of the objection to the government’s 
official agenda and accounts of events in the Middle East, there was an additional source 
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of counterargument against American actions overseas. While neither the begrudged 
reporters or this second source of an alternative opinion looked much like the protest 
scenes of the Vietnam War, they did contribute to feelings of questionable motivations 
and unethical actions that drew the government's official account into question. As a 
second source of an alternative opinion, Hussein himself took to televised events to share 
his side of the war and to explain what he understood as the reality of war. While he may 
have been seeking feelings of sympathy from American viewers, his co-opting of the 
American-based CNN news network and his holding of American hostages did little to 
inspire such feelings. In fact, these moments worked more against him than for him, so 
one of the most notorious sources of counterargument or alternative opinion about the 
war eventually contributed to more support for it, at least in the understanding of the 
American public. Andrew Hoskins notes that Hussein’s attempts to direct information 
regarding his motives and reputation were too easily used against him:  
 
He is probably the most demonized leader of the television age but also one 
whose own use of television often gifted propaganda to the West. From the 
display of his greeting the so-called “human shields” in August 1990 through to 
images of the captured Coalition pilots in January 1991...there appeared a series 
of misjudgments in his use of television, if courting world opinion was ever his 
aim. (Hoskins 107) 
 
 
While Hussein may have grossly miscalculated how his televised actions would be 
interpreted (or in the event that he did understand, but was actually attempting to solidify 
for himself a global reputation as a powerful dictator), American televisions co-opted 
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mediated images of Hussein to fuel the prowar agenda, featuring his appearance 
alongside words, phrases, and pronouncements associated with his evil nature. In a 
moment that could have proven productive for a counterargument, or a weaker form of 
counterargument against the official prowar agenda in the form of an alternative opinion, 
Hussein’s rhetorical tactic to garner feelings of sympathy failed, and the appeal to pathos 
was instead transformed into yet another moment when the government pushed its own 
agenda further. While there was no comparable media co-opting during the Vietnam War, 
there were analogous televised protests against the war that were used to illustrate to the 
“silent majority” how unpatriotic, depraved, and even evil protestors were. While the 
miscommunication and unplanned consequences of media use to spread a 
counterargument were similar in both wars, the enemy force’s leader commanding such a 
media co-opting was novel, and thus memorable. 
One of Hussein’s most memorable, and also controversial, uses of a televised 
platform to attempt to appeal to the sympathetic feelings of Westerners was his August 
1990 detaining of hostages, or “human shields” whom he considered “guests” (Hoskins 
110). Hussein seemingly wanted to portray his hostages as the lucky recipients of a 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to meet a world leader who was, as he hoped they would 
see, much more pleasant and hospitable than they had been led to believe. He was 
essentially attempting to rewrite his own ethos. By providing a sociable and welcoming 
persona, Hussein hoped to sway Western audiences into questioning if war was necessary 
against someone who was not as sinister as the media had previously reported. However, 
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he failed to convince the American public that this was the case, and his televised actions 
were what gave his miscalculation away: 
 
the screening of the hostages with Saddam spectacularly backfired. The Iraqi 
President explained through an interpreter to his ‘guests’ the reasons for their 
internment and even asked them questions, although barely pausing to allow for 
their responses. (110)  
 
 
Such interactions with non-military citizens introduced a very different, and apparently 
recently contrived, version of Hussein; his regularly expected presentation of himself 
involved a “khaki uniform complete with army beret and big shoulder lapels and 
accompanied by officials all also dressed in military attire” (113). After having seen 
countless images of Hussein dressed in military attire, interacting with his armed forces 
with stern expressions, seeing him in a casual business suit among Western citizens did 
little to invoke feelings of understanding or sympathy from the American public; the 
attempt to present himself as friendly and likeable was much too little, too late. Any 
potential counterarguments against the American invasion of Iraq dramatically fell flat 
due in part to Hussein’s own misguided rhetorical attempts to persuade Western 
audiences that the version of him they had been shown was inaccurate. In fact, the 
American media used the more expected images of Hussein in his military attire to 
constantly remind the public of the real global leader against whom the war was 
waged—and thus actively worked against Hussein’s attempts to portray himself in any 
other way, particularly in a way that might pressure Americans to see him as relatable, 
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even humane. While a one-time attempt to rewrite his ethos seemed like a smart strategy 
to this countercollective figure, he could not stop the media—itself a countercollective 
figure—from exposing the faults in his argument. 
The Medium and The Public 
As C-SPAN and CNN ran constant newsfeeds, both mainstream stations 
employed a strategic rhetorical move in addition to the logos of the facts and the ēthē of 
reporters. They also kept their audience engaged, giving the audience a chance to be a 
quasi-rhetor by voicing opinions on live television and contributing to the formation of a 
public collective. After military developments, news briefings, or discussions in 
Congress, news anchors and hosts would ask citizens to call in and discuss their take on 
the recent events. Private citizens with little or even no military or political experience 
could now be heard on a national level, setting them apart from those citizens during 
World War II who could listen to radio programming hosts, but could not themselves 
become (guest) hosts unless they had the means to buy air time or had connections to 
those with access. Citizens could hear the perspectives of other citizens who were 
supposedly just like them, which created a sense of identification with these on-air, 
non-specialist voices. The call-in affordance created a new debate platform that was 
widely accessible and novel. 
Identification with the prowar collective proved to be the majority response to the 
Gulf War, much unlike its televised predecessor of the Vietnam War. Identification was a 
naturally logical response to the televised war for at least two reasons: 1) prowar 
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government officials had pitched the need for war as a logical response to Hussein’s 
unethical and dangerous actions, which could be repeated and analyzed ad nauseum on 
television, and 2) televised coverage of smart bombs hitting very specific targets 
suggested to the American public that the casualties were low, so there was little reason 
not to pursue a Middle Eastern dictator with the potential to become the next Hitler. What 
citizens did not see were the messier moments—when bombs missed their targets or 
when Iraqi civilians became casualties. Because the press traveled in pools and live 
coverage was limited to places safe enough for reporters to occupy, the logic of the 
televised war implied a more sanitized version of what actually took place. However, the 
sanitized version was digestible for the public, and thus adopting the “us-versus-them” 
mentality and supporting the war effort to destroy the “them” seemed logical. Moreover, 
the war itself took place so quickly that a good deal of events were not known until later, 
despite claims that the media could deliver minute-by-minute commentary: “the Gulf 
War was over before much actuality (non-pool) footage could contaminate the stylistic 
endeavors of network television” (Hoskins 24). Overwhelming, highly visual stylistics, as 
previously mentioned, lend themselves to overwhelming the viewer with information, 
and giving the appearance and feeling of knowing everything that is happening, when in 
fact that information has been carefully chosen and crafted. For example, Hoskins notes 
that there were even instances during the early stages of the war when news stations used 
images, colors, and representations of the physical layout of Iraq to demonstrate facts 
about the war, such as when ABC News used a horizon image with a setting sun to track 
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the impending deadline President Bush gave Hussein to comply with the United Nations 
resolutions (27). 
Another element of televised war that promoted prowar collective identification 
through logos was the use of graphics, such as maps and graphs, to explain events when 
televised coverage was limited, inappropriate, or too dangerous to capture (Hoskins 25). 
Such tactics provided citizens an opportunity to learn more details about the war—from 
locating Iraq on a map to understanding the complexities of United Nations resolutions 
that had been violated—and thus contributed to feelings of confidence in supporting (or, 
more rarely, protesting) the war.  
While constant live coverage of the war kept the public abreast of military and 
political developments, such twenty-four-seven updates and call-in news programming 
created the illusion that American citizens were more involved than they actually were. 
While citizen-viewers could learn about and discuss events, they were still only seeing 
what they were permitted to see, and there is no evidence that even the most informed, 
intelligent discussion from citizens during call-in segments reached government officials 
or shaped their politics. However, the television’s importance during the war was not so 
much in what actually happened, so much as what citizens ​felt​ was happening—if they 
felt they were participating, then to them, that was reality. Such a feeling of involvement 
was at least partially due to the highly visual nature of reporting by one of the most 
dominant wartime channels, CNN. This station in particular created a complex display of 
information that lent itself to a feeling of news omniscience—if there was anything to 
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know about the war, CNN suggested it had that information. This look, argues Hoskins, 
was created by strategic visual cues that rhetorically worked to persuade the American 
public viewers that they were “in the know.” One of CNN’s signature visual traits were 
the “banks of monitors and screens-within-the-screen and the production of simultaneity 
through multiple satellite feeds distributed to different visual frames that split the screen 
into desktop-sized fragments of different times and places” (25). As viewers watched 
around-the-clock news coverage with such imagery, they became well acquainted with 
the regular news anchors and reporters. The combination of a fast-paced, highly visual 
aesthetic with the familiarity of the same group of anchors and reporters lent itself to an 
atmosphere ripe for identification. Not only were viewers informed, but they were now 
part of the war process—they could know all about the developments just as the military 
did and could listen to anchors analyze each event as if they were friends discussing the 
news with American citizens, right in their homes. If televised news coverage during the 
Vietnam War proved how powerful television is during wartime, then the same medium 
during the Gulf War combined that power with a more participatory democracy wherein 
average citizens could now speak back on a national level—or at least felt that such was 
the case. 
As citizens contributed to what appeared to be a form of participatory democracy, 
the media ensured their continued attention with the simultaneous use of carefully crafted 
visual and audio material to produce a more engaging, interactive feel. Hoskins details 
this strategy in his recount of how the audio file of CNN’s Arnett was dubbed over top 
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the visual footage produced by ITV and ABC (30). Pairing the most compelling audio 
file with the most compelling visual file was a rhetorical choice to draw the news 
audience in, providing an increased synesthetic experience that involved both hearing and 
seeing, making viewers at home feel they were part of the action. They were watching the 
war live with one another, talking live on-air with one another, feeling as if they were 
there in the midst of battle or in the newsroom. Identification was thus encouraged 
through the aural and visual, as well as through a novel increase in instantaneous 
communication with other citizens across the nation. Because all of these elements took 
place synchronously, the feeling of identification was indeed a more powerful one than 
had been electronically produced and experienced during both World War II and the 
Vietnam War. 
As citizens identified with their peers and felt engaged in the news, the shape of 
the public sphere, and what that meant for participatory democracy, shifted in part 
because of the technology itself. McLuhan argues that television is a cool medium, 
asking the audience to participate by supplying their own understandings and 
interpretations of what they see and hear (​Understanding Media ​39). While small clips of 
war coverage may have reinforced this notion of television as cool media during the 
Vietnam War, I would argue that the coolness of television became slightly warmer 
during the Gulf War because of the twenty-four-hour, around-the-clock coverage, but 
was balanced out by the coolness of the call-in opportunities offered by outlets such as 
CNN and C-SPAN, which asked citizens to create conversations and supply their own 
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responses. However, even the most articulate and productive conversations produced by 
call-in viewers were still tempered by the relatively little room dedicated to such calls 
compared to the news content being fed to them by the channels themselves. In previous 
wars, radio and news broadcasts eventually came to end—after anywhere from fifteen to 
sixty minutes on average. This relatively small time frame left most of a person’s waking 
hours available for him or her to reconsider what they had heard and seen, to debate it 
with others, and to search out additional information from other sources. In all of these 
options, participation was still required and active effort necessary. However, if news 
coverage never ends, then the audience becomes a de facto captive audience to a media 
that does not need any input—there is no opening for such input anyway aside from the 
dedicated timeframes when viewer calls were being accepted and aired.  
Yet, there is a complicating factor that accompanies immediate, live coverage of a 
war: overextended news. Because there can be downtime during wars where no shellings, 
bombings, or other developments are taking place, reporters may find themselves 
struggling to provide novel content. Such moments turn into apt opportunities to 
analyze—and over analyze—every detail of recent events, to invite both expert and 
amateur guests onto the show, and to project potential future events—all of which can 
lead to muddied or even biased interpretations of events. To keep an audience engaged, 
reporters must continually report news, so when news is lacking, they must find a way to 
create a sense of urgency, as well as identification with their particular brand of reporting, 
that encourages viewers to stay tuned. McLuhan noted in ​The Gutenberg Galaxy​, 
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television—particularly live television—does not have the luxury of “downtime”: “The 
elementary and basic fact about the TV image is that it is a mosaic or a mesh, 
continuously in a state of formation by the ‘scanning finger.’ Such a mosaic involves the 
viewer in a perpetual act of participation and completion” (286-87). In other words, the 
audience must be continually engaged, as they are needed for their participation—their 
identification—around a shared interpretation of the news as it unfolds. If news becomes 
stale and is delivered too late, then identification cannot take place because it would be in 
response to past events rather than current ones, and there would be no need to band 
together in response to the event that has already passed. Alternatively, citizens could 
access the news elsewhere and buy into another outlet’s interpretation and identify with it 
instead. In order to remain relevant, news stations had to remain current with their 
up-to-date information. When the audience can participate by seeing and hearing their 
peers, calling in themselves, and experiencing live coverage of developments together, it 
is much more likely that they feel that they are part of the event itself and are connected 
to other citizens through such shared participation. Identification during the Gulf War 
was largely possible due to the electronic synesthesia created by televisions’ timeliness, 
audio, and visual advantages. 
The television coverage of the Gulf War’s voices, both of support and protest, 
was markedly different than that of the Vietnam War. While the Vietnam War grew from 
a quiet start, gradually dominating news hours, the Gulf War essentially began—and 
ended— on television (Taylor 31). The American public first witnessed missile launches 
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during the evening news hours on January 16, 1991, and watched the entirety of the 
conflict play out television via live-action footage and ceaseless commentary from CNN 
and C-SPAN, most notably. Even commercial breaks were done away with in favor of 
news footage (34). The entire experience of the Gulf War was mediated through the 
television, marking it apart from its television predecessor of the Vietnam War. The 
television’s role as collective-enhancer suggested that this medium was much more than a 
vehicle of entertainment or news delivery; it became an identification device that enabled 
a form of participatory democracy where it had not existed before, and in such a way that 
had never existed before. American citizens now knew they could use the same medium 
that delivered the news they consumed, to act as a producer and sharer of public opinion. 
The trend of citizens’ harnessing mass media technology and transitioning from solely 
“consumer” to also “producer” would continue, and be greatly enlarged, during the 
following war in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER V 
 THE IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011: THE GLOBAL AUDIENCE EXPANDING 
 
 
The United States declared war on Iraq for the second time on March 20, 2003 
following a period of intense political, public, and—maybe most importantly—rhetorical 
discussion stemming from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The rhetoric 
thrown about in the media immediately following the September 11 attacks to justify 
engaging in hot war reflected a mixture of residual reservations about Saddam Hussein 
that still lingered in the public consciousness following the Gulf War, accompanied with 
the newfound outrage toward those who had in any way contributed to the recent terrorist 
attacks. The technology relaying news of the unfolding situation represented a mixture of 
the old and the new as well. Updates were broadcast via television programming that in 
many ways resembled news of the previous war; however, the newer Internet technology 
provided an additional outlet for citizens to keep abreast of current affairs while affording 
them increased participation in both reflecting and shaping public opinion. The new 
technology of an interactive platform for the masses enabled public sphere discussion 
during wartime in a way never experienced before on a national—or international—level. 
The Internet provided a space in which both collective and countercollective voices stated 
opinions and reached global audiences in record time. American citizens accessed war 
news from multiple political, cultural, and demographic perspectives in real time, and 
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restrictions on access and public opinions placed by the prowar collective were fewer and 
more difficult to implement than with previous wartime media. The Internet effectively 
combined all previous media, both electronic and otherwise, into a multisensory public 
platform that dramatically reshaped the role of the average citizen in discussing and 
debating within the public sphere. 
Just as with television—but, I argue, to a greater degree and in a much more 
dramatic fashion—the Internet transformed the way in which official government 
decisions were both supported and resisted by the public. The tenor of public sphere 
conversations were now more unfiltered and unrestricted than ever before thanks to a 
virtual platform that could be accessed for multiway communication nearly anywhere, 
including the home. More citizens had access to a public discourse platform than in 
previous generations and wars. This shift to more publicly accessible conversation 
confronted traditional media owners—those who owned and ran radio stations, news 
channels, and even newspapers and other print sources—with the challenge to adapt their 
news delivery to the emerging medium of the Internet. Though the Internet had not 
completely erased or replaced the older forms of media, it did converge multiple media in 
a way that demanded the remixing and restructuring of the old forms into something 
new—something multisensory, something with the ability to be both synchronous and 
asynchronous, and something compatible with other forms of technology, such as the 
radio and television that were so vital for wars past. Moreover, the Internet 
simultaneously acted as a great electronic archive, keeping records of news articles, 
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videos, and images, as well as the public discussions hosted online. The very makeup of 
mass communication and persuasion continued to shift during the Iraq War, and in turn, 
affected American citizens’ identification with the countercollective yet again. 
The Collective 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 marked the first large scale domestic 
attack by a foreign enemy since the attacks on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. As sitting 
president, George W. Bush learned of the events seemingly in stride, as he remained calm 
when learning of the events from his staff as he sat in a classroom of kindergarteners that 
morning during their reading lesson (Choi). From the public perspective, civilian and 
government buildings had been attacked, though it took several days to uncover the 
persons responsible and their motives for carrying out such massive destruction. As the 
nation waited to understand what had happened, and if the likes of it would happen again, 
Bush stepped in to rhetorically comfort and encourage the nation through carefully 
chosen words and phrases that would serve to explain the events of 9/11 while 
simultaneously setting the rhetorical stage for the Iraq War. 
President Bush quickly crafted a highly distinct ethos as a sort of political 
cowboy, determined to save the nation—and even the world—from the “bad guys” 
responsible for the September 11 attacks, while simultaneously drumming up fear of the 
enemy to ensure that the threat was felt nationwide. As Susan A. Brewer notes in her 
study of war propaganda, Bush’s ethos strongly lay in his “us-versus-them” depiction of 
the United States—the epitome of civilization, as popular opinion would 
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suggest—against those responsible for terrorist undertakings—the barbarians (230). 
During the previous conflict with Hussein roughly a decade earlier, President Bush’s 
father relied on a similar strategy of highlighting the cultural differences—and indirectly, 
the supposed cultural superiority of American society—to persuade civilians to support 
the war effort. These three components—an us-versus-them mentality, a feeling of 
cultural superiority, and a similar approach to conflict as his father had made during a 
war that proved to be an “easy win” for the United States—all worked in tandem to 
produce a persuasive appeal to the ethos of both American culture and ideals in general, 
but more importantly, to the ethos of President George W. Bush. 
Ethos may have played a role in persuading American citizens that their leader 
was capable of responding to the terrorist attacks, but ethos alone may not have sufficed 
to persuade citizens to support actual war. The Iraq War was largely created and based in 
a pathos-laden response to the devastating September 11 terrorist attacks. The events of 
that single day that arguably triggered the Iraq War, whether logical or not, worked 
extensively through an appeal to the American pathos. The 9/11 attacks themselves 
elicited understandably emotional responses from across the globe, but especially from 
Americans who watched their nation under a large-scale foreign attack for the first time 
since Pearl Harbor. As sitting president during the catastrophic events of September 11, 
Bush acknowledged the predictable feelings Americans were presumably feeling 
immediately following the attacks. In his address to the nation on the evening of 
September 11, he almost immediately noted the nation’s horrified response to “The 
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pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge—huge structures 
collapsing [which] have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding 
anger” (“Statement by the President”). Although Bush would continue in his speech to 
highlight how these initial feelings were quickly replaced with resolve to defend the 
nation, Anthony R. DiMaggio notes that the strand of pathos-fueled messages continued 
after the address and into the Iraq War months later and did so with the help of 
mainstream media: “Fearful messages were filtered through a compliant media to a 
susceptible public that already shared fears of terrorism after September 11” (59). Brewer 
argues that this “culture of fear” was a necessary “emotional framework for preemptive 
war against Iraq” (234). Much like a wounded animal responds to pain with violence 
toward those who may try to help it, Bush suggests that the United States locate not only 
the terrorists responsible for the attacks but also those who harbor them (and presumably, 
who also support them—with or without harboring them) (Bush “Statement by the 
President”). The alternative approach—to opt for war as a last resort and to pursue 
diplomatic retaliation in the form of policies, trade restrictions, and other economic and 
political sanctions—took a backseat to the idea of a physical, violent, and active hot war. 
In fact, it was on the evening of 9/11 that Bush first used the phrase “war on terrorism” 
when, immediately following his gratitude to the members of Congress for banding 
together in bipartisan national support as well as to world leaders who had contacted the 
president to discuss aid following the events, he confidently and authoritatively stated 
that the American people would “stand together to win the war against terrorism” 
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(“Statement by the President”). The Bush administration also depicted the war “like a 
new reality show in which the entire country had been given a part to play. With its logos 
and theme music, media coverage featured decisive leaders, authoritative anchors, 
courageous war correspondents, ramrod straight military briefers, can-do troops, and the 
folks at home displaying flags and yellow ribbons” (Brewer 234). Thanks in part to the 
successful creation of a culture of fear, American citizens compulsion to participate in 
their role as dutiful patriots proved strong, and persuasion to support the war—or 
whatever actions the sitting president may choose to take—seemed the antidote to 
quelling the fear of an uncertain future. 
While none of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks hailed from Iraq, the 
question of who harbored whom led to accusations against Iraq for its potential aid in the 
Taliban’s activities. By noting the United States’s rocky past with Iraq’s Hussein and 
emphasizing a national distrust of the dictator, Bush reignited a convenient sense of fear 
by reminding Americans that mass threats still existed and could instantly destroy lives 
just as the 9/11 attacks had:  
 
From 2002 to 2003, Bush embarked on one of the largest prowar public relations 
campaigns in history. This campaign ended successfully with public support 
galvanized behind Bush’s war agenda. The president stressed Iraq’s alleged 
WMDs and ties to terrorism. (DiMaggio 59) 
 
 
Fear played the prime role in both prodding citizens to band together as one and in 
encouraging them to follow their leader into a war fueled by the need for retaliation, even 
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if that war sought to attack a different nation, leader, and citizens than those responsible 
for harboring the terrorists. For President Bush, the bottom line was thus: fear sells. 
However powerful fear or retaliation tactics may be, they will not ultimately be 
successful if they are the only emotions called on when supporting any national agenda. 
As time between the terrorist attacks and government action increased, citizens' sense of 
normalcy returned and the initial fear induced by the confusion of 9/11 subsided. To 
maintain momentum for his impending war, Bush capitalized on hope and how despite 
the evil in the world—evil which had struck American soil in the recent past—Americans 
still hoped to create a safe and peaceful world. Hope, then, is a more ongoing emotion 
that while not as jarring as the immediate fear that occurs in the direct aftermath of a 
large-scale attack, it does sustain itself by begging the question of what the future may 
hold. In other words, while Americans would not always feel, or even remember, the 
distinct brand of visceral fear they felt as they learned about the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
they can always access their own ideas and desires for what the future of the nation and 
the world could look like. DiMaggio notes that “Along with cultivating fear, the Bush 
administration sold the promise of hope that the United States would take action to rid the 
world of the ‘butcher of Baghdad,’ and roll back the terror threat” (59). In ridding the 
world of such a threat, Americans could sleep easy knowing that the sources of evil they 
saw in late 2001 were being weeded out and destroyed, thereby ensuring increased safety. 
However, because idealistic hope for a better future does not attract nearly as much 
attention or support as panic-stricken fear, Bush’s tactic to appeal to the former unaided 
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by the latter did not last long, and his support for engaging in the Iraq War would circle 
back to fear even several months after the 9/11 attacks. As Americans’ emotional 
reactions leveled out and proved more difficult for Bush to capitalize one, a third 
rhetorical appeal pushed the prowar collective’s agenda through the ranks of Congress 
and throughout the public. 
Engaging in a hot war requires some degree of logos lest the militaristic 
component of the war be unfounded or too weakly supported once the public’s emotional 
reaction fades. In order to placate the legal and constitutional requirements of initiating or 
participating in war and to encourage citizens to continue supporting military 
intervention, a president must pitch wartime involvement in such a way that garners both 
congressional and public support while also appearing objective and rooted in fact. 
Possibly the biggest concern for the Bush administration was combating “Vietnam 
syndrome”—“the term for American reluctance to go to war” following the deadly 
prolonged and largely unproductive war decades before (Brewer 231). Recognizing the 
pivotal role the media played in both Vietnam and the Gulf War, the Bush White House 
seized media control as much as possible and, as early as possible, following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. In dictating the narrative of the official government 
response to the terrorist attacks, the Bush administration created a specific patriotic 
message that would prove difficult to unravel or contest in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11 and into the early months of the following year as the nation prepared for 
formal entrance into a hot war. Brewer suggests that such a controlled and systematic 
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approach to how the conflict in the Middle East unfolded in front of American citizens 
was in fact highly dangerous and only partially rooted in truth: 
 
Proud of their ‘iron message discipline,’ officials used facts, lies, and patriotic 
symbols as well as censorship to conduct ‘perception management.’ In a time of 
bitter rivalry between Republicans and Democrats, [the Bush administration] did 
not benefit from the bipartisan consensus of the Cold War era, but instead 
manufactured the appearance of consensus. (232-33) 
 
 
While partisan debate may have existed in congressional meetings and sessions, the 
American public received mediated messages of a uniform government that sought to 
destroy an enemy who, although elusive, could somehow be pinpointed in Hussein’s Iraq, 
as he represented the base from which such terroristic threats were spawned, whether 
such a claim was logical and based in fact or not. Fed by a steady diet of “infoganda,” the 
American public appeared to accept the heavily spun version of reality portrayed to them 
by the Bush administration, at least in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks. 
When he was interviewed on ​Meet the Press ​five days after the September 11 
attacks, Vice President Cheney also relied on the government’s brand of logos as he 
explained how combating a terrorist organization like al-Qaeda would require long-term 
effort due to the difficulty of identifying a covert cell of terrorists as opposed to focusing 
on a particular nation and ruler (“The Vice President Appears”). While Hussein’s name 
was linked to the terrorist attacks, his factual link to them did not exist, and thus Cheney, 
as well as the rest of the Bush administration, focused instead on al-Qaida when 
discussing retaliation, using their secretive operations and possible locations as part of the 
170 
 
reason to invade Iraq—or anywhere else nearby that could potentially harbor terrorist 
cells. In doing so, Cheney used this platform to prepare the American people for a 
conflict that could range not only across geographical space and national borders, but 
across time: “It’s...important for people to understand that this is a long-term 
proposition...I think this is going to be a struggle that the United States is going to be 
involved in for the foreseeable future” (“The Vice President Appears”). In this televised 
appearance, Cheney mentioned President Bush’s initiative to retaliate against both 
terrorists and the nations that harbored them, specifically naming Saudi Arabia and 
Afghanistan as potential targets of what he said would be “the full wrath of the United 
States of America” (“The Vice President Appears”). By basing the prowar agenda’s 
rationale on what appeared to be fact-based reasoning, it would seem the Middle East 
could easily be turned into a singular “enemy,” and conveniently glossed over the 
complexities and nuances of the boundaries between Hussein, Iraq as a country, and the 
likes of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. However, Bush and Cheney’s use of 
logos—though faulty and incomplete—combined with the overwhelming appeals to 
pathos immediately following the terrorist attacks proved effective in encouraging a 
degree of public support for the war. 
The Countercollective 
Even if the lack of logos from the collective, prowar agenda were overlooked, and 
even if their appeals to pathos were effective in reaching American citizens, the 
countercollective’s rebuttals to both the war’s premises and rhetorical appeals to support 
171 
 
it were difficult to discredit and nearly impossible not to hear. The Internet afforded the 
countercollective an opportunity to project their own perspective of the war without 
relying on filtration through mainstream (and prowar) media, and could thus reach 
American citizens through their own websites, videos, and publications hosted online. 
The battleground for public opinion as to how to respond to the 9/11 attacks was 
particularly volatile because of how much of a role the rhetorical stylings of a few key 
figures played and of how they spun and delivered their version of reality:  
 
the news of who was responsible for the WTC attack involves assertions, opaque 
and amorphous, grounded in words...Lacking pictures for evidence, and relying 
exclusively on words, the world remains divided about who carried out the WTC 
attacks. It depends on which proposition (reality) you want to believe and who 
you want to believe. (Gladney 24-25) 
 
 
With the Internet as their widely accessible platform, the countercollective could now 
shape and define reality like the collective had been able to do since World War II, using 
an electronic mass medium to communicate the particular message that would create a 
counter-collective of citizens who identified with one another and who sought to 
strengthen their tribe with even more members. In doing so, the countercollective 
exercised rhetorical savvy to attract citizens and international onlookers alike, 
highlighting the growing audience for American wartime rhetoric in the process. 
Much like George W. Bush’s cowboy ethos was one of the first rhetorical appeals 
to become publicly apparent following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ethos was also at the 
forefront of the countercollective’s dissent. To argue that one of the most strident voices 
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opposing the war—Hussein’s—carried ethos with most American citizens would be 
grossly misdirected. However, the voice of the other whom Hussein represented proved a 
challenge to ignore during the Iraq War. As the political antithesis to a capitalist 
democracy such as the United States, Hussein’s dictatorship in an Arab nation stood 
starkly opposed to the ideals upon which Americans had traditionally prided themselves. 
However, it was not Hussein’s politics per se that invited protest to the war—it was his 
representation of a form of government, and even of cultural existence, different from 
that of popular Western beliefs that suggested the United States was attempting to 
discredit and even smother the potential for a nation to operate in a manner which looked 
so unlike that of the American way of life. The countercollective line of reasoning 
questioned whether the United States was trying to play the role of neoconservative 
“super police,” exercising undue control over another nation's functioning (Holloway 35). 
Thanks in part to the Internet, American citizens were able for the first time to break from 
mainstream media and to hear the unfiltered perspectives of citizens from Iraq, as well as 
from other Arab nations, as they interpreted and shared their understanding of the war. 
For those Americans who were receptive to reading, watching, and listening to these 
othered voices, the motivations and pragmatics of American liberation of Iraq became 
suspect (Holloway 74). While Hussein did not appear in American media the way he had 
during the Gulf War, when he hosted “guests” (or took “hostages”), he represented the 
countercollective other who was often demonized, and rarely understood, by mainstream, 
prowar collective media. 
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Like the collective, and President Bush in particular, relying on ethos was only a 
small component of the rhetorical tactics to attract American citizens to the cause. The 
appeals to logos presented by the countercollective may have proven to be the strongest 
appeals against the war. The lack of weapons of mass destruction, the fact that none of 
the September 11 terrorists hailed from Iraq, and the need for oil from the Middle East all 
served as reasons many Americans—as well as citizens from around the 
globe—criticized the Bush administration’s persistence in initiating the war. A perceived 
lack of logos to support engaging in a hot war with Iraq prompted many American 
citizens to look to a news source that may have otherwise been an unlikely outlet for 
information: an Arab-centric website featuring content written by and for citizens in the 
“enemy” region of the Middle East. One of the main countercollective voices throughout 
the Iraq War was ​aljazeera.net​, a website carrying news written by reporters representing 
Arab cultures and often intended for Arab audiences. About a year after the September 11 
attacks, and only months before the war officially began in 2003, Al Jazeera published a 
version of its Arabic site for its English-speaking audience (Azran 103). The English 
version of the website was created to give the American public an opportunity to hear 
about the events of the Iraq War from the “enemy’s” perspective—from those on the 
receiving end of the smart bombs and missiles often lauded in mainstream American 
news (103). Such a move was unprecedented—never before had American audiences had 
easy access to news reports and accounts from the opposing side of the war. Access to a 
translated news source such as ​aljazeera.net ​meant that American citizens could compare 
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accounts of the war as they were represented and interpreted through both American and 
Arab perspectives. 
However, many Western audiences—including Americans—found 
aljazeera.net​’s content helpful in understanding the war from the other side—the side 
often demonized in prowar statements released by the American government and often 
fueled by vindication of the September 11 deaths rather than for liberation of those 
suffering under tyranny. Besides being an alternative to mainstream media in that it is an 
English version of an Arabic news source, Al Jazeera’s role as an antiwar, and even 
anti-American, news source that relayed a different narrative than that of the American 
government capitalized on providing another version of the facts, appealing to American 
citizens’ sense of logos as well as through an appeal to ethos, as Middle Eastern reporters 
were living in the war zone and experiencing the reality of combat firsthand. These 
logos- and ethos-based accounts bothered President Bush to the point that he considered 
bombing its headquarters during the Iraq War due to its perceived threat as a 
propagandist outlet for Bin-laden. However, British Prime Minister Tony Blair dissuaded 
Bush from doing so (Ayish 132). It is apparent that Bush understood the power an 
alternative news source had and the potential ramifications of the sway on American 
citizens of the countercollective. 
The controversial news source was not the only clue that American citizens joined 
millions of other individuals worldwide in questioning the Bush administration’s decision 
to go to war in Iraq. In fact, domestic unrest and criticism of the war began even earlier 
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than Al Jazeera’s initial recognition in the United States. Analyzing the now-defunct 
Worldwatch Institute's website, Yahya R. Kamalipour notes how the language of war 
begins permeating throughout collective consciousness well before the first military boots 
hit the ground (96). Likewise, antiwar language permeates the collective consciousness as 
well, though it may struggle to be heard. The February 15, 2003 protest demonstrated the 
extent of civil rejection of the notion that the war in Iraq was necessary, fruitful, or even 
justified. Protests took place across the nation (as well as the globe), ranging from small 
neighborhood endeavors to takeovers of large urban centers in what turned out to be the 
largest protest movement seen on American soil since the Vietnam War era (Verhulst 1). 
Like the other notable voices of the countercollective, those associated with the February 
Protest relied on a rhetorical strategy that mirrored the antiwar collective’s dissatisfaction 
with the prowar agenda’s overreliance on pathos and minimization of logos.   16
The sheer number of coordinated players involved in organizing the February 
Protest suggests a strength in participants’ ēthē that is compounded as other groups and 
organizations participate side-by-side. Lobby and advocacy groups as well-established 
and notorious as the National Organization for Women (NOW), and as newly emerging 
as MoveOn.org, partnered together under the umbrella advocacy groups ANSWER (Act 
Now to Stop War and End Racism) and United for Peace and Justice in the wake of 
16 ​Multiple protests took place both domestically and internationally in response to the United States’ 
decision to declare war on Iraq. The scope of this dissertation cites only the domestic protest of February 
15, 2003 for rhetorical analysis, as it was this protest that was most coordinated across several cities in the 
US When referring to this particular American protest, I use the singular “February Protest” nomenclature, 
though there were in fact several antiwar protests over a longer period of time, both within and without the 
United States.  
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increased political and social tension following the September 11 terrorist attacks and its 
fallout both domestically and internationally (Verhulst 10). As fifty advocacy groups 
collaborated to coordinate and produce the February Protest, potential citizen-participants 
of the countercollective recognized the power of fifty ēthē combined, and the persuasive 
sway of such a monumental collective ethos convinced an estimated 2,500,000 American 
citizens to protest the Iraq War on that designated day (10, 17). Much of the coordination 
efforts took place online through advocacy groups’ websites, email chains, and online 
news outlets. Often groups would speak of one another and provide hyperlinks to the 
websites of other antiwar coalition members (Verhulst 13). As electronic communication 
protesting the war spread across the nation, it continued garnering support from citizens 
who banded together with international protestors, suggesting a powerful distinction 
between the collective ēthē of the antiwar movement and the ethos of the Bush 
administration: while the prowar effort appeared to have few supporters, the 
countercollective appeared to grow daily (11). The resulting ethos that this 
countercollective boasted sharply contrasted the lack of ethos behind the limited support 
for war both at home and abroad.  
The Medium and The Public 
The online public sphere, in addition to hosting the collective that has 
traditionally had access to mainstream media, now also hosts the countercollective on a 
scale much more encompassing and public than in years past, promising an increased 
potential for viewpoints that run counter to the most popular to be expressed, heard, and 
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even taken seriously, especially as forms of alternative media grow in readership: “The 
participatory nature and the focus on democratic process characteristic of alternative 
media provide additional means for proactive resistance” (Fontes 159). Proactive 
resistance, then, lends itself to the creation of a new social organization that revolves 
around competing voices and viewpoints often encountered on websites where citizens 
routinely read, discuss, and share with others their thoughts on the political climate of the 
nation (and even the rest of the world), as well as engage in conversations that reflect, 
and ultimately shape, American culture. The public sphere is not so much a Habermasean 
parlor where educated, wealthy men discuss the merits of the political, economic, and 
cultural structure of the country; it is now a digital, virtual environment wherein all 
manner of citizens (and even non-citizens) can debate amongst themselves those same 
merits with people they would probably never encounter in a non-digital space. Because 
the space of the parlor has taken up residency inside the Internet and is now housed on 
millions of websites worldwide, so too has the conversation of the public sphere shifted. 
The conversations and debates now take the multimodal forms of text, video, imagery, 
and sound. Even memes can act as rhetorically strategic agents that compel people to take 
part in discussion. While the term “democratic” is never totally appropriate for 
Internet-fueled conversation and while not all voices will be given equal credence in the 
virtual public sphere, the flexibility and increasing access of this potential for an enlarged 
public dialogue can at least be considered a positive advancement toward a more 
equitable public sphere—one where those who never would have been physically 
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included in Habermas’s parlors can now engage in virtual domains (Hauser 20; Rahman 
and Ramaprasad 73). If the Greek demos cannot feasibly be replicated in modern culture, 
at least the idea that culture is closer now to that type of potential than it has been since 
industrialization holds the promise of inviting more citizens into political debate and 
social conversation. 
However, hosting an array of value systems and ideological stances is not the sole 
reason the countercollective sphere exists online—a sense of unease and mistrust of the 
collective’s mainstream media contributes to the rise of the countercollective’s virtual 
presence. In his study of public use of mass media, Tal Azran posits that the differences 
of belief and opinions created room for mistrust of the collective, encouraging those who 
were already skeptical of the mainstream media to propagate their feelings toward it 
while inviting others to consider the same. Azran notes that such news consumers are 
highly selective and share a pattern of comparing news stories from various sources both 
via television and the Internet, though their information diet from the Internet outweighs 
that from television (104). He suggests that mistrust of mainstream media is likely the 
most prominent determining factor in the number of increased Internet news sources 
(106). In all its previous forms, the public sphere in America has never been so friendly 
to the skepticism and information sharing that it now is, largely due to the nature of the 
Internet. Such countercollective skepticism shows up on the Internet in alternative media 
sites that offer a key advantage over mainstream media: “it has been argued powerful 
social institutions (particularly corporations) control mainstream media that seek to 
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reinforce elite hegemony and hierarchical social relationships...In contrast, alternative 
media are structured” to disrupt that pattern by privileging the underrepresented voices 
(107). Because both the collective and countercollective are necessary for the closet 
depiction to the truth that can exist, Americans’ relatively new habit of comparing 
mainstream and alternative media accounts of news stories suggests a national trend 
toward hunting for the “complete picture” rather than trusting a one-sided account, and 
Al Jazeera became one primary outlet for completing this picture during the Iraq War 
(112). 
Citizens can find nearly countless sites that deal with a host of political opinions 
with even the most cursory online search. Though the wide spectrum of various, even 
competing, sources represent fragments of the larger society and suggest a disintegration 
of collectivism, they actually work to suggest just the opposite. Websites as different as 
VICE News and Fox News may imply that the United States is a hodgepodge of 
disagreeing citizens, but it is actually more collectivist than during previous eras and is 
much more unified than it may have been had not electronic technology—particularly the 
Internet—intervened. Rather than being handed some generalized account of events with 
which everyone is expected to agree, citizens can now find others who share their 
ideological views and connect with them, and then pursue the actions they find most 
appropriate with other citizens. Without such mass mediated connections, citizens would 
be prompted to accept the official, government-backed interpretation of events, and 
public dialogue of dissent would be relegated to the margins of society, and the potential 
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for a countercollective formation would be much more unlikely. Now, the possibility of 
finding one’s collective, no matter how far from mainstream public opinion that tribe 
stands, continues to grow as the Internet becomes the go-to medium for news and 
political information—and at the cost of older, more traditional media such as the 
newspaper and television (Dizard, Jr. 1). However, the new medium of the Internet 
should not be seen as a competitor of the older media, as it is rather an extension of older 
media’s affordances. 
The Iraq War expanded the technological affordances of wartime reporting that 
were pioneered during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars. Showing ​and ​telling citizens what 
was happening on the warfront meant a play on multiple senses simultaneously. 
Specifically, the Internet combined the visual and auditory depictions of combat and the 
pressing urgency of real time, around-the-clock updates with the ability for citizens to 
respond both synchronously and asynchronously. The style of participation with mass 
mediated communication altered Marshall McLuhan’s “hot and cold” theory as to what 
engages citizens in the creation of tribalization, or consubstantial collectivization:  
 
The rise of Web-based media outlets has called into question the viability and 
relevance of traditional linear and inverted-pyramid styles of news reporting in a 
new, visually rich, interactive communication environment where the audience 
itself can participate...While the conventional paradigm governing the relationship 
between mass media and audience was characterized by minimal audience control 
over a one-way communication process, the new Web-based communication 
environment has empowered users to engage in information selection and search 
from a wide range of multimedia elements converging into a single operational 
platform. (Ayish 128) 
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The mainstream and alternative media outlets popular during the Iraq War demonstrated 
both the inversion of traditional media power structures by granting individuals more 
control of the content discussed in the news, as well as encouraged higher participation in 
selecting content from an ever-increasing number of online sources. The term “new 
media” has embodied multiple definitions, often overlapping to some degree, but most 
often used in reference to the Internet and its capacity for hyperlinking, hosting audio and 
visual content mixed with print text, and both synchronous and asynchronous 
communication. Ralph D. Berenger offers a checklist of characteristics that capture well 
the traits which set “new media'' apart from “old media”; new media is convergent, 
ubiquitous, agenda-setting, credible, interactive, and transferrable (26-28). If new media 
needs its own definition to separate it from old media, then it also requires a new 
approach in terms of its hot-cool designation. 
 McLuhan argued that the cooler the media, the more audience participation is 
required (​Understanding Media​ 39). Because it was characterized by more participation 
and direct citizen-to-citizen interaction in wartime, the Internet thus became a cooler 
medium than the preceding technology of the radio. Increased participation and access to 
public multilogue encourages the formation of multiple collectives of like-minded 
members who can find one another in virtual space, can band together, and can decide 
what action their collective or countercollective wants to take in a matter. These types of 
activities, which were not afforded by the radio, inherently demand interaction and 
engagement on the part of the technology users. Even locating such websites requires that 
182 
 
individuals participate in such a way that makes the Internet a cool medium. The more 
audience participation that is required, the more important it is for citizens to supply their 
own understanding of events and people—their own understanding of the context, 
message, rhetor, and purpose. The more of a rhetorical understanding of any given 
situation they create on their own, the more likely they are to seek out those who share 
their ideas. This rhetorical analysis and consubstantial identification thus creates camps 
who have, to some degree, created a shared (virtual) reality that could look very different 
from the other camp’s agreed-upon shared reality, which is itself hosted on various 
websites within the same virtual space. In essence, collective and countercollective 
participants are actively ​creating​ a rhetorical reality and are increasingly being prompted 
to do so as the technology becomes cooler. Thus, it is not just the Burkean identity that 
sets collectives and countercollectives apart, or even brings them together—it is also the 
media itself, and how it is employed by a collective or countercollective’s members. The 
cooler the medium—the more interaction that is required from citizens—the more 
citizens search out those with whom they identify, and with the affordances of online 
communication, the more they are able, and thus likely, to participate in reality-building 
with one another.  
However, with the chance to create reality came the chance to create a fictitious 
reality that attracted those who already wanted to buy into it, whether or not it was 
truthful or logical. Choosing a version of news—and thus, of reality—is an affordance of 
cool media that actually works against its coolness. The drawback of an expanded 
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(virtual) public sphere wherein users can create content (and thus, reality) at will is that 
news consumers may only pay attention to those sources which strengthen and reinforce 
their own liking, leaving as little room for critical questioning as possible. Choosing 
one’s own version of reality is much like putting on blinders that block out those 
viewpoints different from one’s own, thereby escalating the degree of collectivism or 
countercollectivism they feel with other like-minded citizens, but also limiting the 
conversations across collectives and countercollectives. Such a rhetorical move makes a 
medium hotter, as users are not critically participating and creating so much as 
uncritically consuming. If a plethora of available sources exist and news consumers can 
identify which sources are most similar to their own viewpoints, they are reinforcing 
likelihood of exposure to the Rashomon effect, “a widely recognized English term 
referring to significantly different perspectives of the same dramatic event by different 
eyewitnesses” (Blair et al. 1). Gladney points out the Rashomon effect affects 
individuals, but also larger scales of people—including news organizations and even 
entire nations. Based on one’s rhetorical identity (Burkean—us vs. them), we can expect 
an individual to participate in a collective or countercollective Rashomon effect, sharing 
the same interpretation as those with whom (s)he identifies. One’s understanding and 
interpretation of war is both affected by and affects his or her identity, which is 
rhetorical. Media serve as shapers and reinforcers of both identity and the Rashomon 
effect and encourage collectivism. Since World War II, citizens’ access to a plethora of 
news sources with various interpretations of news events has steadily increased with 
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technological advancements. As concrete evidence of the powers of consubstantial 
identification and the use of technology to further their own understanding of reality, 
consider the very different news accounts aired during the Iraq War. Arab and European 
news showed horrific images of the Iraq War, while American news showed more 
sanitized versions of reality, focusing on soldiers as liberating a dominated and oppressed 
people. The media worked in tandem with the government to create a version of reality 
the citizenry bought into, possibly unknowingly. Those who suspected something 
different than what was shown on newscasts created another domestic camp: those who 
opposed the war and looked to outside sources for news. They were, in a sense, siding 
with those nations with whom America stood opposed because they saw the victimization 
of Middle Eastern citizens at the hands of the American military that most US citizens 
did not see if they were only paying attention to prowar national news.  
Even if citizens went out of their way to ensure they were exposing themselves to 
multiple news sources and viewpoints, sources were not always transparent about their 
ideological stances. Then, even if ideological affiliation was made clear, certain online 
users may not have had an equal opportunity to participate in the discussion due to forum 
rules and expectations, or even because they could not afford a membership to a 
particular site, thus being relegated to the role of observer only rather than active 
participant. Additionally, sites owned or operated by media conglomerates could limit 
discussion by not even allowing an opportunity for site users to leave feedback on articles 
or postings, to create their own discussion forum topics, or to even know about other 
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users of the site. Moreover, a media conglomerate could own or operate a site while 
concealing their identity as owners; in turn, users may have thought they were 
participating in a publicly created and run forum that was in fact inherently and 
clandestinely biased. Limitations such as these suggest that even if a medium is 
somewhat cool, that does not guarantee access or a critical understanding of media use on 
part of the consumer, and thus the ideals of the collective or countercollective can 
become muddied. 
The coolness of the Internet rested in its affordances to host multiple competing 
spheres, but it could have been much cooler if all content had been equally accessible and 
equitably understood by all users. While the Internet provided increased technological 
and (virtual) social capacity for the formations of multiple public spheres cooperating and 
competing under the umbrella of American civil society, the medium itself still posed 
risks that mitigated its strengths as a more democratic option for public deliberation on 
any matter, including politics. Just as Gerald Hauser notes how the 1920s saw an increase 
in public communication to the point of information overload so too did the Internet 
present citizens with such a multitude of options for news sources that it is unreasonable 
and impractical to assume that any one layperson was ever completely up-to-date on 
political goings-on or possessed the technical knowledge needed to comprehend the 
matters that affected citizens and should have thus been a discussion item within the 
public sphere (25). As a result, many citizens who could not keep pace with the 
specialized political information—as well as the sorting through the biases of news 
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sources—often became passive consumers of “news” rather than critical thinkers who 
participate in public forum discussions, thereby increasing the temperature of the medium 
as it told audiences what to think and believe. It was easier to digest summaries of current 
events from lobbies and other biased sources, but this overreliance on the compacted 
forms of news came at the cost of a truly egalitarian democracy “in which the strongest 
ideas carry the day” (29). Moreover, the bias of any particular online source would have 
been difficult to determine, as the cognitive energy necessary to analyze sources often 
proves too time-consuming for most citizens. Biased news, then, may have become the 
main information diet of most Internet consumers and even other news sources who look 
to inherently biased sources for their own research, creating a feedback loop of suspect 
“news" (Rahman and Ramaprasad 77-78). Even if bias could have been detected and 
citizens made aware of it, they may have still preferred to rely on it as a means of 
minimizing not only the output of cognitive energy, but also as a means of minimizing 
cognitive dissonance (Stroud and Muddiman 10). 
The Internet, then, was not as cool as television, wherein citizens often had to 
supply their own analysis of events and consider context as they made their judgements 
about what they had seen. The Internet was also not as hot as the radio, which allowed for 
minimal citizen-to-citizen interaction and conversation. Thus, to situate the Internet 
within McLuhan’s hot-cool theory requires a slight modification: rather than occupying 
one polar end of a dichotomy, the Internet is better understood as occupying a position on 
the middle of a temperature spectrum, as its blend of multiple affordances and constraints 
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makes it more lukewarm than either hot or cool. Its lukewarm nature became evident 
during the Iraq War as citizens engaged with one another frequently, and in ways never 
before exercised during wartime, yet the limitations they (unknowingly) faced created 
multiple realities that spread through competing collectives virtually unchecked. The 
future of wartime news and media invites the public to participate but also suggests a 
future of competing realities, and thus, competing collectives. If use of the Internet during 
the Iraq War suggests anything, it suggests that the American public can expect to see an 
increase in the strength and number of countercollective. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Socially, it is the accumulation of group pressures and irritations that prompt 
invention and innovation as counter-irritants. War and the fear of war have always 
been considered the main incentives to technological extensions of our bodies. 
                                         Marshall McLuhan, ​Understanding Media​ 69 
 
 
Across World War II, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War, 
American citizens gained more technological affordances that granted them opportunities 
to both interact with and create widely distributed messages concerning military 
involvement and citizen support or protest of hot wars. With technological advancements 
came an expanded public multilogue wherein a greater percentage of average citizens 
could learn of others’ war stances and create collectives with those who shared similar 
perspectives, thereby producing consubstantial identification within the collectives. 
While the affordances granted to collectives may not have been rhetorically analyzed to 
much extent during the peak of their use in wartime, a historical analysis of how rhetors, 
whether individuals or groups, used electronic media and styled their electronically 
mediated messages suggests strategies that could prove useful in future instances of mass 
mediated communication, whether in wartime or otherwise. 
Identifying rhetorical strategies helps us see forward rather than only backward.  
Marshall McLuhan argued that we always understand technology’s impact by looking  
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through the rearview mirror, but this dissertation argues that we can identify how certain 
rhetorical appeals affect people based on what sensory affordances that technology offers 
and predict how those affordances will most likely influence society as a whole during 
wartime (​The Medium ​75). Rather than wait to look backward only once a newer 
technology has appeared, we can understand the present better and maybe even prepare 
for future social movements or attitudes by thinking about how the senses respond to 
technology. We can use public response to mass mediated wartime rhetoric to engage 
technology, and one another, in future moments of war, national crisis, or other moments 
that call upon the public at large to act. 
This type of information can serve individuals representing an array of personal 
and professional interests: media and technology companies with how they reach 
consumers; political campaigners with their appeals to voters’ sense of ethos, pathos, and 
logos; citizens with how they communicate with one another as they debate the merits of 
a political stance; collectives of citizens as they assess similarities and differences 
amongst themselves in larger civil actions. If a person can, for example, predict that 
citizens will respond to pathos more if they can visually see an argument rather than only 
hear it, then (s)he knows when to tap into certain styles of argument, and when not to. If 
one has a fifteen-second radio commercial, the present study suggests that (s)he should 
aim to appeal to ethos rather than pathos. If one is producing an Internet ad, (s)he might 
aim for pathos, especially on video-like platforms where both sound and image are 
expected. However, when working with sites that are more visually-oriented and thus 
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where people might keep sound off, such as Facebook or Twitter, then ethos may be 
more useful, especially as such platforms can capitalize on the ethos of its posters, as in 
the case of celebrity users. This rearview mirror study of how media have rhetorically 
worked in the past can thus serve to inform how to strategically prepare rhetorical 
messages for the future, by knowing in advance the likely outcome such messages will 
have on the citizenry. 
The stakes for content producers are just as important for content consumers. If a 
consumer can understand how a message affects him or her and why, that analysis can 
help the consumer identify weak spots in an argument (s)he may have otherwise missed. 
For example, if a television viewer turns off the sound of an ASPCA commercial 
featuring the song “Angel” performed by Sarah McLachlan, (s)he will not hear the 
melancholic sound or the disturbing facts about animal abuse, though (s)he will still see 
the images of suffering animals. However, by eliminating one of the sensory affordances 
of the television, (s)he may not be as heavily affected as (s)he would have been with the 
sound on and with multiple senses intertwining to produce an amplified response to an 
amplified message. To the average citizen, such rhetorical and strategic use of 
technological affordances may seem like a trick to induce subliminal responses, but such 
strategies can be understood if citizens use the rearview mirror, so to speak, to prepare for 
and predict the future uses of mass mediated messages and the ways they attempt to draw 
in citizens whether or not the latter is even aware. Critical awareness of these strategies is 
key for citizens to be informed consumers, voters, and creators.  
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The current study is a historical appraisal of how rhetorical strategies affected a 
large body of very diverse people over the course of four American hot wars. By nature, 
this dissertation’s methodology is based on correlation rather than causation. Because not 
many extant studies exist from these four time periods that asked citizens specifically 
about connections they experienced between rhetorical argumentation and political belief, 
much of this previous five chapters’ material is inherently informed and researched, but 
still an overview. The rhetorical trends, however, are there: citizens have consistently 
increased their pro- and antiwar activities and collective and countercollective formations 
throughout the decades since World War II; American society is constantly moving 
toward more citizen participation via electronic media, not less. This means that the 
aurality of radio will most likely never reign as it did in the 1940s—too many individuals 
now have that same type of reach and public platform as only a few did back then. There 
is also a higher expectation of sensory involvement in political messages because of 
citizens’ exposure to increasingly sophisticated technology. Radio advertisements for a 
political candidate might help his or her cause, but television and Internet advertisements 
with both sound ​and​ image are more likely to leave a longer lasting impression on 
citizens. 
The parameters of the current study are limited, in some ways, by the qualitative 
nature of rhetorical analysis and its basis in understanding the psychological influence on 
a historical population. Moreover, there are limited surveys, polls, and studies taken of 
public response to mass mediated messages during the four wartime periods under 
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investigation. This dissertation is focused on only the United States and its history of 
technology use during specific moments. The same methodology of historical rhetorical 
analysis may not prove as useful when applied to other nations where access to 
technology for reasons like economy or government control of media color citizens' use 
of mass media. Such methodology may also prove less effective when analyzing how 
citizens respond to mass mediated messages in nations where government structures are 
far removed from the republic nature of the United States. 
Across the four wars discussed in this dissertation, the formation and activities of 
collectivism and countercollectivism consistently increased, with the latter group seeing 
particular growth and becoming more accepted as a participant in public discourse during 
wartime. Burkean rhetorical theory suggests that this is the case because citizens share 
feelings of consubstantial identification with one another. However, the ability to locate 
others with whom one might identify was severely limited during World War II, when 
only a small segment of society—notably, prowar figures often representing the 
government—had access to public mass media technologies. Average citizens, then, were 
more or less relegated to the role of consumer. This role was possibly more passive than 
active because citizens were hearing carefully crafted rhetorical messages that were 
designed specifically to sway listeners and because contradictory messages via the mass 
communication medium were rare. However, as Father Coughlin demonstrated, those 
with opposing viewpoints were heard, though in much more limited fashion and 
constantly facing the threat of being sanctioned or taken off the air completely. 
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The average citizen had increased opportunity to become more active as a critical 
viewer during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, when television provided both audio and 
visual and when the actions of citizens, both soldiers and protestors alike, were filmed 
and shared publicly. While the government did not own or control television networks in 
the same way it did the radio during World War II, most Americans still had little power 
to control what was shared on television, relying on extreme “newsworthy” events to be 
recorded and broadcast. Though arguably a small change in audience participation, the 
ability for non-collective, antiwar citizens to express countercollective viewpoints to a 
national audience illustrated the power of technology to provide a higher degree of 
democratic involvement and public response to war activities. The debate as to how much 
public opinion and television are to blame for the outcome of the Vietnam War remains 
to be settled, though popular opinion suggests that television most definitely posed a risk 
to the military successes of the prowar collective. 
The Iraq War, more so than any previous American war, demonstrated the risks 
associated with the collision of electronic technology and the public sphere. Travis N. 
Ridout notes that partisan news sources took hold of the nation as traditional print news 
declined, and as a result, Americans have been able to selectively attend to media sources 
that most align with their individual political ideologies—a selection citizens make easily 
by choosing to only visit particular websites (1). However, the invention of the Internet 
and its accessibility at the household level is not solely to blame for biased news 
consumption. He notes that although electronic media in the form of televised news 
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existed during wartime during the Vietnam War era, it was not until the Gulf War of 
1991 that news coverage of war presented a partisan dilemma to the American public. He 
argues that the nature of televised news shifted in the 1980s “toward a more interpretive 
style of reporting” that lent itself toward partisan politics at the expense of objective 
reporting (1). The dilemma the public faced, then, was what to do in light of differing 
accounts of the same political situations and even war.  
Marshall McLuhan may not have lived to see the role the Internet would play 
during the Iraq War of 2003-2011 or even the shift that television made to expand the 
public sphere during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Nevertheless, he predicted the way 
citizens would respond as mass media technologies became increasingly sophisticated 
and more accessible to users. Specifically, he suggested that the differences in hot and 
cool media would not only affect citizens differently, but that as technologies became 
colder, people would become more actively involved in the construction of mediated 
messages (​Understanding Media​ 39-40). He also predicted that any technology’s impact 
on the human psyche would be difficult to interpret until it was replaced with an even 
newer form of technology (564). Just as a fish does not realize it is surrounded by water, 
people do not always see the way the media shapes them or the way they shape it. Yet, 
his theories must be expanded upon to accommodate the way technology has continued 
influencing individuals and society at large. 
McLuhan differentiated between hot and cool media, but did not account for the 
way the Internet would encompass both. Hot media are those forms of communication 
195 
 
that do not require much engagement from the listener/viewer/user; cool media require 
more engagement (​Understanding Media​ 39). McLuhan noted the radio as a hot medium, 
and the television as a cool medium, yet the Internet contains both sound clips and visuals 
(both still images and moving images with sound). Such a combination mitigates both 
temperature extremes and produces a lukewarm medium—one characterized by traits of 
all the media it contains. When multiple forms of media interact and involve multiple 
senses, individuals move closer to experiencing synaesthesia, which results in the feeling 
that they are involved as participants in a situation. Although McLuhan argued that cool 
media would elicit more involvement, I contend that the synaesthesia produced by the 
lukewarm Internet elicits more because it is fuller, encompassing all previous forms of 
mass media. 
When sorting through resources online, individuals act as news consumers, 
choosing which links to click, which stories to read, which to ignore, and which to 
share—and thus which angle to adopt as reality. Because one can choose his or her 
collective and their agreed-upon version of reality and because there are an increasing 
number of versions of reality available because access to communication within and 
among collectives has increased with more accessible technology, there exists thus an 
increased number of battles vying for citizens' participation, asking them to choose which 
mediated context within which to participate. In short, more participatory technology 
such as the Internet offers a multitude of communities within which to participate, and 
more citizens today have access to such participation than ever before. It is common 
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sense, then, that the number of disagreements among collectives will increase as they 
both multiply in number and their interactions with one another. Their messages and 
rhetors are different, but it is through interaction—and especially through 
disagreements—with other collectives that each learns their own view of reality is 
different from another’s. What happens that may be hard for tribal members to spot is 
that their own camp is creating a unique version of the context, interpreting it through 
their own biased lens. If analyzed through a Burkean framework, identity with one 
necessarily separates a collective from another, though each collective will understand 
their reality as the truest. 
Yet, despite its immersive and interactive content delivery, the Internet poses a 
serious problem for the existence of an objective, rational public sphere. Tal Azran notes 
that Western-based alternative media organizations originated from the recognition that 
the mainstream media are restricted or controlled by a concentrated number of agents or 
corporations that hold a similar socio-political ideology” and while countercollective 
sources are certainly not immune from bias, they nonetheless serve as a counterbalance of 
viewpoints to the mainstream media often projected through a two-party lens as is 
popular in the United States (107). However, this counterbalancing role may not be as 
effective as one would hope. Natalie Jomini Stroud and Ashley Muddiman point out that 
selective exposure to news based along party affiliation or other ideological positions 
prevents citizens from encountering information that runs counter to their own beliefs, 
and that as a result, many American citizens have surrounded themselves with a bubble 
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of likeminded news sources in an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance (10). When one 
has the option to choose which version of mediated reality (s)he wants to watch, hear, 
and internalize, (s)he creates a one-sided version of the war. This can be great for 
strengthening identity with others in the same collective, but it can also lead to increased 
tension and more numerous, prolonged wars among collectives. This could suggest that 
cool media like the Internet, where much participation is required of the audience, can 
actually cause more wars. Maybe not all of them will be hot wars that involve formal, 
government-sanctioned declarations of war, but division within communities and nations, 
and between nations, will increase, as will the number of camps or factions. People will 
have the ability, via the technology, to seek out those who are like-minded on nearly 
every debate and can thus constantly regroup themselves with their collectives as the 
issues and their own perspectives shift. Additionally, sophisticated algorithms have 
already been employed by corporations, businesses, and social media sites that 
strategically suggest or otherwise make readily available connections to those people 
with whom they most identify, thereby increasing a limited, focused, and likeminded 
experience online (Tufecki). 
The rhetorical strategies used to create collectives and countercollectives during 
hot wars, if understood critically, can explain how these collectives form, operate, and 
expand—or even disband—during other events and in other arenas. Consumerism’s 
reliance on mass media technologies to persuade potential buyers has long capitalized on 
rhetorical appeals to sell a host of products and will undoubtedly continue to do so. With 
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economic uncertainty following natural disasters, political upheavals, global pandemics, 
and other catastrophic events, the economic sector relies on rhetoric to keep businesses 
afloat and to encourage citizens to continue acting as consumers. A historical rhetorical 
analysis of how companies appeal to consumers and encourage spending, especially in 
the midst of an economic bear market, would be useful in alleviating sustained periods of 
financial depression. 
An additional area of focus that would benefit from a similar approach as the 
current study would be age-based examinations of voter registration. As the large 
segment of society’s baby boomer generation passes away, the younger electorate will 
begin carrying an increasing percentage of voters. Studying age-specific domains of the 
population could reveal to campaigners what rhetorical appeals and strategies, including 
which technological vehicles, appeal most to certain age brackets.  
Alongside citizen groups whose response to rhetorical appeals can be observed 
and studied are also those who are underrepresented or marginalized. Those without 
access to mass media communication technologies, those who are illiterate (whether in 
regards to reading or technology), and those who are by law unable to participate in 
social activities, such as the incarcerated and physically or mentally disabled, also 
suggest an area of focus that would be productive for future study of rhetorical appeals. 
While consumerism and political participation may or may not be a primary concern for 
such individuals, vital information regarding their own well-being or that of society 
would still be pertinent and would need to be shared. Consider, for example, a person 
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who can neither read nor write, and thus cannot easily search the Internet for information. 
In the midst of a global pandemic such as COVID-19, how does (s)he learn critical 
information about social distancing and other measures that should be taken to maintain 
his or her own health? How can local authorities and health officials create a message to 
reach such a person while being persuasive enough to this person so as to influence his or 
her behaviors?  
Electronically mass-mediated communications continue to influence American 
society’s interpretation of reality and response to situations ranging from hot war, to 
economic downturn, to global pandemics. While the nature and content of a message 
might look nothing like the messages rhetorically analyzed in this examination, the 
strategies used to influence Americans in years past are still as effective today. By 
approaching and interpreting these messages through a critical lens, message producers 
can more effectively persuade their audience and citizens can more effectively adopt or 
resist messages based on their own stance and understanding. In short, rhetorical analysis 
of electronically mass-mediated messages produces a more informed American citizenry. 
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